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ABSTRACT
In 2010, the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Vancouver (City) v Ward created a framework for a
Charter damages claim. In two subsequent decisions, the Court deviated from Ward by relying
extensively on private law principles to award public law damages. In doing so, the Court has created
increasingly troubling results. I review the history of Charter damages and the Court’s relevant Charter
and private law damages jurisprudence, with a particular focus on factors like fault thresholds, immunities,
and direct liability of government. I find that Ward provides an appropriate and just remedy in accordance
with a purposive approach to Charter remedies, the interest-balancing approach in the Charter text and
jurisprudence, and the well-established objectives of Charter remedies. Understanding Charter damages
in this way limits the role for private law principles. The future development of Charter damages doctrine
ought to be guided by Charter principles first.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2010, the Supreme Court of Canada’s unanimous decision in Vancouver (City) v Ward1 set out a
framework for a constitutional damages claim under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.2 In subsequent decisions, the Court has disagreed sharply over how to apply Ward – first with a
4-2 decision in Henry v British Columbia,3 then a 4-4-1 decision in Ernst v Alberta Energy Regulator.4
The disagreement, it seems, is not simply over how to apply Ward, but to what extent private law
principles should prevail in a claim for damages arising from a Charter infringement.
In my view, Henry and Ernst are disappointments. Both cases fall short in adequately distinguishing a
cause of action for damages under the Charter and similar causes of action based on private law against
government. This thesis attempts to explain the importance of that distinction for Charter damages.
Ward contains a sequential four-step framework for determining whether Charter damages are, in the
language of section 24(1), “appropriate and just in the circumstances.”5 The claimant must, at step one,
prove a breach of her Charter rights and, at step two, prove that damages would fulfill the function of
compensation, vindication, or deterrence. At step three, the government has the burden of raising
countervailing factors to prove that damages are not appropriate and just in the circumstances. At step
four, the court will determine the quantum of damages.6
The Ward framework produces Charter damages – a “unique public law remedy.”7 The Court developed
the Ward framework from the text of the Charter and the purposive approach to remedies described in
Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education).8 Charter damages are available to remedy the
infringement of any substantive right or freedom in the Charter.9 In line with section 32 of the Charter,
the Ward Court confirms that government is directly liable for Charter damages.10

1

Vancouver (City) v Ward, 2010 SCC 27 [Ward].
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, s 24(1), being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]
3
Henry v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 24 [Henry].
4
Ernst v Alberta Energy Regulator, 2017 SCC 1 [Ernst].
5
Charter, supra note 2, s 24(1).
6
Ward, supra note 1 at para 4.
7
Ibid at para 31.
8
Ibid at paras 16-21; Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 SCC 62 [Doucet-Boudreau].
9
See Ward, supra note 1 at para 23.
10
Ibid at para 22.
2
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Consistent with other Charter remedies, the Ward framework balances the interests of the injured claimant
against the interests of the government. The crux of the Ward framework is the balance of interests at
steps 2 and 3. The claimant is not entitled to Charter damages by merely proving a Charter infringement
at step 1, but must prove that Charter damages will fulfill the function of compensation, vindication, and
deterrence at step 2.11 Even if the claimant is successful, the government may raise countervailing factors
to negate a damages award at step 3.12 In other words, determining entitlement to Charter damages is not
based on a Charter infringement alone, but on whether the function of Charter damages outweighs the
policy factors against it.
The Ward Court regularly used the phrases ‘public law’ and ‘private law’ to distinguish the cause of
action for damages described in Ward from the causes of action for damages existing outside the
Charter.13 In Ward, ‘public law damages’ either refers to foreign constitutional damages doctrine or is
shorthand for Charter damages.14 Similarly, the phrase ‘private law damages’ in Ward either refers to
foreign private law generally or specific tort-based causes of action recognized in Canada.15 The Court
also used the phrase ‘tort law’ as a subset of private law, and always contrasted with public law.16 The
Court never used the phrase ‘constitutional tort’ to describe Charter damages in Ward, Henry, or Ernst,
and neither do I.17
The Court’s use of the phrase “private law” in Ward requires further definition. Private law is the general
law which applies to both private and public persons. In Canada, the government and its agents are liable
for all intentional torts as ordinary persons, as well as intentional torts that only apply to the state, such as
the tort of malicious prosecution and the tort of misfeasance in a public office.18 The government and its
agents are also liable for damages in the tort of negligence.19 These tort claims are diverse and separate,
each occupying its own body of jurisprudence distinct from each other and the Charter case. Nothing in
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Ward, supra note 1 at paras 25, 35.
Ibid at para 33.
13
See Ibid at para 22 (for public/private law damages) and para 43 (for public/private law defences).
14
See Ibid at paras 22, 27, 29 (references to international law) and paras 31, 41, 44, 56, 66, 69 (for Charter
damages).
15
Ibid at paras 22 and 53.
16
Ibid at para 36 (“Tort law and the Charter are distinct legal avenues”) and at paras 50-51.
17
This phrase is commonly used in the United States. It is derived from the Supreme Court of the United States’
holding in Monroe v Pape, which describes the cause of action for constitutional damage through 42 USC 1983 as
“read against the background of tort liability”. See Monroe v Pape, 365 US 167 (1961) at 187; 42 USC § 1983
(1871).
18
See Peter W Hogg, Patrick J Monahan & Wade K Wright, Liability of the Crown, 4th ed (Toronto: Carswell,
2011), 194-201 [Hogg et al, Liability of the Crown]; Miazga v Kvello Estate, 2009 SCC 51 [Miazga] (malicious
prosecution); and Odhavji Estate v Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69 [Odhavji] (misfeasance in a public office).
19
See generally Hogg et al, Liability of the Crown, supra note 18; Cooper v Hobart, 2001 SCC 79 [Cooper].
12
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this paper is a critique of private law and tort law claims for damages. My focus is how these private law
causes of action relate to the development of the Ward framework.
By contrast, public law can be defined as the law that applies exclusively and directly to the government.
The Charter is a prime example. By the time Ward was decided in 2010, the Charter was a firmly
entrenched, comprehensive area of Canadian constitutional law. Though drawing on several foreign cases
to develop the specifics, the Court placed the Ward framework within the text of section 24(1) and the
purposive approach to Charter remedies.20
However, the Court also held that private law principles may assist in the future development of the Ward
framework. For example, at step 3 of the Ward framework, the Court permits the government to raise
policy considerations from private law tort claims to negate the appropriateness and justness of Charter
damages.21 The ideal operation of this principle becomes a point of disagreement between the justices in
both Henry and Ernst. The divide in the Court is best explained through a brief review of each case
through the lens of the four-step Ward framework.
In Ward, the claimant was arrested and strip searched by police. At step 1, the claimant proved that the
strip search was conduced in contravention of the section 8 right against unreasonable search and seizure.
The Court found that the unreasonable strip search, which is inherently humiliating, fulfilled the
requirement for compensation, vindication, and deterrence at step 2.22 The Court did not accept the
government’s countervailing factor arguments at step 3, and therefore proceeded to step 4 to uphold the
trial judge’s $5000 Charter damages award for the strip-search. 23 This is the only example of a
paradigmatic application of the Ward framework at the Supreme Court of Canada.
Henry and Ernst both reached the Court on pre-trial motions which attacked the sufficiency of the
claimants’ Charter damages pleadings.
In Henry, the claimant was wrongfully convicted and spent 27 years in prison. After a whistleblower
alerted Henry to exculpatory evidence that was never disclosed during his trial, he obtained an acquittal
and sued the Crown prosecutor’s office.24 Given the compelling facts, Henry had a strong case for

20

Ward, supra note 1 at paras 16-22.
Ibid at para 43.
22
Ibid at paras 62-66.
23
Ibid at paras 68-73.
24
Henry, supra note 2 at paras 3-21, Moldaver J.
21
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proving, at step 1, that his section 7 right to make full answer and defence was infringed by the
prosecution’s failure to provide him with all relevant disclosure. Similarly, his pleadings raised a
substantial likelihood of success at step 2 to justify damages for compensation, vindication, or
deterrence.25 The government brought a motion to dismiss because the pleadings did not allege that the
prosecutor acted with malice – a private law principle made relevant to this case, it was argued, by
operation of step 3 of the Ward test.
The astute reader will know that a person in Henry’s position is not required to plead malice because his
burden ends, according the Ward framework, after proof a Charter infringement at step 1 and the
functional need for damages at step 2. Indeed, the concurring justices applied Ward in that manner and
would have permitted the matter to proceed to a trial where the government could negate a Charter
damages award at step 3 of the framework.26 The majority, however, took a different approach. The
majority shifted the government’s burden of negating Charter damages with private law thresholds to the
claimant’s burden to plead a private law threshold at step 1.27 This holding transformed Ward, or at least
provided a precedent for how to transform Ward.28 It changed the trigger for liability from an interestbalancing approach to a fault-based approach. In broader terms, it replaced the public law approach to
Charter damages with a private law approach.
In Ernst, a similar phenomenon occurs. The claimant was engaged in an administrative proceeding before
the Alberta Energy Regulator (the “Board”) involving the negative effect of hydraulic fracturing (or
fracking) on her drinking water.29 During the course of her litigation, she publicly criticized the Board in
the media.30 In her Charter damages claim, Ernst alleged that the Board refused to respond to her claims
unless she desisted from criticizing it in the media.31 Ernst alleged these facts to prove, at step 1 of the
Ward framework, that the Board infringed her section 2(b) guarantee to freedom of expression through
suppressing her criticisms. This claim alleged, at step 2 of the Ward framework, the need for vindication
of her right to engage in political speech.32 The Board brought a motion to dismiss the claim.
As in Henry, the Court only needed to consider whether the claimant’s pleadings sufficiently alleged facts
that could prove step 1 and 2, and in this case, that those allegations could circumvent the statutory
25

Henry, supra note 2 at para 81, Moldaver J; Henry, supra note 2 at para 138, McLachlin CJC and Karakatsanis J.
Henry, supra note 2 at para 108, McLachlin CJC and Karakatsanis J.
27
Henry, supra note 2 at para 85, Moldaver J.
28
Ibid at 33.
29
Ernst, supra note 4 at paras 139-140, McLachlin CJC, Moldaver and Brown JJ.
30
Ibid at paras 141-144.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid at para 158.
26

5

immunity clause.33 The Court’s divided opinion was fractured over the same reason in Henry – whether
the policy considerations in step 3 of the Ward test were applicable on a motion against the claimant’s
pleadings. Four justices led by Justice Cromwell (joined in the outcome by the concurring opinion of
Justice Abella) held that the policy considerations engaged at step 3, namely the quasi-judicial role of the
Board as an administrative tribunal, leads to the conclusion that Charter damages would never be
appropriate and just against an administrative agency, and therefore dismissed the claim.34 Four dissenting
justices led by Justice McLachlin would have applied Ward and permitted the claim to proceed.35
All three of these cases will be examined in detail below. For now, it is sufficient to observe that the Court
is entirely inconsistent on how the Ward framework ought to function. If the Ward framework provides
the rules of the game, so to speak, the minority opinions in Henry and Ernst which faithfully apply Ward
would use step 3 to potentially end the game, while the prevailing opinions in Henry and Ernst use step 3
to change the rules partway through. The latter is troubling because it places substantial uncertainty in the
law. The approach taken in Henry and Ernst asks Charter damages claimants to shadowbox against
potential private law policy considerations which may or may not emerge at step 3 of the test. More
importantly, the approach taken in the latter two cases does not produce “appropriate and just” 36
outcomes.
A substantial part of this thesis is dedicated to explaining how and why the prevailing opinions in Henry
and Ernst justify their departure from the Ward framework. The answer, I argue, is a failure to recognize
the remedy in Ward for what it is – a “unique public law remedy”37 which awards damages against
government based on well-established grounds in the Charter’s remedial jurisprudence.
There is an understandable temptation to emphasize the ‘damages’ in Charter damages, and therein
characterize the Ward framework as an incomplete structure requiring the tutelage of time-tested private
law damages claims to develop legitimacy.38 But Ward, by its own terms, is not first and foremost a
damages remedy. The Ward Court emphasized the ‘Charter’ in Charter damages by situating Ward within
the purposive approach to 24(1) remedies, employing an interest-balancing approach consistent with the
33

Ibid at para 166. The issue on appeal was whether the statutory immunity clause was constitutional. However, the
Court’s three opinions also addressed, to varying degrees, the question appealed to the Alberta Court of Appeal –
whether the statutory immunity barred a Charter damages claim. See ibid, Cromwell J, at para 13.
34
Ernst, supra note 4 at para 24, Cromwell J.
35
Ibid at para 192, McLachlin CJC, Moldaver and Brown JJ.
36
Charter, supra note 2, s 24.
37
Ward, supra note 1 at para 31.
38
I borrow this turn of phrase from an American author. See Christina Brooks Whitman, “Emphasizing the
Constitutional in Constitutional Torts” (1996) 72 Chi-Kent L Rev 661.
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Charter text and jurisprudence, and promoting the well-established objectives of Charter remedies:
compensation, vindication, and deterrence. Understanding the relationship between Charter damages and
other Charter remedies is essential to seeing the Ward framework as a consistent and legitimate method
for awarding Charter damages against government.
Part I of this paper is this introduction.
In Part II, I review the Charter damages scholarship and jurisprudence from the enactment of the Charter
in 1982 through to the Ward decision in 2010. In this time period, the Court focused on secondary
questions like immunity and jurisdiction prior to the primary question: determining when damages are an
“appropriate and just” remedy. I also explore several Charter and private law cases that reappear in the
Charter damages jurisprudence through step 3 of the Ward framework.
In Part III, I break down the three Supreme Court cases about Charter damages to date - Ward, Henry, and
Ernst. I begin by discussing how Ward addressed and resolved many of the exigent questions from the
past twenty years of speculation. I then analyze how Henry and Ernst deviate from Ward, with particular
attention paid to how and why the majority in Henry and plurality in Ernst invoke private law principles.
In Part IV, I demonstrate how the Ward framework is consistent with the broader Charter remedial
jurisprudence. I review Kent Roach’s comprehensive work on constitutional remedies and extend it to
argue that Ward ought to rely primarily on public law for its future development. Ward fits comfortably
among other Charter remedies and draws its legitimacy from the textual structure of the Charter,
commitment to a purposive approach to remedies, and its fairness to the defendant through interestbalancing.
In Part V, I focus on the Ward Court’s references to how private law can inform the development of
Charter damages in future cases. In particular, I review the comprehensive work done by Jason Varuhas
on how private law can define public law damages in the United Kingdom and extend it to the Charter.
The primary question in this section is which area of private law is the most helpful. I conclude that the
tort of negligence is inconsistent with Charter damages, but that intentional torts bear enough resemblance
to act as a guide to the development of Charter damages; although, ultimately, intentional torts are not
entirely consistent with an interest-balancing framework.

7

Part VI concludes that Ward is what it says it is - a “unique public law remedy.”39 I return to the three
primary points raised in this introduction: appreciating Ward as a Charter remedy consistent with other
Charter remedies; understanding how private law can help and hurt Charter damages; and assessing the
untapped significance of direct liability in developing the Ward framework in future cases.

39

Ward, supra note 1 at para 31.
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II. A HISTORY OF CHARTER DAMAGES: 1982 TO WARD
As introduced above, the Supreme Court of Canada’s three decisions on Charter damages are fraught with
disagreement. How did the Court find itself so divided?
Part of the answer is found in the 28 years between the enactment of the Charter and the Court’s decision
in Ward, during which time there was considerable uncertainty and disagreement over Charter damages.
Many of these themes reappear in Ward and its progeny.
The text of the Charter, particularly the remedial clause in section 24(1), provides some basic parameters
on Charter remedies but is essentially open-ended. The earliest scholarship interpreted the Charter as
providing a damages remedy and filled in the details with speculation about how private law tort doctrines
might provide a framework for Charter damages.
In the same period, the Court’s Charter damages jurisprudence developed slowly, even reluctantly,
dealing with peripheral concerns first. The primary purpose and availability of Charter damages is only
discussed in dissents or dicta while secondary issues such as government immunities abound. I highlight
cases I consider required reading in order to understand the conversation leading up to Ward.
Prior to Ward, the law and scholarship on Charter damages raised many questions but gave few answers.
Indeed, there is some evidence that scholars lost interest in Charter damages around 1995. Ward is an
answer that comes late in the day; what follows is an exploration of the questions from earlier in the day.

A. The Text: Section 24(1) and the Charter
The primary authority for a distinct Charter damages remedy is found in section 24(1):
Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied
may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers
appropriate and just in the circumstances.40
The initial draft of 24(1) was not so broad, limiting remedial power to “a declaration of the court or by
means of an injunction or similar relief, accordingly as the circumstances require” - which would have

40

Charter, supra note 2, s 24(1).
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likely precluded damages - and only “where no other remedy is available or provided for by law.”41 This
remedial section was first reworded, then entirely discarded, and finally, after robust Special Joint
Committee investigations by Parliament, the final version was constructed and adopted. 42 Despite
extensive hearings about judicial review and the exclusion of evidence in criminal cases, there was little
attention paid to the particular personal remedies that might be available under section 24(1).43
The appetite for breadth in section 24(1) was at least partly in response to “uninspired remedial
performance of the courts under the Canadian Bill of Rights,”44 which outlined similar substantive rights
but had no remedial mechanism. 45 Indeed, the Charter is enforced through three remedial sections.
Section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 contains the “Supremacy Clause,” the primary mechanism for
judicial review of unconstitutional statutes, confirming that any law inconsistent with the Charter is “of no
force or effect.”46 Section 24(2) provides a specific remedy for excluding unconstitutionally obtained
evidence in criminal cases. 47 Unlike the other remedial sections, section 24(1) is a residual clause
empowering judges to award any remedy within the court’s competence that is “appropriate and just.”
At this juncture, it is customary to repeat Justice McIntyre’s classic observation in Mills v the Queen, that
it is “difficult to imagine a language which could give the court a wider and less fettered discretion.”48
Justice McIntyre expands by highlighting the importance of judicial creativity in remedying Charter
infringements through section 24(1):
It is impossible to reduce this wide discretion to some sort of binding formula for general
application in all cases ... the circumstances will be infinitely variable from case to case and the
remedy will vary with the circumstances.49
Justice McIntyre’s call to the infinite should, however, consider the constraints in the text of 24(1) itself.
First, The limitation to a “court of competent jurisdiction” precludes certain remedies, like damages, from

41

Dale Gibson & Scott Gibson, “Enforcement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” in The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 2nd ed (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) 781, at 784-785.
42
Ibid at 785-786.
43
Adam Dodek, The Charter Debates (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018) at 339-340.
44
Kent Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada, loose-leaf (consulted on August 17, 2018), 2nd ed (Thompson
Reuters Canada, 2017), at para 2.700 [Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada].
45
See A Anne McLellan & Bruce P Elman, “The Enforcement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: An
Analysis of Section 24” (1983) 21 Alta L Rev 205 at 206-208 [McLellan & Elman, “Analysis of Section 24”]
(provides a concise legislative history of section 24 with regard to effective enforcement).
46
Charter, supra note 2, s 52.
47
Ibid, s 24(2).
48
Mills v The Queen, [1986] 1 SCR 863 at 965 [Mills].
49
Ibid, 965-966.
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being awarded in courts of criminal jurisdiction and certain tribunals.50 Second, the words “Anyone whose
rights or freedoms… have been infringed or denied” appears to preclude claimants with public interest
standing from obtaining personal remedies.51 Importantly, the text does not limit which rights can be
remedied by section 24(1). It follows that Charter damages could conceivably be awarded for an
infringement of any substantive Charter right or freedom, so long as the remedy is “appropriate and just in
the circumstances.”52
A third internal constraint is that the remedy must be “appropriate and just in the circumstances.” It is
tempting to argue that 24(1) should mirror the common law because judicial refinement of remedies has
always aspired to be “appropriate and just”; however, it is clear from the legislative history of section
24(1) that the drafters rejected limiting the Charter’s remedial power to those “provided for by law.”53
This position is supported by the phrase “in the circumstances,” favouring particularized considerations
for each remedy, each substantive section, and each defendant against whom the remedy is sought.54
Beyond the language of 24(1), other sections of the Charter provide parameters on how courts ought to
exercise judicial discretion over Charter remedies. Section 1 provides that the rights in the Charter are
subject to “reasonable limits prescribed by law.”55 Section 1 is epitomized by the test in R v Oakes, where
the government bears the burden to prove a pressing and substantial objective, and that this objective is
proportional to the infringement.56 However, section 1 and Oakes do not necessarily apply to 24(1)
remedies. For example, where the alleged infringement impugns an action taken by an executive branch of
government, there may not necessarily be a prescription of law through which the defendant infringes the
Charter. In the language of Oakes, when the infringement is caused by government conduct absent a
statute, there is no pressing legislative objective to proportionally balance. As a result, section 1 and Oakes
generally will not directly apply to remedies sought under section 24.57

50

See Ward, supra note 1; see R v Conway, 2010 SCC 22 [Conway].
McLellan & Elman, “Analysis of Section 24”, supra note 45 at 208-209.
52
Charter, supra note 2, 24(1).
53
See Gibson & Gibson, supra note 41.
54
A similar point is made by David Mullan, “Damages for Violation of Constitutional Rights - A False Spring?”
(1995) 6:1 NJCL 105 at 126.
55
Charter, supra note 2, s 1.
56
R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103 at 138-139 [Oakes].
57
See Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada (Minister of Justice), 2000 SCC 69 at paras 140-141 [Little
Sisters] (“Violative conduct by government officials that is not authorized by statute is not “prescribed by law” and
cannot therefore be justified under s. 1.”). also see Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 SCR
624 at 643 (“the Charter may be infringed, not by the legislation itself, but by the actions of a delegated decisionmaker in applying it. In such cases, the legislation remains valid, but a remedy for the unconstitutional action may be
sought pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter”).
51
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A particularly unique aspect of the Charter is section 33, or the “notwithstanding clause.” According to
section 33, Parliament or a legislature may enact legislation declaring its validity notwithstanding a
substantive Charter infringement. This extraordinary political measure comes with a set of rules: it only
applies to sections 2 and 7 through 15, and the legislation is only effective for five years (whereupon it
must be re-enacted).58 For the purposes of Charter damages, it is important to confirm that a remedy
sought under section 24(1) cannot itself be the subject of a section 33 legislative override. The
notwithstanding clause must be directed at the substance of the right infringed, not its remedy.
Another important textual limitation, though not often thought of as such, is the party against which 24(1)
remedies may be awarded. Section 32(1) of the Charter confirms that its substantive protections and
remedial sections apply only to the Federal and Provincial governments.59 In an early Charter decision,
the Court confirmed that this includes the “legislative, executive, and administrative” branches of
government and excludes private persons.60 I characterize this as a limitation because the Court must
consider its own competency to award a remedy against a co-equal branch of government, which
ultimately constrains its remedial discretion.
In sum, the text of section 24(1) supports a cause of action for damages against government to remedy
Charter violations. Charter damages can conceivably remedy the breach of any right or freedom in the
Charter. The discretion to award damages is wide and is not directly affected by either justification under
section 1 or the notwithstanding clause in section 33. Although the judiciary is limited both through
textual limitations and its institutional capacity to award remedies against the legislative and executive, the
broad objective to award remedies that are “appropriate and just in the circumstances” can guide its
discretion in how to balance the interests of the injured party and the government.

B. The Literature: Predicting Charter Damages Doctrine
The early scholarship on Charter damages asked important questions from historical, theoretical,
doctrinal, comparative, and practical perspectives. Between 1984 to 1995, several scholars weighed in on
their interpretation of an appropriate and just 24(1) damages remedy. Of this period of scholarship, three
particular themes emerge: defining a purpose, identifying the proper defendant, and pinpointing the role of
private law and tort doctrines for Charter damages. The divide over these three points is the same as the
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divide in the Court 20 years later – to what extent will private tort law influence the shaping of a Charter
damages remedy?
In her 198461 and 198762 articles, Marilyn Pilkington sets out the earliest comprehensive discussions on
Charter damages. Based on the text of the Charter, she finds that “section 24(1) provides a new starting
point” for creating a Charter damages remedy.63 Unlike the tests for damages and injunctions in the
private law context, the remedy “must be reassessed in light of the purposes for which the remedy is
given.”64 For Pilkington, constitutional damages are firmly rooted in the text of the Charter and ought to
be awarded within a Charter context. Pilkington identifies that “constitutional wrongs may be
qualitatively different from ordinary civil wrongs” because the harm is the infringement itself. 65
Therefore, Pilkington argues “This loss in itself should be redressed.”66 Her position reflects a relatively
strong commitment to a public law approach for Charter damages.
By contrast, Ken Cooper-Stephenson embraces private law as his starting point. In his 1990 monograph on
Charter Damages Claims, Cooper-Stephenson presents a “constitutional tort” model as analogous to the
American tradition of construing constitutional violations by state and federal agents as tortious conduct.67
While Charter infringements should be determined on constitutional law grounds, he suggests that
remedies ought to be awarded “by reference primarily to recognized principles found within the area of
civil remedial law, tailored and adapted for constitutional purposes.”68 His preference is for constitutional
damages claims to be guided by the tort of negligence.69 A similar argument is made by David J. Mullan,
who predicts that the Court’s Charter damages doctrine would not deviate from the established private
law liability rules.70
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Pilkington remarks that private law principles, such as the tort of negligence, may “undermine the
effectiveness of damages as a means of vindicating, compensating and deterring constitutional wrongs.”71
This is the first time the principles of compensation, vindication, and deterrence are identified as the
purposes of Charter damages – an approach canonized decades later in Ward as the three purposes for
Charter damages.72 Cooper-Stephenson disagrees, finding that compensation, vindication, and deterrence
reflect “an unstructured mixture of goals.”73 In his view, Charter damages ought to be compensatory
only.74
A year after Cooper-Stephenson’s book was published, H. Scott Fairley quipped that section 24 was
becoming “legal academia’s latest and clearly most voluminous cottage industry.”75 For his part, Fairley
was critical of Cooper-Stephenson’s emphasis on compensation, with particular reference to the largely
undesirable American experience with constitutional tort claims. 76 Fairley is kinder to Pilkington’s thesis that constitutional damages ought to be available for vindication and deterrence in addition to
compensation - finding that “the chief stumbling block appears to be the private law focus on the
protection of tangible personal or proprietary interests,”77 and, in contrast, “the Charter was meant for
greater things – intangibles with respect to which most private law principles have less to say - or so we
suppose.”78
The purposes of Charter damages are difficult to evaluate in the abstract. In a 1993 article, Lorne Sossin
focuses his discussion on Crown prosecutor liability for Charter damages. Sossin argues that deterrence,
not compensation, should be the prime purpose of Charter damages.79 With reference to the section 24(1)
remedy for the exclusion of evidence in criminal trials, Sossin argues that Charter damages should focus
on the conduct of the government actor, not on the accused’s deservedness.80 Thus, Sossin rejects CooperStephenson’s suggestion to leverage principles from the tort of negligence, which Sossin says is focused
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on the “distribution of loss,” and instead proposes that Charter damages ought to reflect a policy of
Charter compliance.81
Sossin casts significant doubt on Cooper-Stephenson’s claim that complete compensatory damages would
serve as an effective deterrent, as compensation would privilege those who have more to lose.82 The point
is compelling. Take for example a person who is held in pre-trial custody without a bail hearing for a
week in excess of the reasonable time mandated by section 11(e) of the Charter. Under CooperStephenson’s view, an accused with steady work would receive full compensation for any lost wages,
while a person with precarious work might receive full compensation in the form of nothing. Sossin chalks
up the purely corrective approach to Charter damages as a problematic manifestation of formal equality.83
The divide over whether public or private law principles should guide the purpose of Charter damages
was also reflected in the debate over who should be liable for Charter damages.
Scholars preferring a public law approach tended to also prefer direct liability of government. For Sossin,
Charter damages should target systemic Charter breaches: “the point... is not to bring the rotten apples in
line, but to keep watch on the barrel.”84
In line with his preference for the purpose of deterrence and direct liability of government, Sossin is
generally opposed to applying traditional private law defences, thresholds, and immunities to Charter
damages claims. Sossin refers to the Supreme Court decision in Nelles v Ontario, which held that Crown
prosecutors are liable in damages for malicious prosecutions.85 In Nelles, only three of the nine justices
held that the malice threshold would not apply to Charter damages claims.86 Sossin questions why the
immunity exists at all: “either it immunizes prosecutors from the consequences of legal acts, which would
be redundant, or it immunizes them from the consequences of illegal acts, which would be repugnant.”87
His preference is for “a standard approaching strict liability.”88
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Curiously, none of the early scholarly work on Charter damages was entirely clear on how exactly private
law thresholds and defences would apply to Charter damages claims. Pilkington, who was open to
individual liability for Charter infringements, wrote that a “state of mind” requirement, or a ‘good faith’
defence, might be appropriate in some cases to avoid the ‘chilling effect’ that might be caused by strict
liability.89 Cooper-Stephenson would likewise reject strict liability and permit several defences from the
tort of negligence to negate a Charter damages remedy.90 However, neither are clear on whether these
private law principles would be required to find a Charter breach or if they will only be considered at a
later remedial stage.91
Mullan’s article characterizing Charter damages as “A False Spring” concludes that the multidimensional
questions raised by the early scholarship on Charter damages were still unanswered by courts.92 Indeed,
Mullan seems to have had the last word on Charter damages for some time. After publication of his article
in 1995, the cottage industry that was Charter damages went into recession. From 1995 through 2010,
there are only a handful of articles focused directly on a 24(1) damages remedy, supported by several
others considering 24(1) more broadly.93 It was only after Ward in 2010 that the Court, for the first time,
addressed important questions such as the purpose of Charter damages, direct liability, the role of private
law fault thresholds and defences.
In the interim, the Supreme Court occasionally released decisions resolving issues on the outermost
contours of the Charter damages remedy. In the next section, I focus on the Court’s development of
Charter damages prior to Ward.
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C. The Court: On the Margins of Charter Damages
From 1982 through 2009, Charter damages were mentioned frequently in dicta and dissents, and usually
only in reference to how this area of the law was uncertain at best. The Court’s decisions around Charter
damages are something akin to setting up the furniture before the house is built, addressing details like
specific immunities to Charter damages before defining its purpose and function. Many of these cases,
discussed below, placed significant limits on what was still only a theoretical remedy.94 I begin by looking
at cases addressing the purpose of Charter damages and the significance of direct liability for 24(1)
remedies. I then examine the limits the Court places around Charter damages by applying private law
immunities in the Charter context and judicial acceptance of statutory parameters on section 24(1).
Several of the cases and ideas described in this section are referred to by the Court in Ward and its
progeny. Exploring the details of these decisions is a step towards untangling the public and private
aspects of the contemporary Charter damages doctrine.
1. Purpose
Recall Justice McIntyre’s call in Mills for “imagination” in crafting 24(1) remedies. 95 For Charter
damages, the creativity envisioned by Justice McIntyre would not find its purposive drive until Ward. On
the road towards Ward, the Court provides only a few hints in dissents and obiter dicta on the nature and
purpose of Charter damages.
In 1990, Justice Wilson delivered a stirring and lengthy dissent in McKinney v University of Guelph, a
case in which several professors challenged the mandatory retirement age set by the University as a
violation of their equality rights in section 15 of the Charter.96 The majority found that the Charter did not
apply to the University and therefore did not reach the question of remedies; however, Justice Wilson’s
dissenting opinion would have found that the Charter did apply and would have awarded Charter
damages.97 Her opinion outlined that “the remedial scope of s. 24(1) was not intended to be limited to that
available at common law,” and therefore Charter damages should be awarded to compensate the
claimants.98 Importantly, she added that these compensatory damages would not necessarily be qualified
94
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by good governance considerations such as “impecuniosity and good faith” of the governmentdefendant.99 Justice Wilson’s remarks are important in that she identifies, at the very least, that Charter
damages are a valid 24(1) remedy and that damages could be awarded based on “different considerations
respecting appropriate remedial relief” than private law damages.100
In 1994, Charter damages were discussed indirectly in the context of Charter injunctions. In RJRMacDonald Inc v Canada (AG), two tobacco companies sought to invalidate a statute that restricted their
ability to advertise cigarettes contrary to section 2(b) of the Charter.101 Prior to the hearing of that claim
on the merits, the tobacco companies brought a rather rare interlocutory motion for a suspension of the
impugned statute until the appeal was heard on the merits, claiming that a failure to do so would result in
irreparable harm.102 In discussing whether irreparable harm would result absent an injunction, the Court
was forced to indirectly comment on whether the harm would result in Charter damages. The Court makes
three statements on Charter damages neatly summarized by W.H. Charles:
(1) Charter damages are not the primary remedy in Charter cases.
(2) The Court had, on several prior occasions, accepted the principle that damages may be awarded
for breach of Charter rights.
(3) There was a lack of developed Charter [damages] jurisprudence.103
In over a decade of Supreme Court decisions on the Charter, these three comments – which are entirely
dicta in a case about injunctions, not damages – became the most informative precedential literature on
Charter damages. Even the Court’s citations to its prior acceptance of Charter damages are to cases in
which the claimant had not advanced a Charter damages claim.104
In its 2002 decision in Auton (Guardian ad litem) v British Columbia (Attorney General), the British
Columbia Court of Appeal awarded $20,000 in Charter damages to parents of children with autism who
established a section 15(1) infringement where an underinclusive treatment program excluded their
children. 105 Roach commented that Justice Saunders’ majority decision provided “little guidance...
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concerning the still underdeveloped nature of the Charter damage claim,” particularly on good faith
immunities, fault thresholds, or the proper purpose and calculation of damages.106 By contrast, Roach
notes that Justice Lambert’s dissenting opinion provided helpful criteria for trial judges to follow.107
Roach concluded, “These are difficult issues that ideally will be addressed when the Supreme Court
delivers its judgment in this case.”108 Famously, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Court of
Appeal on the merits of the section 15(1) claim.109 As a result, the Charter damages issue, as in McKinney,
was not reached by the Court.
In 2003, the Supreme Court made a ground-breaking 5-4 decision in Doucet-Boudreau, spelling out in
great detail the purposive approach to section 24(1) remedies. The claimants proved that the province had
violated their right to minority language education in section 23 of the Charter when it failed to provide
adequate French-language schooling.110 The trial judge invoked section 24(1) to make an extraordinary
order for judicial oversight of the school restructuring.111 The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal - and four
Supreme Court judges - would have quashed the remedy based on the common law doctrine of functus
officio, requiring a trial judge to end their involvement in a case once judgment is rendered.112 However,
five Supreme Court justices reinstated the trial judge’s remedy, and in doing so spelled out a broad,
purposive approach to 24(1) remedies.
Though the Court does not consider Charter damages in particular, the purposive approach in DoucetBoudreau applies to all 24(1) remedies. In particular, the Court defines the phrase “appropriate and just”
with four criteria, summarized as follows: (1) the remedy “meaningfully vindicates the rights and
freedoms of the claimants” 113 ; (2) the remedy must “employ means that are legitimate within the
framework of our constitutional democracy”114 ; (3) the remedy must flow from the competent “function
and powers of a court”115 ; and (4) the remedy is “fair to the party against whom the order is made.”116
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In 2010, the Ward Court reviewed the Doucet-Boudreau factors and found that damages fit neatly into the
purposes of 24(1) remedies.117 Thus, although the purpose of Charter damages was elusive for several
decades, the Doucet-Boudreau Court provided a general framework for 24(1) remedies which the Ward
Court used to craft a specific framework for Charter damages.
2. Direct Liability and Individual Liability
The purpose of Charter damages is closely related to the question of liability. The Court in DoucetBoudreau, for example, contemplates remedies against government directly.118 With reference to section
32 of the Charter, Ward confirms that only government institutions are liable for Charter damages, and
that they are liable directly (as opposed to vicariously or against individual government agents directly).119
This holding should be relatively noncontroversial. For example, the Charter does not hold police officers
individually accountable for exclusion of evidence. However, there is some evidence that the history of
damages suits against individual government actors appears to have a strong grip on our legal
consciousness. Indeed, Roach notes that several cases initiated after Ward continue to name individuals as
defendants for Charter damages.120
Illustrative of the real-world pleading problems is the Manitoba Court of Appeal decision in Young v
Ewatski.121 The trial ended prior to the Supreme Court decision in Ward, but judgment was rendered
afterwards.122
Young sought Charter damages against several police officers on private law and Charter grounds for a
warrantless search of her home. She also brought a statutory claim for damages against the chief of police.
She did not bring a Charter damages claim directly against the Winnipeg Police Service. The trial judge
awarded Charter damages against the individual officers.123
The Manitoba Court of Appeal, applying Ward, accepted that the police breached Young’s section 8 rights
but denied the Charter damages remedy because it was sought against individuals as opposed to the police
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department.124 Similarly, the Court found that the claim against the police chief, though sued in his
“representative capacity,” was not subject to Charter damages because the cause of action against him
was purely statutory.125
Young reflects an uncertainty in the law largely created by the conflation of Charter and private causes of
action for damages. While a substantial jurisprudence exists to show that the Charter applies to
government institutions, and not its individual representatives, that jurisprudence has not reoriented our
attitudes towards damages as a Charter remedy distinct from private law.
Direct liability becomes a sticking point in Henry and Ernst. When applying private law policy
considerations to Charter damages, how much emphasis should be placed on the distinction between
individual liability and direct liability of government institutions? As discussed in this next section,
several policy considerations against awarding damages are based on the negative effect of imposing
liability on the individual that may not easily translate to institutional defendants.
3. Thresholds and Immunities
Keeping direct liability at the front of mind is important while looking at the Court’s decision on
immunities to damages. Prior to (and after) Ward, individual government agents benefitted from tailored
fault thresholds and special immunities to tort claims for malicious prosecution, misfeasance of public
office, and negligence. However, given that Charter remedies are awarded against governments and not
individuals, there is a question of whether the same thresholds and immunities would apply to the
government directly.
As noted in the introduction, the Ward Court permits the government to raise private law thresholds and
immunities as “good governance” factors at step 3 of the Ward framework to militate against a Charter
damages award.126 The Henry Court, however, provides a rationale for shifting the burden of proving a
fault threshold on to the claimant at step 1. Given the sudden change towards how immunities factor into
Charter damages claims, it is worth exploring the role of prosecutorial, police, and Charter-based
thresholds and immunities in both private law and Charter claims. The following discussion reveals those
aspects of thresholds and immunities that complement direct liability under the Charter, and those
destined to clash.
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a. Prosecutors
One of the stronger, entrenched threshold immunities in Canadian law is the Crown prosecutor’s
immunity from liability arising out of its broad discretion to prosecute. Prosecutorial discretion is
protected on the theory that Crown lawyers, like judges, require a shield from liability in order to “carry
out their duties with courage and independence.”127 Malicious prosecution is a tort action against the
Crown lawyer in particular - as confirmed in Nelles, the Attorney General and Crown attorneys are
personally liable for their own torts, but the Crown itself is not liable either directly or vicariously absent
statutory consent.128 The Nelles approach was upheld by the Court in its two subsequent decisions in
Proulx v Quebec and Miazga v Kvello Estate.129
As the name suggests, malicious prosecution requires the plaintiff to prove malice as an element of the
prima facie case. Malice is defined as an “improper purpose” and a “fraud on the process of criminal
justice.”130 Malice is more than “recklessness, gross negligence, or poor judgment.”131 The bar is high,
achieving the goal of protecting prosecutorial independence while permitting an action for the clearest of
cases.132
Malicious prosecution is not itself a Charter infringement, though it could implicate one or more Charter
rights given the circumstances. The Court acknowledged this in Nelles. As Sossin notes, only three of the
six judges concluded that malice would be required on a Charter damages claim.133 The Charter damages
theory is not discussed by the Court in Proulx or Miazga.
Prior to Ward, there was no consensus on whether the Charter damages claimant would need to plead
malice in order to succeed against the Crown. The Ward Court refers to Miazga in step 3 of the Ward
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framework,134 and the Henry Court is divided over how to apply the policy considerations from Miazga in
the Charter damages context.135

b. Police
In Canadian law, the immunities enjoyed by prosecutors are not shared by the police.136 At common law,
police are liable for intentional torts and negligence as private persons, with some adjustments to account
for their special government function.137 For negligence, the test in Cooper v Hobart, which is used to
determine whether the government owes a duty of care to the plaintiff, is used for police just as it is used
for other government institutions and individuals.138
Under the Charter, the sections that apply directly to police, like sections 8 through 10, are qualified with
well-settled law and interact with traditional policing methods. For example, unreasonable search and
seizures and arbitrary arrests and detentions are largely guided by ordinary police procedures such as
obtaining warrants and the formation of probable grounds.139 Thus, the term “immunity” may not be the
best word to describe the subject of analysis below. Rather, what I am exploring is the relationship
between Charter liability and private law liability. I limit my analysis to two pre-Ward cases - Jane Doe v
Metropolitan Police of Toronto and Hill v Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board - which
shed some light on how the public and private aspects of law intersect for police. Of course, the ultimate
authority on police liability for Charter damages is Ward itself.
The Jane Doe case, though not a Supreme Court decision, is remarkable for drawing a distinction between
tort claims and Charter claims. Jane Doe’s case arises from the police search for the “balcony rapist”
targeting women in a Toronto neighbourhood. The police carried out their investigation without warning
women in the neighbourhood that they were in any danger, which as Jane Doe pled, essentially turned her
and other neighbourhood women into “bait” to lure out the predator. Jane Doe was attacked and sexually
assaulted by the predator. Jane Doe sued the Toronto police for damages in negligence as well as a
134
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declaration under 24(1) for infringements of her rights to security of the person and equality in sections 7
and 15(1).140
Notably, the Divisional Court distinguished between Jane Doe’s claim in negligence and the Charter
claim. While the negligence claim was based on identifying a duty of care, the Charter claim was based
on her allegation that the police “chose, or at least adopted a policy not to warn her” based on stereotypes
about her gender contrary to section 15(1). 141 This holding emphasized the difference in substance
between a Charter claim and a claim in negligence. Just as not all negligent investigations by police or
malicious prosecutions by Crown attorneys are Charter violations per se, so too can substantive Charter
violations be distinguished from the standard applied to those torts. In other words, a tort cannot define the
parameters of Charter liability.
Police are also liable for negligence to suspects for the tort of negligent investigation. In Hill, the Court
confirmed that police owe a duty of care to suspects under investigation. In this case, Hill was accused of
committing several robberies despite significant evidence pointing to two other suspects.142 Hill was
convicted for one robbery at trial, had his conviction overturned on appeal, and sued the police department
and its officers for negligent investigation.143
Utilizing the test from Cooper v Hobart for discovering whether government owes a duty of care, the
Court found that police do owe a duty to suspects under investigation and that the standard of care is a
reasonable police officer in like circumstances.144 The Court added that although no Charter claim was
advanced in this case, the judicial recognition of a tort of negligent investigation “is consistent with the
values and spirit underlying the Charter, with its emphasis on liberty and fair process.”145 In this case,
constitutional principles influenced an expansion of tort liability on police.
Interestingly, although Hill is mentioned in Ward, it has no bearing on the development of the Ward
framework or on the outcome of Ward’s Charter damages claim.146
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c. Combining Legislative and Personal Charter Remedies (the Mackin rule)
In addition to the private law immunities above, the Ward Court also considered the appropriateness of
public law immunities created in its Charter jurisprudence. The most prolific of these is what is often
referred to as the rule from Mackin v New Brunswick (Minister of Finance): in short, Charter claimants
cannot combine a section 52(1) remedy to strike down legislation with a section 24(1) personal remedy
absent bad faith.147 This rule applies to all 24(1) remedies, not just damages. The rationale for the rule is
that imposing liability for enforcing a presumptively valid statute would impair the “effectiveness and
efficiency of government action.”148 The Mackin rule comes from three cases: Schachter v Canada,
Guimond v Quebec, and Mackin. Though these three cases are often considered to hold the same rule, a
closer look reveals that each of these cases are substantially different. The general rule that develops out
of these cases is increasingly detached from its rationale.
The first piece of this puzzle is understanding the role sections 1 and 52(1) could play in Charter damages
claims. Recall that the section 1 justification will only be available to government where the Charter
infringement is “prescribed by law.” Where the Charter infringement is caused by the actions of
government without the operation of a statute, section 1 will generally not apply.149 Of course, it is
conceivable that damages might be sought in cases where there is a statute impugned as well as where
there is only conduct impugned.
The relationship between sections 1, 52(1), and 24(1) was addressed in Schachter, which held that “An
individual remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter will rarely be available in conjunction with action under s.
52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.”150 In that case, the claimant successfully argued that a statute granting
paternity care benefits to adoptive parents infringed his section 15 equality rights as it excluded biological
fathers. He sought to both invalidate the statute and retroactively collect the money to which he was
entitled absent the unconstitutional statute.151
The Court characterized Charter damages in strictly corrective justice language - to put the claimant in the
position he would have been had there been no wrong.152 However, in the same paragraph, the Court noted
that, in this case, there was substantial ambiguity as to what place the claimant would be in absent the
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Charter breach. The Court held that awarding the retroactive remedy would assume that, absent the
unconstitutional statute, Parliament would have included Schachter (and other biological fathers) in the
group of beneficiaries. It was just as likely, wrote the Court, that “there could have been no benefit at all,
for the plaintiff or the original beneficiaries.”153 In other words, the Court concluded that it could not
correct the harm with a personal remedy because it was impossible to determine whether a personal loss
occurred.
Schachter presents a logical and reasonable reason why a section 52 and section 24(1) remedy might not
be available concurrently. Corrective justice is stringent but straightforward, and its application is
consistent with the Court’s historical aversion to involving itself in distributive justice aims that are better
suited to Parliament.154
In two subsequent cases, Schachter was applied and expanded to provide a broad immunity from 24(1)
remedies. However, these cases – Guimond and Mackin – replace the logical application of corrective
justice with a “general rule” that eludes the logical rationale set forward in Schachter.
In the 1996 decision in Guimond, a class action composed of prisoners serving jail sentences for unpaid
fines sought to strike down the sentencing provision under section 52(1) and obtain damages under section
24(1).155 The claim for monetary compensation in Guimond arises out of the harm suffered from being
unconstitutionally jailed. The Court, purportedly applying the rule in Schachter, struck down the
unconstitutional sentencing provision but refused to combine it with damages under 24(1).156 Justice
Gonthier wrote for a unanimous court, holding that in situations where the government acted under a
“claim of right” - a presumption that the statute was constitutional - they could not be retroactively held
liable once the statute was declared unconstitutional.157
Guimond differs substantially from Schachter. On the corrective justice approach taken in Schachter, the
Court correctly held that it would be impossible to compensate the claimant because, after striking down
the legislation, it was not clear whether Schachter would have been a statutory beneficiary. In Guimond,
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however, it is clear that absent the unconstitutional sentencing provision, the persons with unpaid fines
would certainly not have been imprisoned.
Instead of relying on Schachter alone, the Court pulled in several negligence cases against government not
mentioned in Schachter. For example, the Court referred to Welbridge Holdings Ltd v Greater Winnipeg,
where a company building on a parcel of land incurred damages when the municipal zoning law under
which it was operating was found ultra vires. The company sued the city for damages on a theory of
negligence. In that case, the Court found that the city owed no duty of care to the company, and on that
basis rejected the company’s bid for damages.158 The Court in Guimond uses Welbridge and other
negligence cases to demonstrate that lawmakers and those who enforce the law in good faith are not liable
for damages.159
It is unclear, however, why a duty of care is necessary to establish a claim for 24(1) remedy in Guimond.
The Court’s reliance on Welbrdige Holdings, a case discussing the tort of negligence, elevates the
requirements for the tort of negligence to universal laws about government liability. It suggests that
Charter damages liability will only exist where the claimant proves a tort as well as a Charter
infringement.
To summarize, the rule in Schachter and the rule in Guimond are indeed quite different. Schachter is
based squarely on a logical application of corrective justice and is entirely consistent with the Court’s
relationship to the legislature’s distributive justice decisions. Guimond is based on a conflation of
Schachter with the law of negligence. That the two are often spoken together, along with the rule in
Mackin, is indicative of the entanglement between public and private law on the issue of immunities.
The Court’s 2002 decision in Mackin affirms the Schachter and Guimond immunity, but adds a new twist:
in order to pair section 52 and 24(1) remedies, the claimant must prove bad faith on the part of the
government.160 In Mackin, two provincial court judges sought to invalidate a New Brunswick statute
amending the compensation for supernumerary judges. In addition, they sought damages essentially
amounting to back-pay.161 The Court found that the change in compensation scheme did violate section
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11(d) of the Charter and struck it down.162 As for 24(1) damages, the Court concluded that damages are
not available in conjunction with a section 52(1) remedy in the absence of “conduct that is clearly wrong,
in bad faith or an abuse of power.”163
Mackin is a peculiar case. Just as it is rare to see judges as a party to litigation, it is also rare for any
claimant to seek damages where their personal rights were not breached. Recall that section 24(1) begins,
“Anyone whose rights or freedoms ... have been infringed or denied,”164 indicating broad standing, but
only personal standing.165 Indeed, both the trial judge and the dissenting appellate judge held that the
claimants did not qualify for any 24(1) remedy because they were not personally deprived of the right to a
fair trial in section 11(d).166 This alone would seem to easily dispose of the 24(1) claim.
Instead, the Court applied Schachter and Guimond. However, the reason provided for applying these cases
is detached from those cases. Rather than appealing to the Court’s institutional competency and logical
application of corrective justice as in Schachter, or reiterating the requirement for a duty of care as in
Guimond, the Court in Mackin based its ruling on the need for good governance: “creating a balance
between the protection of constitutional rights and the need for effective government.”167 It is unclear why
constitutional rights and effective governance are at odds, both in this case and in general.
Although Schachter, Guimond, and Mackin superficially form a trilogy of cases affirming a public law
immunity, a closer look reveals that these three cases have little in common. By the time Mackin is
decided, the sensible rule from Schachter is watered down to a “general rule” forbidding a combination of
remedies under 52(1) and 24(1) absent bad faith. The reasoning in Schachter is the strongest as it is based
on a reasonable approach to the relationship between the Court and Parliament and a logical application of
corrective justice. The reasoning in Guimond is problematic on several bases, not the least of which is that
it requires proof of negligence to compensate people unconstitutionally imprisoned and ignores a logical
approach to corrective justice. Meanwhile, the reasoning in Mackin appears to have little to do with the
section 52(1) remedy and simply holds that bad faith is a requirement for Charter damages.
For now, it is sufficient to illustrate the problem with one more pre-Ward case. In Kingstreet Investments
Ltd v New Brunswick (Finance), the Court made an exception to the Mackin rule for unlawfully levied
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taxes. The claimants, who were taxed under an ultra vires statute, succeeded in invalidating the statute and
recovering the tax paid under it - a section 52 remedy paired with personal retroactive section 24(1)
remedy.168 This is the correct application of Schachter. As the Court said about Kingstreet, an application
of corrective justice principles leads to “only one possible remedy: restitution to the taxpayer.”169 In other
words, while cases like Schachter evidence some ambiguity about how to apply corrective justice, the
outcome in Kingstreet was clear – the position the claimant would have been in absent the
unconstitutional tax is undoubtedly that he would never have paid the tax.
I fail to see how Kingstreet might be distinguished from the facts in Guimond, where convicted persons
were sentenced under an unconstitutional law but were not compensated for their deprivation of liberty.
Neither case includes the distribution of benefits, but rather are both focused on two of the government’s
most coercive powers: taxation and criminal justice. There is no doubt that absent the unconstitutional
sentencing provision in Guimond, the claimants would absolutely not have been jailed. That only taxation
is exempt from the rule is suspect.
Debra McAllister has forthrightly argued for “reconsideration of [the Mackin] rule, and the role section
24(1) of the Charter is to play in constitutional challenges to invalidate legislation.”170 I agree, in
particular, that the rule should be reconsidered in light of Ward.
Interestingly, the Court in Mackin suggests that the Charter damages remedy sought by the claimants is
only available “in theory,” and goes about restricting the theoretical.171 Now that the Court has announced
a clear Charter damages doctrine in Ward, the rule in Mackin should either be subordinated to the Ward
framework or reconsidered altogether.

4. Statutory Parameters on 24(1)
The Supreme Court has held that section 24(1) does not create its own procedure.172 Thus, several details
of the Charter damages claim will be determined by statutes of general application. Prior to Ward, the
Supreme Court had weighed in on at least two important areas: statutes creating remedial jurisdiction and
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statutes of limitation. Based on the holdings in these cases, I briefly foreshadow how statutes of ordinary
application can frustrate the valid purposes of 24(1) remedies and Charter damages specifically.
Section 24(1) remedies, though broad, can only be granted by courts of “competent jurisdiction.”173 The
Charter itself does not create rules for jurisdiction, nor does it expand the powers of Parliament or the
provinces to legislate these definitions.174 Prior to Ward, the Court held that certain tribunals with the
ability to determine questions of law and award damages would have the authority to grant 24(1)
remedies 175 while provincial courts with criminal jurisdiction would not. 176 Ward reaffirms these
holdings.177
A similar issue is raised when applying ordinary statutes of limitations on civil claims to Charter damages
claims. The Ontario Court of Appeal had held in Prete v Ontario that a six-month limitation period for
actions against public authorities frustrated the purposes of the Charter. 178 However, a subsequent
decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ravndahl v Saskatchewan held that a statute of limitations
with ordinary application can bar a cause of action under section 24(1).179 Roach notes that the Supreme
Court’s approach is consistent with statutes defining a “court of competent jurisdiction,” though he
wonders why the Court does not mention the Prete decision.180
Statutes assigning remedial jurisdiction and limitations on claims are applicable to section 24(1) because
they add definition to the phrase “court of competent jurisdiction.” Ordinarily, issues around jurisdiction
and statutes of limitations are raised at the outset of a case and dispositive on a motion prior to a trial on
the merits.
Other statutes, however, sit on the fringes of providing definition to section 24(1). Consider a statute that
creates an immunity from damages suits for an administrative tribunal. On one hand, a statutory immunity
to damages defines “competent jurisdiction” because it removes discretion from the judge to order
damages; however, as an immunity statute it could be characterized as a common law immunity for
prosecutors, judges, and Parliament, which suggest section 32 of the Charter might trump the application
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of the immunity state.181 Similarly, a statute immunizing government from damages claims are of “general
application” in that they do not restrict the Charter only, but are not general in that they only apply to
immunizing the government.
Thus, the question of which statutes restrict or define 24(1) remedies boils down to a question of whether
that statute is consistent with the text and purpose of 24(1) itself. This issue arises in Ernst, where the facts
raised the question whether a statutory immunity clause for an administrative agency can act as a bar to
Charter damages. In my view, a statute immunizing a branch of government from damages is contrary to
the purpose of section 24(1). The Court’s future decisions in this area should be careful in distinguishing
statutes that guide interpretation of 24(1) and those that hinder its effective operation.

D. Summary: The Law and Scholarship Prior to Ward
Prior to Ward, the state of the law on Charter damages was, in a word, unclear. Section 24(1) provided a
blank canvas on which the Court could print its own constitutional damages doctrine.
The disagreement within the scholarship on key points like the purpose of Charter damages, the proper
defendant, and the immunities available to government are illustrative of fundamental disagreements over
how much influence private law should have on a public law cause of action. The Court was no clearer.
Despite stating in 1994 that Charter damages were likely an available remedy,182 and in 2002 that Charter
damages were available “in theory,”183 the Court continued to raise fences around a purely theoretical lot.
It is no wonder that, in the years leading up to Ward, litigators expressed cynicism about the state of the
law on government immunities.184 One senior litigator for the Crown commented on the ability of public
policy rationales to defeat even the strongest claims, noting that the decisions turn more on “the immediate
strength of a public policy argument than with the alleged Charter violation.”185 Similarly, a litigator in
private practice concluded that “Courts have erected numerous obstacles” to compensation for Charter
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wrongs “based on antiquated common law doctrines such as government immunity that should not apply
in the constitutional context.”186
There are some additional observations to be made on the pre-Ward cases. The cases could be
distinguished across lines relating to whether the underlying claim resembles a private law cause of action.
The prosecutorial and police cases appear more like well-known torts, where a particular bad action
results in harm to an individual. Cases like Schachter are far less like torts in that the constitutional injury
was caused by the effect of legislation rather than an act of an individual, and the compensation sought is
for a benefit rather than a “substitute comfort” for harm. Cases like Guimond and Kingstreet fall
somewhere in the middle, where although the constitutional injury was caused by legislation, the unlawful
imprisonment and taxation arguably resemble intentional torts like false imprisonment and conversion.
Meanwhile, Mackin and McKinney raise facts that appear more like a contractual dispute over the terms of
employment. The diversity of claims for money against government defy the simple application of one set
of doctrines, public or private in origin.
Importantly, the early scholarship and cases do not advocate for a proportionality-based approach to
Charter damages. This should be remarkable because the early years of the Charter were dominated by
cases striking down legislation where the Court routinely balanced the infringed Charter right and the
government’s justification. Instead, the cases and scholarship borrow liability principles from private law
tort claims, like fault thresholds from malicious prosecution and duties of care from the tort of negligence,
to justify and legitimize Charter damages.
The case that comes closest to proportional interest-balancing is Mackin, which intends to balance the
interest of the claimant in a 24(1) remedy against the government’s good or bad faith conduct. Mackin is
ineffective in doing so. The Mackin rule contrives a conflict between constitutional rights and effective
governance;187 but, as Ward ultimately stated, “Compliance with Charter standards is a foundational
principle of good governance.”188 Although Ward mentions Mackin favourably,189 the rule ought to be
subordinated to the Ward framework, and not the other way around.190
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Indeed, Ward does not specifically overrule any of the above cases.191 The question becomes how do these
cases, many of which are defined by private law principles, influence the “unique public law remedy.”192
In the next section, I discuss how Ward defines an entirely new framework for Charter damages, and how
subsequent decisions in Henry and Ernst invite the uncertainty of the pre-Ward cases back into Charter
damages. The difficulties are almost entirely based on how private law principles will define Charter
damages doctrine.
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III. CHARTER DAMAGES AT THE SUPREME COURT: WARD, HENRY, AND
ERNST
After a long wait, the Supreme Court rendered its first comprehensive decision on Charter damages. The
Court in Ward created a four-step framework for determining whether Charter damages are “appropriate
and just in the circumstances.”193
If scholarly article titles are any indication, the response to Ward was reserved in its praise but grateful for
the clarity: “New Dawn or Mirage?”194, “Tort Lite?”195 and “A Promising Late Spring.”196 After Henry
and Ernst, however, the criticisms rang clearer. Articles like “Backpedalling on Charter Damages”197 on
Henry and “Damaging the Charter”198 on Ernst express scholarly disappointment in the trajectory of
Charter damages doctrine.
These articles, and others discussed below, pick on the tension between private law principles and
constitutional objectives, now cast as the intrusion of private law principles into Ward’s four-step
framework for awarding Charter damages. I devote most of my analysis to interpreting how and why the
prevailing opinions in Henry and Ernst prefer private law principles in awarding public law damages.
Notably, Justice McLachlin, who wrote Ward, also co-authored the concurring opinion in Henry and the
dissenting opinion in Ernst. Her decisions remain the most consistent in applying Ward, whereas the
majority in Henry and Ernst deviate from Ward by incorporating more private law principles than Justice
McLachlin. Although the Court’s holdings have been problematic and the opinions divisive, the spirit of
Ward has not been abandoned yet. There is still hope, as I argue, to revive Ward and apply it to Charter
damages claims without recourse to extraneous private law guidance.

A. Vancouver (City) v Ward
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In 2010, the Supreme Court of Canada announced, for the first time, the purposes for a damages award
under section 24(1). A united court led by Chief Justice McLachlin described the following test for a trial
judge to determine whether damages are an “appropriate and just” remedy under section 24(1):
First, the Applicant must prove a Charter infringement.
Second, the Applicant has the burden of demonstrating that damages are “appropriate and just” to satisfy
the purposes of compensation, vindication, or deterrence.
Third, the government-defendant has the evidentiary burden to prove that damages are inappropriate or
unjust by reference to “countervailing factors,” such as good governance concerns or the availability of
other more appropriate remedies.
Fourth, the Court will determine the quantum of damages.199
The Court also clarified several supplementary points: provincial courts are not competent to award
Charter damages;200 the proper defendant is not the government actor, but rather the government itself
directly;201 and, while private law and tort provide a separate and distinct claim, tort principles may inform
the development of Charter damages doctrine.202 The Court described the test as “functional” and left the
development of specific aspects to future cases.203 After reviewing the facts, I will address the Ward
framework in detail.
In August of 2002, then Prime Minister Jean Chretien was participating in an outdoor event in Downtown
Vancouver. The Vancouver Police Department received a tip with a description of an individual that was
planning to throw a pie at the Prime Minister. On the strength of that tip, the Police arrested Alan
Cameron Ward, a local lawyer who was on hand for the outdoor event. Upon arrest, Ward caused a
substantial scene and was charged with a breach of the peace. Ward was taken to the provincial police
station where he was strip-searched and held in a cell for over 4 hours. His vehicle was impounded. When
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the police realized they would not have sufficient grounds on which to obtain a warrant to search the
vehicle based on an attempted assault, Ward and his vehicle were released.204
Ward sued the city, the province, and each of the individual officers who participated in his arrest,
detention, strip search, and seizure of his vehicle. His claim sought damages against the defendants on
both common law and Charter grounds. At trial, the Charter claim for the strip search resulted in $5000
against the province and the seizure of the car resulted in $100 against the City of Vancouver.205 The
balance of the Charter and tort claims were dismissed. The trial court did not accept the government’s
position that Charter damages could not be awarded absent proof of bad faith. This ruling was upheld on
appeal 2-1, with one justice dissenting based on the necessity of a bad faith to a Charter damages claim.206
The Supreme Court replaced the $100 award for the seizure of the car with a declaration. The $5000
award for the strip search, though not a subject of this appeal, was endorsed by the Court.207
The Court’s decision was well-received. Roach, who represented an intervener in Ward, praised the
Court’s opinion, “It was systematically written and laid out a clear point-by-point approach to Charter
damages claims... Stylistically, Ward is a model judgment that provides clear and principled guidance.”208
Justice Linden, writing an extrajudicial comment on Ward, described it as “unanimous, comprehensive
and balanced 80 paragraph reasons.” 209 Cooper-Stephenson, in his 2013 monograph Constitutional
Damages Worldwide, wrote that Ward is “an important definitive judgment... which may well be adopted
internationally.”210
While Ward was praised for its content, it was also suggested that its impact, for better or worse, would be
minimal. Josh Hunter and Robert E. Charney, who represented the Attorney General of Ontario as an
intervener in Ward, later wrote that Charter damages in Ward were a “consolation prize”211 for those who
cannot prove tort claims at common law. Ward merely created “a parallel system of ‘tort lite’” which
would not result in “a radical expansion of government liability beyond that already provided by the law
of tort.”212 Linden suggested that “Ward is a welcome, comforting, needed, overdue, but I must say largely
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symbolic advance in our legal system, but the symbolism of Charter supremacy and its availability for
damage cases do matter mightily.”213 Both Roach and Gerald Chan, noting that the low $5000 award for
the strip search was well below the cost of litigation, expressed similar scepticism on whether litigants
would be running to the courthouse to seek Charter damages.214
Nevertheless, Ward provided clarity to an unclear area of Canadian law. In my view, the four-step test is a
principled framework that trial judges can flexibly apply to any Charter breach to find an appropriate and
just outcome. I think the outcome for Ward was appropriate and just, even if the final quantum is on the
lower side.
1. The Ward Framework
The four-step Ward framework is the method for determining whether Charter damages are, in the
language of section 24(1), an “appropriate and just remedy in the circumstances.”215 The steps are to be
applied sequentially. The crux of the Ward framework is in steps 2 and 3, where the Court balances the
interests of the claimant in a Charter damages remedy against the interests of the government in negating
a damages award. This interest-balancing approach is what makes Charter damages a “unique public law
remedy” distinct from several private law torts it mentions.216 While the parties are invited to raise private
law and tort principles to fortify their positions, Ward subjects these non-Charter principles to the balance
of interests in steps 2 and 3.217

a. Step 1: Proof of a Charter Breach
In all of three sentences, the Court simply states that proving a Charter breach is always the first step
towards earning any 24(1) remedy. The Court does not elaborate on this requirement, leaving the
impression that a 24(1) damages case would be no different than establishing an infringement for any
other Charter remedy. Applied to Ward’s case, the Court referenced the leading case on unconstitutional
strip searches, R v Golden, which restricts the use of strip searches for persons being detained for a short
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period of time at a police station.218 Both in its description of the Ward framework and its application, the
substantive constitutional infringement is separated from the remedial inquiry in the subsequent three
steps.
Linden finds this striking: “there is no mention of any need for fault or any mental element, such as
malice, bad faith or unlawful intention by the government in order to qualify the factual breach of the
Charter as one which could support a damage claim.”219 The reason might be a matter of procedure: in
Ward, the government’s appeal to the Supreme Court did not challenge the trial judge’s findings that the
strip search and vehicle seizure constituted breaches of section 8.220 Since the trial court did not require
bad faith or any other finding of fault above and beyond the ordinary constitutional inquiry, the best hint
from the Court is that those findings were upheld.
Another plausible explanation is that the Court established a framework of damages liability that does not
require a Charter claimant to plead fault, bad faith, or malice on the part of the defendant as in a tort
damages claim. This explanation is supported by the Court’s numerous distinctions between the private
law damages remedy and the “unique public law remedy” in the Charter. This position is also reaffirmed
by the minority decision in Henry, where Justices McLachlin and Karakatsanis would have required fault
to be raised by the defendant at step 3 of the test.221
b. Step 2: Functional Justification of Damages
The Court outlines three purposes for Charter damages: compensation, vindication, and deterrence. The
functional approach to damages is strongly informed by eight cases from New Zealand, South Africa,
Trinidad and Tobago, the United Kingdom, and the United States.222 These cases describe what had yet to
be described in Canadian law: the fundamental purposes of public law damages. Thus, rather than cobble
a test from the dicta and dissents mentioning Charter damages in Canadian law, the Court took a bold step
of creating a new framework based firmly in public law principles from abroad. Roach notes with
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approval that these objectives fit his “principled remedial discretion” criteria, guiding a court’s discretion
without being overly formal or excessively flexible.223
Compensation is described with reference to private law, where damages must be proven by evidence and
may reflect similar quantums to private law results.224 However, compensatory damages in the Charter are
broader than private law damages because they also cover intangible interests like “distress, humiliation,
embarrassment, and anxiety.”225 Vindication “focuses on the harm the Charter breach causes to the state
and to society” and justifies a personal remedy in Charter damages so that Charter rights are not “whittled
away by attrition.”226 Deterrence in Ward is synonymous with “Charter compliance,” and thus justifies a
damages remedy to “regulate government behaviour, generally, in order to achieve compliance with the
Constitution.”227 Compensation, vindication, and deterrence, are not novel heads of damages, but rather
the “the objects of Charter damages” that may justify any head of damages in pursuit of these
objectives.228
Prior to Ward, lower courts had awarded Charter damages using language like “symbolic damages” and
“moral damages,” but these terms are now swallowed up by these three purposes.229 Roach notes that this
arm of the test will produce “reasonable disagreement… but litigants and judges can now agree about the
terms of the debate.”230
Once the claimant has proven, a Charter infringement at step 1 and the functional need for compensation,
vindication, or deterrence at step 2, the analysis then shifts to the government’s burden to negate damages
at step 3.
c. Step 3: Countervailing Factors
As the catch-all title suggests, step 3 presents the government with an opportunity to raise policy factors
against holding the government liable in damages. The Court held that two countervailing factors were
immediately apparent - alternative remedies and good governance concerns - but that the category of
223

Roach, “Late Spring”, supra note 196 at 144.
Ward, supra note 1 at paras 48-50.
225
Ibid at para 27; also see Charles, supra note 103 at 84 (noting that intangible loss “is unique to public law in that it
covers personal emotional reactions such as humiliation, embarrassment, and anxiety, none of which would be
considered legally recognized injuries in private or civil law”).
226
Ward, supra note 1 at paras 28, 25.
227
Ibid at para 29; also see para 38.
228
Ibid at paras 57, 59. This idea is supported by the Court’s reference to exemplary and punitive damages, which
may serve the purposes of compensation, vindication, and deterrence, at para 56.
229
Charles, supra note 103 at 94.
230
Roach, “Late Spring”, supra note 196 at 147.
224

39

countervailing factors was not closed to only those two.231 The burden is on the government to raise these
factors in an effort to prove why damages would not be appropriate and just in the circumstances, which
are then balanced against the claimant’s interests from step 2 in compensation, vindication, and
deterrence.232
Alternative remedies are those remedies which can “adequately meet the need for compensation,
vindication and/or deterrence.”233 The Court identifies two possible categories of alternative remedies. The
first alternative is private law damages against the individual tortfeasor, which may achieve the goals of
compensation, vindication, and deterrence. An award in both private law damages and Charter damages is
precluded based on “double compensation.”234 The second alternative is a different Charter remedy, like a
declaration, which can plausibly achieve the purposes of compensation, vindication, and deterrence in
some circumstances. 235 Thus, alternative remedies in step 3 relate directly back to the purposes of
damages put forward in step 2. For example, where only vindication is engaged, the government might
counter by stating that a declaration is sufficient; however, where compensation for personal loss is at
issue, money damages are more likely to adequately compensate than a declaration. The analysis for
alternative remedies is not simply about whether an alternative exists, but about whether an alternative can
fulfill the function of damages proven at step 2.
Good governance is not fully defined by the Ward Court. While the Court is open to a variety of good
governance concerns to negate a Charter damages remedy, the fundamental statement on good
governance is with regard to deterrence: “Compliance with Charter standards is a foundational principle
of good governance.”236 While the Court goes on to cite several examples of how good governance is
achieved in other areas of law, including the rule from Mackin and private law fault thresholds in Miazga,
these particulars fall under the umbrella of what is called the “chilling effect” rationale.
The chilling effect rationale is pervasive in litigation against government.237 The essence of the chilling
effect rationale is that imposing liability on a government official, like a police officer, will cause the
officer to make decisions based on her potential liability instead of the public interest. A similar
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proposition applies to institutional defendants – that the institution will not pursue bold and innovative
policies in the public interest for fear of potential liability.
The Ward Court indicates that the chilling effect argument should once and for all be put on ice:
At one extreme, it may be argued that any award of s. 24(1) damages will always have a chilling
effect on government conduct, and hence will impact negatively on good governance. The logical
conclusion of this argument is that s. 24(1) damages would never be appropriate. Clearly, this is
not what the Constitution intends.238
Roach notes that the chilling effect argument is particularly irrelevant for 24(1) claims because of the
direct liability of government. While individual government agents “may be more susceptible to being
overdeterred,” government departments are in a better position to make appropriate adjustments to comply
with new Charter decisions from the Court.239
What is the right balance for the chilling effect? From my perspective, the rationale of the chilling effect
should always be qualified by the broader application of good government. Not all chilling effects are
contrary to good governance. Indeed, in other Charter contexts, the Court has created remedial
frameworks to jumpstart reform where the government institution shows complacency towards Charter
rights.240 As the Ward Court states explicitly, the logical conclusion of the chilling effect rationale is to
say Charter damages are never appropriate and just. The chilling effect rationale, in order to be successful,
must show that imposing liability on government in this particular context will negatively affect the public
interest in similar circumstances. 241 In other words, the chilling effect on government should be
demonstrably bad for society, not just bad for government.
To conclude, Linden predicts that step 3 of the Ward test “will undoubtedly occupy the courts in the days
ahead.”242 Indeed, the Court’s next two Charter damages decisions prove him right. Despite the Ward
Court’s rejection of generic chilling effect defences, the same general demur appears with renewed vigour
in both Henry and Ernst.
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d. Step 4: Quantum
In order to answer the “how much?” question, the Ward Court provided broad factors to guide the
calculation of damages. The Court does not place the burden of proving quantum on either party, but
rather places the task of calculation on the court.
The Court first addressed the compensatory objective of damages. Both pecuniary and non-pecuniary
claims could be made. The Court notes that when a person’s Charter rights are breached by a prolonged
detention, they may have pecuniary claims for lost earnings, and they may also have a non-pecuniary
claim that, though hard to quantify, should be calculated as “providing substitute comforts and
pleasures.”243 When quantifying Charter damages, the Ward framework requires a “focus on the breach
of Charter rights as an independent wrong, worthy of compensation in its own right.”244
For deterrence and vindication, the Ward decision suggests that an “appropriate and just” quantum can be
determined with reference to the egregiousness of the infringing conduct: “the more egregious the conduct
and the more serious the repercussions on the claimant, the higher the award for vindication or deterrence
will be.”245 The Court cites to Golden to highlight that strip-searches are inherently humiliating.246 In
analysing the egregiousness of the conduct, the Court referenced the number of officers who were
involved in the strip search, whether the officers left Ward unclothed for a prolonged period of time, and
whether the strip search was exacerbated by verbal abuse or threats.247 The more egregious the factors, the
higher the quantum of damages.
Roach cautions that the “countervailing factors” in step 3, when they are not strong enough to negate
damages entirely, might act as a deductible in step 4. Roach predicts several policy arguments that could
lead to unprincipled results: “The government should not be able to make casual and routine claims that
damage awards will be costly and disruptive or invoke a rigid rule that damage awards should always be
modest.”248 There is some valid concern that Charter damages will be awarded with too much deference
to government interests and not enough emphasis on the Charter injury.
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Roach also notes that the Court’s decision essentially rejects the notion raised by several early
commentators about the prospect of minimum, maximum, or liquidated amounts of damages.249 This
rejection does not fully foreclose a damages per se theory, in that vindication might demand a per se
amount where there is no other remedy, but it does appear to foreclose a fine-like system where
government is penalized with a standard dollar amount. However, it would still be open to courts to
locally determine, based on the evidence, whether a particular government department is a “repeat
offender” and award increasing quantums for specific deterrence.
Little more is known about how to determine quantum. In Henry and Ernst – both cases brought on
summary judgment motions – quantum was not addressed by the Court.
2. The Role of Private Law
Ward declares that Charter damages will be a “unique public law remedy,”250 but acknowledges that the
policy considerations underpinning “private law damages against state actors may be relevant when
awarding public law damages against the state.”251
Private law and tort law are referenced as guiding the future development of Charter damages in three
important areas: at step 2 for defining entitlement and calculating quantum of compensatory damages,252
at step 3 for determining whether policy considerations underpinning fault thresholds and defences might
apply to the circumstances of the Charter damages claim,253 and at step 4 for calculating quantum with
reference to comparable private law awards.254
Private law is not mentioned in the course of determining a breach at step 1. To the contrary, the Court
implies that the failure of Ward’s tort claims did not effect the outcome of his Charter damages claim.255
Ward has been criticized for its overgeneralized approach to “private law” and “tort law,” which are
diverse areas of law comprised of several different doctrines.256 The Ward Court, foreseeing the breadth of
substantive claims for Charter damages, likely resorted to general references to private law in order to
avoid marrying the Ward framework to a particular private law doctrine. As past cases have proven,
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claims for monetary remedies through section 24(1) can arise through tort-like conduct by police (as in
Ward), claims for wages which resemble contract disputes (Mackin and McKinney), and claims for
statutory benefits of a purely political nature (Schachter). In that sense, general references to private law
are an attempt to maintain a contextual approach to remedying Charter infringements with the assistance
of private law.
While Ward references the usefulness of private law in developing the Ward framework in future cases, it
does not rely on any private law principles in its application to Ward’s claim. However, its
overgeneralized and permissive approach to receiving “practical wisdom”257 from private law becomes a
point of contention in both Henry and Ernst.

3. Direct Liability
Based on section 32 of the Charter, which confirms that the Charter applies to government, the Ward
Court held that Charter damages would only be available against government directly, and not against
individual government agents.258 Affirming direct liability, however, may have broader consequences than
the Ward Court explicitly acknowledged.
Taking Ward as an example, consider the difference between the individual police officers who carried
out the strip search and the defendant on the Charter claim – the Province of British Columbia. Placing
too strong a focus on the conduct of the police officers could distract from the real target of Charter
damages: the government itself. In Ward, for example, it was open to the Province to argue that its officers
“went rogue” and departed from their training and standards when conducting the strip-search. It follows
that since the conduct of the officer was detached from the Province, no Charter liability should apply to
government. This type of foreseeable argument can be avoided by placing the focus on the defendant
itself, and analyzing its internal practices, policies, and culture to determine whether Charter liability
should attach to government.259 They Court may, in future cases, wish to clarify how direct liability will
account for the difference between the defendant and its employees.
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Direct liability of government for Charter damages is possibly the most significant differentiator from
private law torts. The Ward Court concedes that these are “complex matters… [for] future cases,”260 but
that is an understatement. In Henry and Ernst, there is substantial disagreement over the implications of
direct liability on elaborating Charter damages doctrine, resulting in confusing holdings about the bases
for liability in Charter damages claims.
4. Fault Thresholds and Immunities
The Ward framework does not require the Charter damages claimant to plead a fault threshold as part of
the burden in steps 1 and 2. Instead, the burden is on the defendant to raise private law fault thresholds
through step 3, but only as a reason for why damages are not appropriate and just in these
circumstances.261 Immunities to damages are ordinarily dealt with on a pre-trial motion, though the Ward
Court seems to place immunities like the rule from Mackin under step 3 as well.
Placing the burden of proving the relevance of an immunity or fault threshold at step 3 can be
confusing.262 Immunities are traditionally decided prior to a trial in the matter. Similarly, fault thresholds
are traditionally pled by the plaintiff in order to demonstrate moral entitlement to damages.263 However,
by placing private law immunities and thresholds as part of the defendant’s burden in step 3, the Court
suggests that these policy factors should not be applied at the outset of a case; instead, the policy factors
underlying their ordinary operation are a part of the balancing act between steps 2 and 3.
Linden rightly notes that “The issue of immunity from civil liability of governments has been debated for
centuries.”264 The responses to the Ward decision relitigate that discussion and arrive at no consensus.
a. Private Law Fault Thresholds
Hunter and Charney express the position taken by Ontario as intervener in Ward, which was that faultbased thresholds and immunities must be same or higher in the Charter than in private law; otherwise,
“Charter damages run the risk of subsuming the entire field of tort law when a governmental actor is the
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defendant.”265 Of course, the opposite argument might also be true: that adopting the tort principles into
the Charter would serve no purpose but to constitutionalize torts against public officials.
Charles finds that while some level of immunity may be appropriate, the distinctness of public law
damages contemplated in Ward creates “the unspoken caveat is that such policies [about immunities]
should not be determinative of the Charter remedy decision.”266 This perspective accords with Ward’s
restriction of immunities to step 3 of the framework.
Roach argues that the exclusion of formal immunities in Ward seems to be a more straightforward path to
compensation from a government entity as opposed to an individual government employee.267 Containing
immunities and private law thresholds to step 3 ensures a relatively quick resolution to Charter damages
claims.
By confining the relevance of immunities and private law thresholds to step 3, the Ward Court ensures a
more streamlined approach to Charter damages claims while still providing government with the tools to
negate a damages remedy when appropriate and just.

b. Mackin as a Countervailing Factor
At the Supreme Court, the defendants argued that Ward should not be able to recover Charter damages
unless he could prove bad faith on the part of the defendants.268 The defendants relied on the principle
from Mackin, which the Court summarized as follows:
Mackin stands for the principle that state action taken under a statute which is subsequently
declared invalid will not give rise to public law damages because good governance requires that
public officials carry out their duties under valid statutes without fear of liability in the event that
the statute is later struck down.269
The Court declined to apply Mackin in Ward because the police offers did not conduct the strip search
under a valid statute.270 However, the Court permitted future defendants to raise the rule in Mackin as a
good government defence in step 3 of the Ward framework.271
265

Hunter & Charney, supra note 195 at 404.
Charles, supra note 103 at 91.
267
Roach, “Late Spring”, supra note 196 at 143.
268
Ward, supra note 1 at para 41.
269
Ibid.
270
Ibid at paras 41, 68.
266

46

Were it not for this statement, it would seem that Mackin would continue to apply as a bar to combining
section 52(1) remedies with section 24(1) remedies from outside the Ward framework. The process would
look something like this: once a 52(1) remedy is awarded, the court would apply Mackin and require proof
of bad faith to get to determine whether any section 24(1) remedy is appropriate and just. Assuming bad
faith was proven, the court would then turn to Ward to determine whether Charter damages are
appropriate and just.
However, since Ward places Mackin under the purview of step 3, it seems that the Ward Court intended to
limit the operation of Mackin to step 3 only. Thus, once a section 52(1) remedy is awarded, the court
should move directly to applying Ward and only consider whether Mackin negates a damages award at
step 3.
A third option: that by placing Mackin in step 3, the Ward Court suggested that bad faith is presumed
unless the government can prove (1) that bad faith is required for damages in the circumstances and (2)
prove the absence of bad faith to negate a damages award.
None of these three approaches are entirely satisfactory or consistent and, I think, reflects the increasing
irrelevance of Mackin.272 Consider the result of removing Mackin from the equation entirely. Once a
section 52(1) remedy is awarded, the court can apply Ward and, at step 3, can consider whether the
alternative remedy of section 52(1) adequately serves the purposes of compensation, vindication, and
deterrence. If so, then no 24(1) remedy is needed. If not, then the court can determine whether damages
(or another remedy) can compliment the section 52(1) remedy to fully compensate, vindicate, and deter in
the circumstances.
As I foreshadowed in Part II of this thesis, there is substantial reason to reconsider Mackin both because of
its internal inconsistencies and in particular because of its irrelevance in light of Ward. Its operation either
before or within the Ward framework is redundant. However, since the Ward Court includes Mackin as a
potential defence at step 3, the best policy would be to require government to first prove the relevance of
Mackin and then prove the absence of bad faith. For clarity, the Charter damages claimant should not
need to plead bad faith, since proving Mackin at step 3 is part of the defendant’s burden. A similar
approach can be taken to the holding in Schachter, which at step 3 could negate a compensatory damages
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award based on the impossibility of determining whether a claimant would have been entitled to statutory
benefits absent an infringement.
In conclusion, confining private law thresholds and the Mackin immunity to step 3 of the Ward framework
is consistent with the allocation of burdens in steps 1 and 2. Step 3 is not an opportunity for the
government to change the rules of the game in the middle of trial, requiring a Charter claimant to prove
more than their burden in steps 1 and 2; rather, step 3 is an opportunity for government to negate the
appropriateness and justness of damages in the circumstances by reference to how the claim might shake
out in the non-Charter context. The Mackin immunity to combining 24(1) and 52(1) remedies may be
raised by government in the same way; however, it is unclear why Mackin remains relevant given that the
government can raise section 52(1) as an adequate alternative remedy to Charter damages.

5. The Role of Statutes on 24(1) - Court of Competent Jurisdiction
Both Roach and Linden note that the 2010 decision in R v Conway signals that several tribunals will have
jurisdiction to award Charter damages.273 Roach points out, however, that this jurisdiction to award
Charter damages could be limited by legislation.274
Provincial courts remain on the outside of Charter damages. While this, too, could be amended by
legislation, any chance for accused persons to obtain a damages remedy in criminal court – what Roach
has called “one stop shopping” – is currently forbidden.275 Although this restriction is inconvenient, the
underlying rationale holds water: provincial courts are not procedurally equipped to handle damages
claims of any sort, and damages may often be sought against a party that is not part of the proceeding.
Long before Ward, Sossin and others raised concerns over this barrier for access to justice and Crown
accountability.276
However, those same concerns may be assuaged by the prospect of Charter damages in Small Claims
Courts. Roach notes that in Ontario, Small Claims Courts are a division of the Superior Court and would
have jurisdiction to award Charter damages. The Small Claims route presents several appealing options:
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litigants can come before the court without a lawyer, can raise claims without the fear of severe costs
awards, and a higher number of individuals will have access to personal Charter remedies.277
Thus, while Superior Courts with civil jurisdiction remain the ideal forum for civil litigation through
24(1), Ward makes space for other quicker, less expensive options for enforcement of Charter rights.

6. Summary: A Unique Public Law Remedy
The Ward framework is the first comprehensive statement by the Court on how to award Charter
damages. The four-step, sequential framework seeks to balance the interests of the Charter claimant and
the government-defendant in order to determine a fair and functional remedy. The Ward framework is a
principled method of determining whether Charter damages are “appropriate and just in the
circumstances.”278
Ward presented the Court with a straightforward set of facts. The section 8 search and seizure
infringement was well-established in Golden. Remedying this infringement with Charter damages is not a
far stretch from remedying comparable intentional torts like assault or battery with damages. Ward does
not raise the same policy issues as Nelles, where the defendants benefited from an historic Crown
immunity, or Schachter, where the Charter infringement impugned a statute and sought both a section 52
and 24(1) remedy.279 The straightforward facts led to a straightforward test for Charter damages which
remains flexible enough to apply to any Charter infringement.
The Court made several firm doctrinal conclusions on direct liability, the statutory definition of a court of
competent jurisdiction, and the functional purposes of Charter damages. The Ward Court was cognizant
of its role within the 24(1) remedial menu by fitting the Charter damages remedy squarely within the
purposive approach to remedies described in Doucet-Boudreau.280 As I argue in Part IV of this paper, the
Ward framework is entirely consistent with the Charter approach to personal remedies.
Despite the purely public law thrust of Ward, the Court believed that the Ward framework could require
assistance from “private law” and “tort law” as it developed in future cases. The Court does not provide
details on which private law causes of action or which torts are the most helpful in furthering the
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objectives of the Charter and Ward. The Court considered that private law thresholds and defences to
individual liability may potentially be relevant to Charter damages cases; however, Ward clearly confined
private law fault thresholds and immunities as countervailing factors rather than outcome-determinative
hurdles.281
This holding becomes the central point of controversy in Henry and Ernst. Both cases reach the Court on
preliminary motions prior to a trial which assess the sufficiency of the claimant’s pleadings. Curiously,
although step 3 of the Ward framework places the burden of raising immunities and private law fault
thresholds on the government, the prevailing decisions in Henry and Ernst are entirely focused on whether
the claimant’s pleadings support a particular requirement at step 3.
As a sign of things to come, I will add that the Ward court uses the term “public law damages” nine times
to distinguish damages under 24(1) from private law damages.282 Tellingly, Henry and Ernst drop that
terminology entirely.

B. Henry v British Columbia
In a 2013 reflection, Myles Frederick McLellan considers whether Ward may have opened a new path to
compensation for the wrongfully convicted and a new form of accountability for police and Crown
lawyers.283 At the time of McLellan’s writing, Ivan Henry was on his way to the Supreme Court of Canada
seeking Charter damages against British Columbia.
In 1983, Henry was wrongfully convicted of 10 sexual offences. He spent 27 years in a penitentiary until a
whistleblower from the Crown office brought forward exculpatory evidence that had never been disclosed
to Henry at trial. The Crown’s trial lawyer, who had since died, had withheld evidence that the police had
twice arrested another suspect for the same crimes – a fact critical to Henry’s defence.284 In light of this
new evidence, Henry was acquitted (though not an exonerated).285 In 2011, Henry brought a Charter
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damages claim for the denial of his Charter right to make full answer and defence based on sections 7 and
11(d) of the Charter. British Columbia moved to strike the pleadings.286
The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether a Charter damages claim against the Crown
required an allegation of malice on the part of the prosecutor. Henry relied on the Ward framework to
argue that the claimant is not required to plead malice in a Charter damages claim. British Columbia
argued that Henry must plead malice in order to succeed on a Charter damages claim for the same policy
reasons as those underpinning the Nelles and Miazga line of malicious prosecution cases.
The majority of four justices led by Justice Moldaver agreed in part, stating that malice is too high;
instead, they articulated the threshold as “intentional.”287 Justice Moldaver describes the “intentional”
standard as a high standard, though lower than malice.288 Requiring the claimant to prove that the Crown
lawyer acted intentionally, the majority reasoned, would bar “marginal claims” from distracting
prosecutors from their important roles and will counteract a chilling effect while still providing a remedy
for the clearest cases.289
In doing so, the majority holding redefines the claimant’s burden at step 1 of the Ward test by defining a
breach of the right to a fair trial through non-disclosure with four elements:

(1) the prosecutor intentionally withheld information;
(2) the prosecutor knew or ought reasonably to have known that the information was material to the
defence and that the failure to disclose would likely impinge on his or her ability to make full
answer and defence;

(3) withholding the information violated his or her Charter rights; and
(4) he or she suffered harm as a result.290
The test can be summarized as requiring a Charter infringement plus intentional action, reasonable
foreseeability, as well as causation and harm.
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This holding deviates from Ward in two important respects. First, it shifts the burden to prove private law
fault from the defendant’s burden in step 3 of the test to the claimant’s burden at step 1. Second, elements
1, 2, and 4 mutate the Ward test by introducing over-generalized tort law doctrines that do not fit within
the Ward framework. I will discuss these two deviations from Ward in detail below.
The concurring opinion, written by Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Karakatsanis, strongly rejects the
majority’s new test. They would have applied Ward without modification. The concurring opinion
identified that step 3 of the Ward test places the burden on the government to raise the applicability of
private law policy rationales, and thus Henry should not have to plead facts sufficient to prove the
defendant’s case.291
The concurring judges distinguished the policy considerations for malicious prosecutions from Charter
damages. Malicious prosecutions implicate individual liability and address the wide discretion to initiate
and continue a prosecution, whereas this particular Charter claim is about direct liability of government
and addresses the non-discretionary duty to disclose. 292 Based on these significant differences, the
concurring justices declined to apply the same policy considerations informing the malice standard to
Henry’s Charter damages claim for non-disclosure. Thus, their opinion would have applied Ward without
shifting any burdens or importing tort law into the Charter analysis. While their analysis fundamentally
disagrees with the majority’s, they concurred in the outcome of the application – denying the defendant’s
motion and sending the matter to trial.
McLennan’s hope that Ward would create a new path to vindication and accountability for wrongful
convictions was set back in Henry. The majority opinion drew substantial criticism. Brooke MacKenzie
expresses her preference for the concurring reasons, arguing that “the Supreme Court’s majority decision
in Henry is an unfortunate step backward for the law of Charter damages, and has once again introduced
uncertainty into an area that was only recently clarified.”293 Sossin, writing about Henry as part of an
overview of constitutional cases in 2015, expresses a similar view: “notwithstanding the principled stand
taken by the concurring minority, Henry calls into question the Court's resolve under the Charter to ensure
against rights without remedies.”294 Hart Schwartz and Anthony Robert Sangiuliano, who represented
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Ontario as intervener in this case, appreciated that the Court “recalibrated” Ward into a “pragmatic,
realistic, and practical approach” for government liability.295
The balance of the literature on Henry is focused on his wrongful conviction, not on 24(1) remedies.296
My focus here is on how the majority of the Court applied over-generalized tort doctrines within the Ward
framework to answer a constitutional question, with due acknowledgement that the issues raised by this
case go far beyond what Charter damages alone can fix.297
1. Who Proves What?
In Henry, the majority decision makes significant changes to step 1 of the Ward test. Although the
majority attempts to limit their decision to cases of wrongful non-disclosure only, their decision sets a
precedent for how to import over-generalized tort law into the Charter damages framework.
The concurring opinion would have applied Ward without modification. At step 1, Ward requires the
claimant to prove a Charter infringement. In this case, the concurring justices had no problem finding that
the undisclosed exculpatory evidence undoubtedly constituted a Charter violation.298 Note, however, that
the concurring justices did not refer to the leading cases on constitutional disclosure obligations, R v
Stinchcombe and R v McNeil, presumably because the events in Henry’s case took place in the Charter era
but before either of those landmark decisions.299
At step 2, the concurring justices asked whether Henry’s claim engaged the purposes of compensation,
vindication, or deterrence, and found that the egregious circumstances surrounding his wrongful
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conviction engaged all three purposes: compensation for “for the hardships Mr. Henry has endured”;300
vindication to “recognize the state’s responsibility for the miscarriage of justice”;301 and deterrence so that
“the state [will] remain vigilant in meeting its constitutional obligations.”302
The concurring opinion would have ended its analysis there. They determined that the claimant had pled
facts sufficient to discharge its burden under Ward. They did not proceed to step 3 as, on this motion
challenging the pleadings, it was not necessary to look at the defendant’s burden to raise countervailing
factors. The motion would have been dismissed, the case would have proceeded to trial for proof of those
elements and, if proven, the defendant could attempt to prove that damages are not the “appropriate and
just” remedy for this particular case at step 3 of the Ward framework.
I must stress that the concurring justices’ approach is the correct application of the Ward framework;
however, the government’s motion capitalized on an ambiguity in Ward. In its discussion of step 3, Ward
permits the government to raise policy considerations drawn from comparable private law claims,
including malicious prosecution actions, as an argument against awarding Charter damages.303
One reading is that step 3 can negate the claimant’s argument in favour of the damages remedy at step 2,
but would not change the determination of whether the Charter breach could be remedied by a different
remedy. This is the concurring justices’ view. The majority, however, holds that private law policy
rationales raised at step 3 can justify changing the claimant’s burden at step 1. This is the sticking point in
Henry.
The majority decision makes two holdings with wide-ranging implications. The first it that it shifts the
burden of proving fault to the claimant. This is a private law paradigm that is inconsistent with the Ward
framework’s commitment to finding a Charter breach then balancing the reasons for and against awarding
damages. The private law paradigm, appearing in Henry as an over-generalized approach to negligence
and intentional torts, requires the Charter claimant to prove that the prosecutor’s conduct was, essentially,
blameworthy.
The second is that this holding appears to create two standards of enforcing the Charter right to make full
answer and defence depending on the process. Henry is explicit that in the civil process, brought through
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the Ward framework, the claimant at step 1 must prove intent, reasonable foreseeability, a Charter
infringement (ostensibly through a Stinchcombe or McNeil violation), and harm and causation. 304
Meanwhile, in the criminal process, an accused need only prove a Stinchcombe violation - that all relevant
evidence was not disclosed and the Crown could not fit that disclosure into an exception – without
reference to intent, reasonable foreseeability, harm or causation. In other words, the right to a fair trial for
the wrongfully convicted – a live issue in Canada – is harder to remedy once the damage is done. The
Court’s holding on this point approaches tone-deafness. When determining the requirements for a Charter
remedy, more attention should be paid to the social circumstances in which these infringements tend to
occur.305 There is no principled reason why remedying a Stinchcombe breach should be more difficult
after a conviction than before, particularly given that failures to disclose often require, as in Henry’s case,
the good-will of an internal whistleblower to even be discovered.306
Indeed, the majority’s four-step test requiring intention, reasonable foreseeability, a Charter breach, and
causation and harm, looks much less like an application of Ward to Stinchcombe violations and more like
an entirely new tort. The Charter infringement is minimized by piling overgeneralized tort principles into
step 1 of the Ward framework.
Despite its attempt to limit it to disclosure issues only, the majority’s decision provides a roadmap for how
to warp the Ward framework with private law paradigms. It permits defendants in future cases to bring
motions against pleadings that shift the focus away from Charter rights and towards the government’s
conduct. Sossin made a similar observation in his comment on the Nelles decision in 1993. The Supreme
Court’s decisions on malicious prosecution were made on preliminary motions in an “evidentiary
vacuum,” leading Justice Lamer to state that the prosecutorial immunity “ultimately boils down to a
question of policy.”307 The same problem reoccurs in Henry,308 where the majority makes substantial
changes to the Ward framework based entirely on policy arguments.
In sum, shifting the burden of proving fault to the claimant at step 1 of the Ward framework only serves to
obscure the balancing of interests in steps 2 and 3. The results are far-reaching, and I spend the balance of
my discussion of Henry explaining how this error led to several problematic holdings.
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2. Step 3: Fear of Hypothermia
The Court’s basis for shifting the burden of proving fault to the claimant is based on the Court’s concern
for Crown lawyers catching hypothermia - the combined effect of being cold in the chilling of their
responsibilities and wet from the flood of litigation. Of course, on this theory, both are not possible - either
they will be chilled and there will be less litigation, or they will not be chilled and be flooded with
litigation. The Attorney General of British Columbia presented both rhetorical arguments without
evidence.309 The Court accepted both arguments, considering these policy concerns to be “very real.”310
The majority’s deferential approach to good governance defences is problematic.311 While the Court
accepted that the chilling effect and floodgates rationales will have a negative impact on government, it
did not make the connection to how these rationales would negatively affect the public interest. Good
governance is for the good of the governed. The majority’s decision shows more concern for the status
quo of government operations, a particularly unconvincing concern given the claimant’s proven Charter
breach for a wrongful conviction.
a. Is it Cold in Here? The Chilling Effect Rationale
Justice Moldaver summarized the chilling effect rationale as a phenomenon where Crown counsel are
“motivated by fear of civil liability” rather than the public interest.312 According to Justice Moldaver,
disclosure decisions should be based on “legal principle” rather than “the spectre of liability.”313
Disclosure decisions, some have argued, are not straightforward because the Stinchcombe standard of
“relevant evidence” is a shifting bar that changes with the stage of the criminal proceeding.314 However, it
seems the worst result of the ghoulish consequence of erring on the side of more disclosure is simply more
fairness to the accused.315
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Sossin is likewise unconvinced by the chilling effect arguments, finding it “as unsavoury as it is
unpersuasive.” 316 He questions why prosecutors are treated “as a vulnerable group who need
protection,”317 and in any event, why the prosecutor’s vulnerabilities would be relevant in the context of
direct liability of government.318 To Sossin, “private law perspectives simply are unsuited to the test of
identifying and enforcing public and constitutional duties.”319
The chilling effect rationale skates by scrutiny on very thin ice. The Ward decision had ostensibly ended
the reflexive use of the chilling effect rationale, but Henry affirmed its central role in the 24(1) remedies
milieu.

b. Is it Wet in Here? The Floodgates Rationale
The Floodgates Rationale is best explained by its namesake. The purpose of a floodgate is to divert the
flow of water and avoid flooding. Where the water is legal claims and the gates are a filter for merit, the
flood is too much meritless litigation in courthouses. The floodgates can be opened and closed, for
example, through creative implementation of administrative bodies or mandatory out-of-court mediation.
A flood of litigation can be a strain on judicial resources. In Henry, the Court was concerned that a low
threshold for constitutional liability arising from disclosure breaches would “force prosecutors to spend
undue amounts of time and energy defending their conduct in court instead of performing their duties.”320
The Court clarifies that without a liability threshold, a claim alleging “a relatively minor breach with
minimal harm” could lead to “opening the floodgates to scores of marginal claims.”321
Of course, there can only be scores of marginal claims if there are scores of disclosure breaches. Though
some have praised Justice Moldaver’s decision for properly reflecting on the “everyday, real-life work of
an Assistant Crown Attorney,”322 one would think that scores of Charter breaches should not be a part of
the job description. Indeed, if there are scores of casual disclosure breaches, it might even be called a
complacent attitude towards Charter obligations.
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The concurring judges point out that most disclosure issues are resolved within the criminal process and
only rarely after a conviction at trial.323 From that perspective, there are no marginal claims – only
wrongful convictions carrying varying degrees of prejudice and harm. Indeed, after Ward, a case
involving police misconduct at a relatively low end of fault, the statistics indicate no rush to the court
filing office.324 Is there much more to the fear of being swamped by Charter damages litigation than legal
antlophobia?
Roach points out that the Ward Court dismissed the general demurring from government about chilling
effects and floodgates because “compliance with Charter standards is a foundational principle of good
governance.”325 In Henry, the majority seems to suggest that Charter compliance is only important in big
cases. This holding should be resisted.
Even assuming that Henry is correct in focusing its concern on serious infringements only, why would the
Ward framework not be up to the challenge?326 For example, where a serious and intentional failure to
disclose resolves in an acquittal, one would wonder if the claimant could satisfy their burden, at step 2 of
Ward, to prove their need for compensation or vindication. Deterrence may be engaged, but several
alternative remedies and procedures could satisfy that purpose, including costs, a declaration, or
potentially through complaints through the law society or Ministry of the Attorney General. In other
words, Ward is equipped with adequate tools for dealing with so-called marginal claims.
The majority was clear in its acceptance of the rote, abstract application of the chilling effect rationale and
floodgates rationale. In order to protect Crown lawyers from hypothermia, the Court wrapped them in a
blanket of immunity for Charter infringements that fall below the level of intentional fault.
3. Intentional Negligence
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The majority decision in Henry relies on private law tort rationales to create its “intentional” standard –
lower than malice, but high enough to exclude marginal claims.327 What is unclear is which specific area
of tort law the majority believes is best suited to guide a Charter damages claim. As I explain here, the
Court relies on an over-generalized approach to tort principles. In the majority’s attempt to describe a
standard lower than malice but higher than gross negligence, it creates an innominate chimera.
Recall that the four-part test to be applied at step 1 of the Ward framework for unconstitutional disclosure
obligation requires intent, reasonable foreseeability, a Charter violation, and that the violation caused
harm.328
The element of intentional withholding of disclosure conjures intentional torts, or something similar to the
deliberate action necessary to establish misfeasance of public office.329 Justice Moldaver’s use of the
reasonable foreseeability element seems to call on the tort of negligence.330 Likewise, the requirement for
causation and harm could be with respect to their definition in the tort of negligence, or their broader
application in private law torts.
Justice Moldaver takes great pains to explain that he rejects malice as the appropriate standard for
nondisclosure cases.331 Likewise, he firmly rejects the tort of negligence, arguing that “a negligence-type
standard poses considerable problems, and ought to be rejected.”332 He insists that pairing the intention
element with reasonable foreseeability establishes a standard that will “rise above a purely objective
‘reasonableness’ or ‘marked departure’ standard grounded in a duty of care paradigm.”333
Despite Justice Moldaver’s insistence that this standard rejects malice, Sossin reads the four-part test and
does not see a meaningful difference between it and malice.334 Indeed, it does appear that way. Likewise,
despite Justice Moldaver’s insistence that this standard is not based on the tort of negligence, Schwartz
and Sangiuliano focus on the words would know, or would reasonably be expected to know, and see the
standard of care from the tort of negligence.335 Indeed, it does appear that way, too.
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The standard set out in Henry must be more than a Rorschach test; or, there must be an explanation as to
how Justice Moldaver can explicitly reject both malice and negligence but create a test that looks like both
malice and negligence.
The answer to this question may be found in a broader trend in tort law in Canada and abroad. Varuhas
describes “the imperialism of negligence-type thinking,”336 a phenomenon in which the phrase “tort law”
has become synonymous with the tort of negligence.337 The dominance of the tort of negligence has been
observed in Canada as well, exemplified by “the intrusion of fault concepts into other areas of tort law,”
including “strict liability torts… diluted by fault concepts.”338 Tort law broadly has “drifted incrementally
and erratically towards greater generalization and integration” focused around negligence concepts.339
This trend throughout the world and in Canada could explain the apparent paradox in the Henry majority’s
decision. In the context of Charter damages, the Court should resist the temptation to use over-generalized
private law tort doctrines within the Ward framework. Any reference to private law within Ward ought to
be particularly identified and specifically grounded in Doucet-Boudreau’s purposive approach to Charter
remedies.
4. Causation and Harm
The over-generalization of tort law is problematic not only because it lacks purposive grounding, but also
because it is simply incompatible with the rest of the Ward test. In particular, Justice Moldaver’s
requirement that the victim of the Charter infringement “suffered harm as a result”340 imports causation
and harm from the tort of negligence into step 1 of the Ward framework as part of the claimant’s prima
facie case.
As the concurring justices point out, requiring the claimant to prove causation and harm at step 1 has
serious consequences for step 2. Vindication and deterrence, as defined by Ward, are not guided by harm
to the individual, but rather are intended to promote Charter rights and Charter compliance.341 In
practical terms, the majority holding in Henry limits Charter damages in nondisclosure cases to
compensation only.342 Limiting damages to material harm is entirely inconsistent with the purposes of
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vindication and deterrence outlined in Ward. Similarly, only permitting vindication and deterrence
damages to flow alongside compensation is likewise inconsistent with step 2 of Ward, which permits
Charter damages for any of the three purposes.
The majority lists several examples of how harm and causation can be proven. Beginning with the most
obvious – an historical wrongful conviction – the majority would also approve of Charter damages where
a failure to disclose resulted in an acquittal if the claimant can show “that the charges would have been
dismissed or withdrawn at an earlier stage of proceedings had proper disclosure been made.”343 Frankly, I
do not understand how that is possible, since withdrawal of charges is part of the prosecutor’s core
discretion protected by the malice standard in Miazga.344 Indeed, being prosecuted is not in itself a
“legally cognizable harm” – only malicious prosecution rises to that level.345 This suggests to me that the
Charter damages claim in Henry shares more in common with malicious prosecution than the majority is
willing to admit.
Furthermore, causation and harm carry with them other negligence doctrines that the majority does not
mention. For example, factual causation on the “but for” standard carries with it the notions of joint
causation or alternative causes. Thus, where a peaceful protest is broken up by police in riot gear just as a
rainstorm begins, would the police escape liability for their unconstitutional act because the weather was
another factual cause of the protest dispersing? Would the Court engage in analysis of whether the police
in riot gear were a “substantial factor” on the interference of the right? Would only those with umbrellas
qualify for compensatory damages? Notice that none of these questions about causation address the real
issue: whether the police infringed the protesters’ section 2 rights. Requiring elements of harm and
causation shifts the focus from the constitutional injury to meandering inquiries about compensable harm.

5. Direct Liability: A Problem
In Henry, Justices McLachlin and Karakatsanis repeated the importance of the distinction between
Charter damages and private law damages: “Charter liability flows from the constitutionally entrenched
mechanisms that permit individuals to hold the state to account. This is distinct from tort liability, which
imposes conduct-based thresholds to regulate tortious conduct as between individuals.”346
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This passage highlights two important distinctions between Charter damages and private law cases against
prosecutors: the defendant in a Charter damages claim is the institution, not the individual, and the
Charter imposes obligations on the government itself, not necessarily on the individual’s private conduct.
Sossin comments on these distinctions, noting that the Henry majority’s focus on the blameworthiness of
the individual Crown lawyer is disconnected from the government’s Charter obligations.347 Sossin argues
that the focus should not be on individual conduct, but on “unjustified harm imposed on those subject to
state authority flowing from breaches of their rights under the Charter.”348 The key word is ‘unjustified’,
recalling that Charter rights are limited by the government’s ability to justify its infringing conduct.
Justice Moldaver dismisses the significance of direct liability. For example, in discussing the chilling
effect, he argues that civil liability of government affects the individual Crown lawyers because “Like all
lawyers, Crown counsel are professionals who jealously guard their reputations and whose actions are
motivated by more than personal financial consequences.”349 The difficulty is that when a Crown lawyer’s
motives are implicated in a Charter case, they do not have the right to defend themselves. The reputation
they guard so jealously might not be so jealously guarded by the defendant in Charter cases – their
employer, the Ministry of the Attorney General.
Indeed, based on the circumstances of a particular case, the Attorney General’s office, as the defendant in
a Charter damages claim, might have an interest in distancing itself from its employee. The non-party
Crown lawyer does not have the right to testify and certainly does not have the right to marshal evidence
in defence of her reputation. It could take as little as an agreed statement of facts for a Crown lawyer’s
reputation to be tarnished without due process. If the same Crown lawyer later faced a disciplinary hearing
through the law society – or, in other circumstances, a police officer in a disciplinary hearing – then the
tribunal might be bound, or at least significantly influenced, by the holding of the Superior Court that this
individual government actor was at fault in the Charter claim; potentially worse, the evidence raised by
the individual government actor at the later hearing would call into question the evidence heard in the
Charter damages case, resulting in inconsistent and incomplete holdings. The reputation of individual
government employees should be a concern for Charter damages doctrine.
Surely this is an unintended consequence of the Henry holding. It is, however, symptomatic of the
majority’s conflation of private law principles and the Ward framework.
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Instead of using step 3 of the Ward framework to consider the fault of individuals, it could be used to
consider the fault of the institution. Rather than focus on the chilling effect of individual government
agents, a better question would be whether imposing liability on the Attorney General’s office will have a
chilling effect on prosecutions in that local courthouse, province-wide, or nation-wide. Indeed, framing the
step 3 discussion in this context sounds far more like a “good governance” concern about Ministry
resources, local policies and practices, and serving the public interest. Clearly, these systemic concerns are
more relevant to good governance than a single person’s conduct.
Direct liability should be a driving force in sharpening Charter damages doctrine in future cases. As it
stands, ignoring the significance of direct liability, as the majority in Henry did, can lead to troubling
unintended outcomes.

6. New Trial, Settlement, and Appeal
After the Supreme Court’s decision, Henry amended his pleadings, settled out of court with the City of
Vancouver and the federal government, and proceeded to trial against the province only.
A brief review of the trial shows that the infiltration of private law principles reached a peak. Justice
Hinkson’s decision is replete with tort language, including determining that Henry was a “thin skull”
plaintiff because he was “mentally destabilized at the time he was making important decisions about trial
matters.”350 Rather perversely, Justice Hinkson reduced part of the overall damages award on the grounds
of causation, because “had Mr. Henry not been convicted in 1982, it is probable that he would have
continued to offend with some frequency as a relatively petty criminal, and found himself incarcerated at
various intervals for approximately one-third of the time that he did spend in custody between 1982 and
2009.”351 In other words, despite being imprisoned for crimes he did not commit, his compensation was
reduced for crimes he did not commit. This application of private law tort doctrines in the constitutional
context is unsettling. The remedy for a due process infringement by the Crown was reduced for what can
only be described as a further lack of due process by presuming Henry would have committed crimes if he
only had the chance.
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In a decision to exclude the Vancouver Rape Relief as interveners, Justice Hinkson explicitly referred to
the case as “Private litigation between the two remaining parties, albeit one a government actor.”352 Emma
Cunliffe observes that neglecting the public aspect of the case had a detrimental effect on Charter rights:
“Reconstructed as private litigation, the Henry trial ultimately denied the complex and multidimensional
approach to Charter rights.”353
Private law resurfaced once more in Henry, this time after the completion of his trial. Justice Hinkson
awarded Henry an astounding total of $8,086,691.80 in damages against the province.354 British Columbia
argued, successfully, that the damages amount should be reduced by the amounts of the settlements with
the City of Vancouver and the federal government, which totalled approximately 5 million dollars.355
Henry argued that applying the principle of double-recovery mechanically would frustrate the purposes of
deterrence and vindication identified in Ward.356 The British Columbia Court of Appeal rejected that
argument and ordered that the province’s damages be reduced by the total amounts of the settlements.357
The net result might be correct by the numbers, but it seems to frustrate the function of Charter damages
in vindicating the particular Charter wrong of each defendant and deterring each defendant’s bad conduct.
These subsequent decisions obliterate the “uniquely public law” remedy described in Ward.
7. Summary: A Uniquely Troubled Public Law Remedy
The Henry decision does significant disservice to the “uniquely public law remedy” described in Ward.
Whereas Ward frequently used the term “public law damages” to distinguish the 24(1) remedy for its
tortious cousin, that phrase is never used in Henry.
The shift in language is apparent in the substance of the Henry majority’s decision. Based on a
comparison between malicious prosecution and a Charter claim for nondisclosure, the majority imports
overly-generalized tort law doctrines to create an unclear doctrine for Charter damages claims for failures
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to disclose. The majority attempts to confine their holding to these narrow factual circumstances,358 but its
reasoning is too easily adaptable to other Charter damages scenarios.
The majority’s decision mutates Ward by shifting the burden of raising fault from the defendant’s burden
in step 3 to the claimant’s burden at step 1. The result is that courts will focus on whether the conduct of
the Crown lawyer is worth punishing, rather than ask the important question: whether imposing liability
on the Ministry of the Attorney General has a negative effect on good governance. This is a disappointing
change to the Ward framework which reappears in Ernst.
The private law rationales come into the Ward framework from what I have called the concern for
hypothermia based on the chilling effect and floodgates rationales. Adopting these rationales without
evidence, the majority dismissed of the importance of direct liability of government in Charter damages
claims, creating the unintended consequence of placing a Crown lawyer’s conduct as the centre of a case
to which the lawyer is not a party. Direct liability should mean that inquiries into fault should be focused
directly on the actual defendant, not the defendant’s arms-length employee. Not only do individual
government agents stand to suffer without due process, but the entire inquiry misses the point of achieving
good government through Charter compliance.
Among the more confusing aspects of the holding is the majority’s test requiring the claimant prove that
the prosecutor was acting both intentionally, unreasonably, and also resulting in a Charter breach. The
over-generalized tort principles used crafting the majority’s holding are disconnected from the DoucetBoudreau definition of purposive remedies. Indeed, other tort law principles that the majority invites into
step 1 of the Ward framework, like causation and harm, are incompatible with the purposes of deterrence
and vindication in step 2. The net result is an unprincipled Charter damages doctrine.
The trial after the Supreme Court decision highlights precisely how the Henry decision took a “uniquely
public law remedy” and turned it into a novel tort action. Henry’s Charter claim was resolved on purely
private law grounds.
Henry’s odyssey to vindication reflects an extreme reliance on private law in awarding Charter damages.
In this next section, I argue that the over-generalized private law principles in Henry directly influenced
the troubling decision by the plurality in Ernst. Public law damages in Ward are now encumbered by a
host of invasive private law elements.
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C. Ernst v Alberta Energy Regulator
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ernst v Alberta Energy Regulator, law student Julia Kindrachuk
wrote a case comment on the Alberta Court of Appeal decision suggesting the Supreme Court dutifully
apply the Ward framework and “protect the constitutionally-entrenched judicial discretion” to award 24(1)
damages.359 I suspect Kindrachuk was disappointed to learn that the Ernst decision instead came to the
rather unwarranted conclusion that Charter damages would never be appropriate and just against a
tribunal in any circumstance.360 The Court’s three opinions are divided along similar lines as the Henry
Court, namely over how private law tort principles ought to guide the Ward framework for Charter
damages.
Ernst’s claim began with a complaint about local hydraulic fracturing (or fracking) contaminating her
drinking water.361 After a series of complaints to the Alberta Energy Regulator (the “Board”), she was
informed that the Board would no longer accept her correspondence unless she refrained from criticizing it
in the media.362 Ernst alleged in her statement of claim that the provincial tribunal infringed her Charter
guarantee to freedom of expression when, in essence, it punished her for publicly criticizing the Board.363
She also made a claim in negligence against the Board for the harm caused by its negligent enforcement of
their environmental protection mandate. The Board countered by arguing that a statutory immunity
contained in the Energy Resources Conservation Act (“ERCA”) was an absolute bar to both her claim in
negligence and her Charter damages claim. As in Henry, the Supreme Court received the appeal on
summary judgment.
The immunity clause relied upon by the Board reads:
No action or proceeding may be brought against the Board or a member of the Board … in respect
of any act or thing done purportedly in pursuance of this Act, or any Act that the Board
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administers, the regulations under any of those Acts or a decision, order or direction of the
Board.364
Justice Cromwell, writing for four justices in the majority on the disposition of the case, made two
holdings. The first is that it is plain and obvious that the statutory immunity bars the Charter damages
claim.365 Justice Cromwell points out that Ernst herself argued that the statutory immunity clause barred
her Charter damages claim – indeed, it was the basis of her appeal to challenge the constitutionality of the
statutory immunity.366 The second is that the statutory bar is not unconstitutional.367 The reason for this
holding is perplexing: Justice Cromwell held that Charter damages would never be appropriate and just
against a tribunal on the basis of common law quasi-judicial immunities to damages, and therefore the
statutory immunity does not unconstitutionally bar access to a 24(1) remedy.368 The plurality found in
favour of the Board and struck the pleadings.369
Justice Abella, writing for herself but joining Justice Cromwell in the outcome, agreed that the statutory
immunity bars Ernst’s Charter damages claim, but emphasized that the record on the constitutional
question was deficient.370 Her separate opinion was written to indicate that she would have disposed of the
appeal on procedural grounds: Ernst had not notified the Attorney General of her constitutional claim, and
therefore her appeal should fail.371
Justices McLachlin, Brown, and Moldaver, writing for themselves and Justice Cote, dissented on the
outcome, primarily because they did not believe that the statutory immunity plainly and obviously barred
Ernst’s Charter damages claim. The dissenters would have applied Ward sequentially and then
determined whether the facts pled were sufficient to overcome to the statutory immunity. The dissent
found that the punitive conduct pled by Ernst was not immunized by the ERCA and therefore would have
permitted the Charter damages claim to proceed to trial.372
As the dissenters concede, the Ernst case raises difficult and novel issues that defy the straightforward
application of any legal framework.373
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Academic responses to Ernst strike a similar tone. In a compelling comparison between Ernst and
Roncarelli v Duplessis, the infamous pre-Charter case where the Quebec Premier was liable in damages
for religious discrimination, Matthew Lewans expresses his hope that “Ernst will be a case of passing
interest.”374 Lorne Sossin would second Lewans by pointing to the worst-case scenario of Ernst: “In my
view, by upholding the validity of a statute to bar a Charter remedy, this first judgment of 2017 has
damaging potential to erode the enforcement of Charter rights.”375 In line with his comments on Nelles
and Henry, Sossin continues to advocate for a purely public law approach to Charter damages. In a similar
vein, Jennifer Koshan writes, “The Ernst decision is challenging to read. It comes across as largely
technical and devoid of the substance of Ernst’s Charter claim, except for the dissenting decision of Chief
Justice McLachlin.”376
Where Ward was widely hailed as a “model judgment”377, Ernst is the opposite. Though twice the length
of Ward, it tells us much less about Charter damages. The Ernst decision continues the trend from Henry,
where the justices sharply disagree over the role of private law tort principles in deciding Charter
damages claims.

1. Finding the Bottom Line
Part of the difficulty in analysing Ernst is distinguishing between the essential parts of each opinion and
the obiter dicta. The three opinions answer entirely different questions. However, each opinion also
addresses the arguments of the others. The result is a set of conflicting opinions that are difficult to
understand and analyse.
In order to sort through this difficult case, it is helpful to consider the question on appeal. The question put
before the motions judge and the Alberta Court of Appeal was whether the Charter damages claim was
barred by the statutory immunity in the ERCA. Both the motions judge and unanimous Court of Appeal
held that the immunity clause barred the Charter damages claim.378 Ernst’s appeal to the Supreme Court,
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for the first time, challenged the constitutionality of the statutory immunity.379 In order to do so, however,
she had to place the statutory immunity into controversy by acknowledging that it barred her claim.380
Thus, the issue formally before the Supreme Court was the constitutionality of the statutory bar, not its
applicability.
On this narrow issue, all three of the Court’s opinions differ. Justice Cromwell answers this question by
stating that the statutory immunity is not unconstitutional because Charter damages would never be
available against a tribunal.381 This is a curious response to the question. In essence, his position is that
Charter damages are never appropriate and just against a tribunal, and therefore the constitutionality of
the statutory immunity is moot.
Justice Abella would dismiss the appeal because of Ernst’s failure to notify the Attorney General of the
constitutional question, thereby providing the Court with an insufficient record.382
Justice McLachlin simply declined to answer the constitutional question. 383 Instead, the dissenters
answered the question posed at the Court of Appeal as to whether the statutory immunity applied to
Ernst’s Charter damages claim. They found that Ernst’s pleadings made allegations of punitive and
arbitrary conduct not covered by the statutory immunity, and therefore should be permitted to go to trial.
Based on the above, the real tension in the decision is about the best question on appeal, not necessarily
about the right application of the Ward framework. However, Justice Cromwell’s holding that Charter
damages, regardless of the statutory immunity, would never be appropriate and just gets the attention of
the dissenting judges.384

2. Step 3: Never Appropriate and Just?
The most extraordinary aspect of Justice Cromwell’s analysis is the suggestion that Charter damages
against a tribunal would never be “appropriate and just.”385 This extreme conclusion is not supported by
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its reasons. This holding has the potential to eviscerate the Ward framework and creates a shockingly large
safe-zone for Charter violations by administrative agencies.
Recall that the earliest jurisprudence on Charter remedies considered section 24(1) as unimaginably
broad, that “It is impossible to reduce this wide discretion to some sort of binding formula for general
application in all cases.”386 In defining the term “appropriate and just,” the Court in Doucet-Boudreau
listed four criteria: that remedies meaningfully vindicate rights, employ legitimate means, flow from the
powers of the court, and that the remedy be fair to the party against whom it is ordered.387 These guiding
principles about the breadth and purposive approach to Charter remedies is in direct conflict with Justice
Cromwell’s assertion that tribunals have an absolute immunity from Charter damages in all
circumstances.
Justice Cromwell identifies Ward as the leading case for Charter damages; however, he does not address
either step 1 or step 2 in any detail.388 Following the majority of the Court in Henry, Justice Cromwell
focuses almost all of his analysis on step 3 of the Ward framework, which puts the burden on the
government to raise evidence as to why Charter damages would not be an appropriate and just remedy.
The plurality’s justification returns to familiar territory explored by the majority in Henry:

•

excessive demands on resources, [a stand-in for the floodgates rationale]

•

the potential chilling effect on the behaviour of the state actor, and

•

protection of quasi-judicial decision making.389

Most concerning is that Justice Cromwell lists these factors as “capable of negating a prima facie duty of
care”390 – a concept from the tort of negligence implicitly rejected by Ward391 and explicitly rejected by
Henry.392

386

Mills, supra note 48 at para 278.
Doucet-Boudreau, supra note 8 at paras 55-58.
388
Ernst, supra note 4 at para 26, Cromwell J. It appears the plurality does not address step 1 and 2 of the Ward
framework at all; however, the dissenting opinion considers this an acceptance that Ernst satisfied her burden in
those steps. At para 164, McLachlin CJC, Moldaver and Brown JJ.
389
Ibid at para 45, Cromwell J.
390
Ibid, emphasis added.
391
Ward, supra note 1 at para 68 (“Mr. Ward sued the officers for assault, as well as the City and the Province for
negligence. These claims were dismissed... While this defeated Mr. Ward’s claim in tort, it did not change the fact
that his right under s. 8 of the Charter to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure was violated.”)
392
Henry, supra note 3 at para 93, (“A duty of care paradigm risks opening up a Pandora’s box of potential liability
theories.”)
387

70

In addition to these three reasons, discussed in detail below, Justice Cromwell also identified an
alternative remedy for Ernst – judicial review. Justice Cromwell notes that judicial review would have
provided Ernst with “prompt vindication” and “effective relief” of her Charter breach. 393 Justice
Cromwell justifies his decision based on his interpretation of Henry, which requires a court to consider
“general principles of liability.”394
This holding is troubling. As I stated in my discussion of Henry, there is reason to be suspicious of rote
arguments about chilling effects and floodgates. However, Justice Cromwell’s decision extended those
arguments beyond the policy rationales for Crown immunity. The justification provided by the plurality is
a cocktail of quasi-judicial immunity, elements from the law of negligence, and “countervailing factors…
of a more generalized nature.”395 These loose justifications are at odds with the purposive approach to
Charter remedies broadly and with Ward specifically.
a. Chilling Effect, Floodgates, and Quasi-Judicial Immunity:
In Ward, Justice McLachlin raises and dismisses the chilling effect as hyperbole. She writes that “the
logical conclusion of this argument is that s. 24(1) damages would never be appropriate. Clearly, this is
not what the Constitution intends.”396
What seemed so clearly right in Ward seemed so clearly wrong in Ernst. Justice Cromwell, who was
himself on the Ward Court, flips the script on the chilling effect.
I provide a thorough critique of the chilling effect and floodgates rationales in section III-B-2 of this paper
where I discuss the Henry majority’s reliance on these generalized demurs to government liability. In
short, the Court’s application of the chilling effect and floodgates rationales to Charter damages cases
obscured the direct liability of government by placing the individual government actor front and centre in
the analysis.
In Ernst, the most pressing concern about these common law rationales is their stated connection to the
law of negligence. Justice Cromwell’s decision implies that all damages claims against government
require a duty of care in order for liability to attach, yet the duty of care analysis in Canadian law is only
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required for the tort of negligence.397 For Charter damages, the only connection to negligence is the
remedy – money. That single factor seems to drive the analysis in Ernst further and further towards
conflation between Charter damages and over-generalized private law damages, particularly from the tort
of negligence.
The floodgates argument, here described as an “excessive demand on resources,” has some compelling
features. Justice Cromwell describes the statutory immunity in the ERCA as legislative assent to the
common law immunities enjoyed by judges extended to this tribunal. The purpose of that immunity for
discretionary decision-makers is, as the plurality describes, to avoid case-by-case decisions where the
defendant is plagued by litigation threatening its independence and impartiality.398 The Henry decision
supported a qualified immunity for prosecutors to weed out “marginal cases”399 – but the plurality in Ernst
goes a step further when it states that “Even qualified immunity undermines the decision-maker’s ability
to act impartially and independently, as the mere threat of litigation, achieved by artful pleadings, will
require the decision-maker to engage with claims brought against him or her.”400 Where the Henry
majority raised the floodgate to only permit the most serious claims to flow to court, the plurality in Ernst
dammed the flow completely.
This extreme holding elicited a dissent in kind. The four dissenting justices saw “no compelling policy
rationale to immunize state actors in all cases,” adding, “we see no basis for our colleague’s
characterization.”401 In particular, they reject the plurality’s application of the duty of care in negligence
law as dispositive against Charter damages.402
I strongly agree; an absolute immunity is not justifiable on public law or private law grounds. On private
law grounds, a special immunity for government is in itself contrary to the Rule of Law.403 On public law
grounds, there is room for a limited immunity from damages based on the supremacy of Parliament and,
as Ward notes, a concern for good governance by immunizing purely discretionary decisions and political
choices; but outside that narrow band of protection, what benefit comes from complete immunity to the
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Charter? If the chilling effect and floodgates rationales are the only basis for carving out exceptions to the
Rule of Law, we can hardly expect to see more government accountability on either public law or private
law grounds.

b. Alternative Remedies
At step 3 of Ward, the government may argue that the claimant has alternative remedies that are less
invasive on government than damages.
Justice Cromwell accepted the defendant’s argument that judicial review was an alternative, and less
invasive, remedy than Charter damages in the circumstances.404 I would tend to agree that damages are
not the only remedy for these allegations. Ward considers alternative remedies to include both public law
remedies, like a declaration, or private law remedies, like damages in tort.405 However, Ward is also clear
that the claimant is not required to exhaust all her remedies before asking for 24(1) damages.406 In this
case, it may be that the claimant’s pleading, which stresses punitive and arbitrary conduct, may prove
egregious to the point of justifying damages, or may be proven minor enough to be adequately vindicated
and deterred with judicial review or a declaration.
Lewans persuasively argues that the plurality’s decision implies Charter damages should be “regarded as
a remedy of last resort.” 407 In his comparison to Roncarelli, Lewans notes that judicial review of
Roncarelli’s business operating licence would have provided “cold comfort” to Roncarelli, whose entire
business had essentially been destroyed by Duplessis’ malicious exercise of his political office.408 In that
case, Roncarelli was permitted to seek damages “despite various statutory provisions which limited the
civil liability of public officials.”409
Similarly, Sossin picks on the plurality’s “puzzling” holding that although judicial review cannot be
barred by statute, Charter damages can.410 Why would one be subject to immunity while the other would
not be? There is no answer to this question in Ernst.
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The combined effect of Lewans’ assertion that Charter damages have become a remedy of last resort and
Sossin’s assertion that a statute can bar a constitutional remedy is that section 24(1) remedies are, contrary
to Ward, being clothed “in a straight-jacket of judicially prescribed conditions.”411

3. Direct Liability and Good Governance: A Failure
As I argue throughout this paper, Ward’s holding that Charter damages apply to government directly, and
not to individuals, should be an integral part of developing the future of Charter damages doctrine. Where
the defendant is an administrative agency, direct liability should focus the good governance arm of the
Ward test on the particular function that agency purports to execute. Treating government as a monolith is
unproductive for achieving a Charter-compliant society.
In Ward, the direct liability of government was an implicit but integral part of the Court’s choice to not
apply a duty of care analysis to the section 8 search and seizure claim against the province. Ward did not
have to prove that the officers who conducted the strip search and seized his vehicle did so contrary to
what a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would have done in order to succeed on his Charter
damages claims against the province.412
In Henry, the direct liability of government is explicitly considered irrelevant by the majority, who instead
treat the actual defendant – the Ministry of the Attorney General – and its employees as an indivisible
entity. As I noted in my discussion on Henry, one of the tragic consequences of this holding is that
individual government agents may find that their reputation is the subject of litigation to which they are
not an actual party. Charter breaches have a multiplicity of causes, and to only remedy those caused by an
individual’s intentional action is to leave many systemic causes of Charter breaches outside of the Charter
damages purview.
Ernst raises another problem, which is the distinction between the judicial and executive functions of a
particular administrative agency. Unlike traditional judges, who have no political or executive functions,
administrations often have several functions in addition to the decision to pursue prosecutions and render
judgments. Ernst argued that the alleged breach of freedom of expression was done by the Board’s
Compliance Branch, which was carrying on an executive function that would not attract the immunities
411
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ascribed to a judicial function.413 However, Justice Abella agrees with the plurality when she writes that
the Court’s precedent suggests a reviewing Court ought to avoid “artificial binary distinctions between
adjudicative and other administrative decisions.”414
The immunity clause in the ERCA would likely bar a private law damages claim against any branch of the
Board, regardless of its function. However, the Ward framework demands specificity. In its countervailing
arguments at step 3, the administrative agency can show that “good governance” militates against a
damages award. However, the term “good governance” itself, I suggest, demands an inquiry into the
governmental function being exercised by the agency. Unlike the inquiry into a duty of care, which looks
at the administration’s statutory duties and relationship of proximity to the plaintiff, the good governance
factor asks specifically whether the government’s Charter infringement – already proven – should not be
remedied by damages because of the effect liability would have on the ongoing functioning of the agency.
Under this particularized approach, at step 3 of the Ward framework, the Board would have to point to its
own mandate, policies, and functions to show why damages are not appropriate and just to remedy the
infringement of Ernst’s freedom of expression. The inquiry is not so different from the section 1 inquiry
into the pressing and substantial objective, except it focuses on the narrower question of whether liability
in damages would interfere with the Board’s ability to carry on its particular function.415 It is impossible to
answer that question without a trial, and I would not answer it here. My intention is to show that good
governance, conceived as it has been by the Court to date, is too broad an inquiry. Indeed, it is no wonder
Justice Cromwell, defining good governance so broadly, finds that damages would never be appropriate
and just against an administrative body.
Whereas in Henry the Court focused too narrowly on the individual instead of the government, in Ernst
the plurality focused too broadly on the administrative agency as a whole rather than particularize the
government function being defended as ‘good government’. Their results are the same: permitting
defendants to escape Charter damages liability because of the Court’s refusal to carefully scrutinize the
actual defendant’s conduct.
4. Statutory Immunity, Not Notwithstanding
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Sossin and Lewans both express their concern over the most interesting issue in the case: whether a statute
can ever limit a particular type of 24(1) remedy.416 Justice Cromwell’s decision simply accepted the
claimant’s argument that the statute barred her own claim, but did not elaborate.417 The dissenting judges
held that Ernst pled facts about punitive conduct that could get around the statutory immunity.418 None of
the opinions directly addressed what Sossin and Lewans saw unfold: that a legislature may have
successfully circumvented the notwithstanding clause.
Sossin’s view prioritizes constitutional supremacy. He argues that Charter damages cannot be precluded
by statute unless the notwithstanding clause is used to “immunize public bodies from Charter scrutiny,
and therefore, from Charter remedies.”419
Sossin’s statement here is carefully crafted to remind us that the notwithstanding clause does not apply to
remedies directly. By its own wording, the notwithstanding clause can only be used to narrow the scope of
rights in sections 2 and 7 to 15.420 The notwithstanding mechanism cannot narrow the discretion of a court
on the appropriate and just remedy. Why an ordinary statute can so limit the Charter in a way that the
Charter itself would not permit is perplexing.
Roach made a similar point in response to Ward on how statutes can define section 24(1)’s phrase “court
of competent jurisdiction” - if the competency of the court can be changed by legislation, there is little to
stop the government from removing remedial competency from all decision-makers but Superior Courts
with inherent civil jurisdiction.421 There is some danger in leaving too much power over 24(1) remedies in
the hands of the defendants.
Despite none of the Court’s decisions actually holding so, the Ernst decision as a whole creates the
impression that a statute could potentially bar a section 24(1) remedy outright, mimicking the effect of the
notwithstanding clause without any of the qualifications on substance and time limits. In a future case,

416

Sossin, “Damaging the Charter”, supra note 198 (“The issue in the appeal to the Supreme Court is on the scope of
the statutory immunity clause, not the strength of the claim to Charter damages.”); Lewans, supra note 374 at 385
(“whether a statutory immunity clause should be read down to the extent it purports to immunize administrative
action which infringes someone’s Charter rights”).
417
Ernst, supra note 4 at para 15, Cromwell J.; Also see Ernst, supra note 4 at para 72, Abella J (concurring with the
plurality).
418
Ibid at para 180, McLachlin CJC, Moldaver and Brown JJ.
419
Sossin, “Damaging the Charter”, supra note 198. Parenthesis omitted.
420
Charter, supra note 2, s 33.
421
Roach, “Late Spring”, supra note 196 at 141-142.

76

with a evidentiary record and no procedural hiccups, this dangerous principle should be clarified and
rejected.

5. Section 1 and the Mackin Rule in Ernst
Justice Abella’s opinion in Ernst considers that the constitutionality of an immunity statute and the policy
reasons justifying its enforcement could be raised, in a future case, on a full evidentiary record during the
section 1 analysis stage.422
Koshan notes that Ernst provides little guidance on how the immunity clause might violate a substantive
part of the Charter.423 A statutory immunity clause might be inconsistent with section 24(1) itself, though
only if the latter is held to have a substantive quality. A statutory immunity might be inconsistent (or
maybe irrelevant) given the waiver of immunity in section 32 of the Charter, or that the statutory
immunity is inconsistent with the preamble of the Charter as it effectively acts as a higher law than the
constitution.
In any event, what is most disturbing is that, even if a future litigant could be - or Ernst had been successful in striking down or reading down a statutory immunity clause under section 52(1), the rule in
Mackin could preclude a 24(1) damages remedy anyway. Recall that the Mackin line of cases contains a
general rule that the claimant cannot pair a 52(1) remedy with a 24(1) remedy absent some bad faith on
the defendant.424 Thus, an unconstitutional immunity clause could be struck down but a remedy would be
denied by a potentially identical immunity in Mackin.
Absent serious reconsideration of the Mackin rule, the weight of precedent suggests a potentially
tautological outcome.

6. Summary: A Uniquely Purposeless Public Law Remedy
Ernst is a difficult case. The three opinions by the Court disagree on which aspect of the case should be
outcome-determinative. Separating law from dicta demands much from the reader. For Charter damages
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in particular, none of the three decisions are particularly helpful in understanding how the Ward test ought
to be applied going forward.
The dissenting opinion comes closest to applying Ward to the facts. Based on the pleadings, the dissenters
would have concluded that Ernst pled sufficient facts to survive a motion against her pleadings. However,
even the dissenting judges are pulled into an extended discussion on step 3 of the Ward test, which is
explicitly the defendant’s burden and thus unnecessary to discuss on a pleadings motion.
In accepting the Board’s arguments about the potential chilling effect and floodgates, Justice Cromwell
indulged the defendants in raising generic countervailing arguments of a purely general nature. I argue
that Ward requires the good governance branch of the test to be specific to the particular defendant and its
actual government functions. Instead, the Ernst plurality does exactly what the Ward Court had
forewarned: it used the chilling effect to ensure that Charter damages are never appropriate and just.425
Ernst creates a blind spot in the Court’s Charter remedies jurisprudence by tacitly permitting (though not
actually holding) that an immunity clause can restrict the type of remedies available through section 24(1).
If unaddressed, this minor oversight could permit legislation to limit the Charter’s remedial strength
without resort to the notwithstanding clause.
Furthermore, in the event that a statutory immunity like the one in Ernst is successfully challenged, the
defendant may still benefit from the Mackin immunity, turning Charter damages litigation into a hamster
wheel of government immunities.
While Lewans expresses concern that Ernst might undo more principled decisions like Roncarelli, there is
some hope: In the first year of reported decisions since Ernst, it appears that Ernst has mostly been applied
on pleadings motions and only once after a trial.426 In those cases, however, the dissenting opinion from
Ernst is never applied. In addition, there appears to be a separate body of cases that apply Ward (and
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sometimes Henry) with no reference to Ernst.427 Both Koshan and Lewans note the limited precedential
value of this decision.428 For now, it appears that their predictions are holding true.
The lasting impact of Ernst may not be in its holding or even in its reasoning, but simply in its
unexamined use of private law principles as outcome-determinative markers for constitutional cases. The
logic of its central holding – Charter damages would never be appropriate and just against a tribunal, and
therefore the statutory immunity is not unconstitutional – is difficult to justify. The result is that it turns
Ward from a “uniquely public law remedy” into a purposeless application of general tort principles to
constitutional claims.
I spend the balance of this paper examining the public-private divide and asking whether Ward should be
given a chance to determine Charter damages cases without reference to private law.

D. Summary and Conclusions
Ward affirmed that Charter damages are indeed a different remedy than private law damages. The Ward
framework provides a flexible mechanism for balancing the claimant’s Charter injury and proven
purposes for damages against the government’s countervailing factors. Ever since that determination,
though, the Court has insisted on cramming the Ward framework full of private law doctrines. Henry and
Ernst have led the Court’s Charter damages doctrine “down a problematic path.”429
The primary problem is the Court’s unexamined and overgeneralized use of private law tort doctrines to
manipulate the Ward framework. The root of the problem is dormant in Ward, where the Court makes
overgeneralized statements about “tort law” without specifying which tort law. The Ward framework is
intended to balance the individual’s interest in obtaining damages in step 2 against the defendant’s
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countervailing factors in step 3. At step 3, the government may raise policy factors from private law
claims against government, like malicious prosecution and the tort of negligence.430
Henry undercuts the Ward framework’s interest-balancing approach. The majority in Henry switches the
burden to plead private law policy factors onto the claimant, essentially changing the interest-balancing
framework in Ward into a tort paradigm, where the injured party must prove a particular level of bad faith
on the part of the defendant. Ernst takes the “qualified immunity” in Henry to its logical extreme: that,
against administrative tribunals, Charter damages will never be appropriate.
These latter two decisions should be concerning. The government immunities in Henry and Ernst are
based almost entirely on two policy rationales: the chilling effect and floodgates rationales. The majority
in Henry and plurality in Ernst accept these rationales as truisms about government behaviour. In the
Charter damages context, these rationales have completely dominated the scope of liability. It raises the
question: if these rationales can limit Charter damages, should they not limit all Charter remedies?
Certainly not. That the Court treats the monetary remedy differently than other remedies is suspect. Henry
is an excellent example: an infringement of the right to make full answer and defence based on
nondisclosure is an entirely different right in Henry where the remedy is damages than in Stinchcombe
where the remedy is not damages. The Charter infringement is the same – a failure to provide an accused
with the right to full answer and defence – but Henry insists on awarding damages through a private law
tort-based paradigm.
In that regard, the Henry and Ernst decisions are irreconcilable with the Ward framework. As I note, the
requirement for causation and harm at step 1 in Henry is entirely inconsistent with the purposes of
vindication and deterrence at step 2. The Henry majority’s misuse of overgeneralized private law tort
doctrines is out of touch with the purposive approach to Charter remedies. Similarly in Ernst, Justice
Cromwell’s reliance on precedent from the tort of negligence imposes a negligence-based duty of care
analysis on a Charter claim. In no other Charter cases does an injured party need to establish a duty of
care in order to prove a Charter infringement. Placing these burdens on the Charter damages claimant is
inconsistent with Ward and upends the interest-balancing approach.
The combined effect of Henry and Ernst is that over-generalized private law tort doctrines can be
routinely used to defeat Charter damages claims contrary to Ward.
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However, Ward is not completely written out of the Court’s jurisprudence. The two concurring judges in
Henry and the four dissenting judges in Ernst remain faithful to Ward, providing some hope that the Court
will return to Ward and undo some of the ambiguity and damage caused by Henry and Ernst.
All three cases were decided within a seven-year period, where the composition of the Court changed
significantly. Of the nine judges deciding Ward in 2010, only three were still on the Court for Henry in
2015 and in Ernst in 2017: Justices McLachlin, Abella, and Cromwell. Chief Justice McLachlin is
consistent in her approval of Ward through all three cases. After Ward, Justice Abella consistently sides
against the minority opinions by joining the majority in Henry and writing for herself in Ernst (joining the
plurality in the outcome). Justice Cromwell does not take part in the six-justice panel in Henry and leads
the group against Ward in Ernst. When considering Henry and Ernst on their own, Justices Gascon and
Wagner are consistently in the anti-Ward groups. Meanwhile, Justices Karakatsanis and Moldaver switch
spots: Justice Karakatsanis sided with the pro-Ward concurring group in Henry switches to the anti-Ward
group in Ernst, and Justice Moldaver who wrote the majority decision in Henry transfers to the dissenters
in Ernst. Thus, while there is some consistency in how each Justice votes in Charter damages cases, the
voting patterns provide no clear clues as to how the next chapter of Charter damages will be written.
The next two sections of this thesis address the divide between the proponents of Ward and the proponents
of private law principles. In Part IV, I look specifically at the public law aspects of Ward and how Charter
damages fit alongside other Charter remedies. In Part V, I look at the private law aspects of Ward and ask
which particular aspects of private law are helpful in placing Charter damages back on the right path.
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IV. PUBLIC LAW IN WARD
In the previous section, I explored how Ward created a framework for awarding public law damages, and
how Henry and Ernst encumbered the Ward framework with overgeneralized private law tort principles.
In this section, I want to return to Ward and explore the extent to which Ward is a public law remedy.
How does the Ward framework for Charter damages fit into the broader Charter remedial framework?
A starting point is returning to the text and structure of the Charter. Recall that the Charter not only
outlines substantive rights and freedoms, but also provides mechanisms for enforcement, application, and
interpretation.431 The Ward framework fits snugly within the structure of the Charter, leveraging its most
important features by adopting direct liability of government, aligning the purposes of the Charter
damages award with the purposes of other Charter remedies, and defining an interest-balancing test in
accordance with the limitations on rights and remedies present within the Charter.
The tendency to view Ward as a species of tort law is caused, at least in part, by overlooking the
commonalities between Charter damages and other 24(1) remedies. In particular, the purposes of
compensation, vindication, and deterrence ground the Ward framework within well-known constitutional
remedial purposes. The Ward remedy’s purposes both accord with a purposive approach to other 24(1)
remedies and complement the existing remedial menu. This point has been heavily understated in the
literature, and I hope to highlight how Ward was written as a “uniquely public law remedy.” Along with
the final section of this paper on the private law aspects of Ward, I demonstrate that the Ward Court’s
references to the assistance of private law in the Charter remedy were perhaps overstated.

A. The Structure of the Charter and Ward
The basic structure of the Charter is well-known but worth reviewing with an eye to seeing how Ward fits
into the text’s purposes. Sections 2 through 23 of the Charter contain substantive rights ranging from the
broadly conceived freedom of expression432 and right to life, liberty, and security of the person,433 to
specific rights like the right to bail hearing for a criminal accused434 and particularized minority language
rights.435 An infringement of any of these rights could result in a section 24(1) remedy, including
damages.
431
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The substantive rights in the Charter may have some relationship to private law. Recall that the equality
claim in McKinney and the right to a fair trial in Mackin both raised, in their own way, issues about job
security and wages.436 These claims superficially resemble employment contract disputes in the same way
that the right to a fair trial in the Henry case resembled a malicious prosecution. Other substantive rights,
like those regarding minority languages, voting rights, and mobility rights, are less likely to have a private
law analog. By not wedding itself to any particular private law doctrines, the Ward framework is flexible
enough to address any of these distinctive and diverse substantive claims.
Section 32 of the Charter confirms that only the Federal and provincial governments are bound by the
Charter. The word “government” has been interpreted to include legislatures, government departments,
administrative bodies, and cabinet ministers. It has not been interpreted to apply directly against individual
government actors personally.437 Ward precludes damages against individuals on the same basis.438 Direct
liability of government is not a policy decision by the Court, but a textually faithful approach to the
Charter.
Section 1 contains a limitation on rights. The text guarantees the rights and freedoms subject to limits
“prescribed by law” and justifiable in a free and democratic society. Thus, section 1 justification is only
available to government for unconstitutional legislation, not necessarily for unconstitutional actions.439
The test for justification in Oakes places the burden on the government to prove that its legislation
addresses a “pressing and substantial objective” and does so proportionally.440 Where the government fails
to meet its burden, a law interfering with Charter rights will be struck down to the extent that it is
unconstitutional in accordance with section 52(1) of the Constitution Act. Thus, in the context of
unconstitutional legislation, the framework of the Charter is inherently a balancing act between the rights
of individuals and the objectives of government.
Where a substantive right is infringed by government and is not prescribed by law, there is no legislation
to strike down. Thus, the only remedies available are in section 24. Section 24(1) does not in and of itself
require a balance of interests; however, its wide remedial discretion requires that the remedy be
436
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“appropriate and just.”441 The 2004 decision Doucet-Boudreau, described in detail below, defines the
phrase “appropriate and just” in terms of fairness and balance.442
Several tests for remedies include a balancing analysis. For example, the test for the exclusion of evidence
under section 24(2) described in R v Grant balances the seriousness of the breach against the interests of
the accused and the interests of society in an adjudication on the merits.443
Balancing is also observed in cases where no specific test is outlined. In PHS Community v Canada, the
Court remedied a section 7 breach of the right to life, liberty, and security of the person by awarding
mandamus against the federal Minister of Health, effectively reversing a discretionary decision to close a
safe drug injection site in Vancouver.444 While the Court did not outline a formal test for mandamus, it
provided a full analysis of alternative remedies. A declaration, the Court said, would not go far enough as
it would not adequately account for the human lives at stake. At the other extreme, a constitutional
exemption would go too far as it would remove discretion from the minister in future applications for safe
injection sites. The Court preferred mandamus because it adequately balanced the need for a swift and
lasting remedy for the applicants while also permitting the Minister to retain broad discretion in future
cases.445
However, there are examples of tests for 24(1) remedies that do not include balancing. For example, the
test for costs against the Crown for a violation of the Charter right to disclosure in a criminal proceeding
is a “marked and unacceptable departure” from the substantive constitutional standard in Stinchcombe.446
If the plaintiff can prove a marked and unacceptable departure, then she is entitled to costs. No balancing
is necessary for this “expedient remedy.”447
Sections 25 through 31 contain clauses to guide interpretation of the Charter, including a provision in
section 26 which ensures that the Charter’s enactment does not deny “the existence of any other rights or
freedoms that exist in Canada.”448 While the main thrust of this section is to ensure the continued
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existence of rights and freedoms not enshrined in the Charter, it also implies that there may be some
tension between the rights in the Charter and the rights at common law.
The Court’s section 26 jurisprudence raises several interesting relationships between Charter claims and
private law claims, though none are a precise fit for the difference between Ward and the private law
damages claims against government. In Young v Young, for example, the Supreme Court remarks that the
right to freedom of religion in the Charter can conflict with common law parental rights.449 In Singh v.
Minister of Employment and Immigration, section 26 was raised in the context of parallel rights existing in
both the Canadian Bill of Rights and the Charter, leading 3 judges to find in favour of the applicants on
Charter grounds and 3 judges to find in favour of the applicants on Canadian Bill of Rights grounds.450 In
Mills, which contains Justice McIntyre’s quotable snippet about the breadth of discretion in section 24(1),
the dissenting judges led by Justice Lamer wrestled with whether a Charter-based claim for certiorari can
swallow up a common law claim through a prerogative writ. In this case, the Court found harmonization
of the two claims was the preferred course of action based on the reasoning that “access should be
enhanced not restricted, let alone denied.”451
For Charter damages, it is not two rights that conflict - as in Young - but two paradigms for awarding
damages, the public and private. The Charter and private law torts are not necessarily parallel roads to the
same remedy - as in Singh - because the defendant (and therefore the defendant against whom the remedy
is awarded) are not always the same, and the substantive foundation for Charter damages is not the same
as those at private law. For the same reason, Charter damages and private law damages claims against
government elude harmonization on the Mills principle because the two claims are not similar enough.
The Henry majority makes this much clear in its rejection of the malice standard for Charter claims
against the Crown.452 Thus, the balancing act in Ward, for section 26 purposes, is charting a new path in
the relationship between Charter rights and private law rights.
The final section of the Charter to address is section 33 and its notwithstanding clause. A unique addition
in the Charter, this clause permits the government to override constitutional rights in sections 2 and 7
through 15 through explicit legislation for five years at a time.453 This clause does not apply to section
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24(1). It follows that the notwithstanding clause must be directed at the substance of the right, not its
remedy.
As mentioned in my discussion of Ernst, the potential effect of the statutory immunity clause in the
tribunal’s governing statute was to override the constitution without resort to section 33. There is some
concern that this decision frustrates the purpose of the notwithstanding clause.454 The better approach is to
consider whether statutory immunities, like the one in Ernst, are a compelling countervailing factor that
would outweigh the need for damages. If, for instance, there were no alternative remedies other than
damages, the balance would tip towards declining to apply the statutory immunity. If, as the case was in
Ernst, an alternative remedy like judicial review exists, then that might tip the balance towards applying
the statutory immunity to damages. This balancing approach in step 3 of the Ward framework, when
applied faithfully, would not frustrate the purposes of section 33.
Having reviewed the broad structure of the Charter, and the Ward framework’s place within it, several
points become clear: section 24(1) creates a cause of action for wrongs that are entirely distinct from
private law causes of action; section 32 clarifies that direct liability of government is not a policy choice,
but textual fidelity; section 1 and the Court’s jurisprudence on section 24 remedies support an interestbalancing approach to remedies in most circumstances; section 26 and its jurisprudence provides some
insight into how the Charter damages claims and private law damages claims can co-exist without one
driving the other; and section 33, which outlines the only method for overriding the constitution, should
help identify which statutes of general application should inform 24(1) procedures and those which tend to
frustrate constitutional remedies.
As I intend to show in the balance of this section, the Ward framework’s stated purposes for damages at
step 2 of the test – compensation, vindication, and deterrence – fit neatly within the purposive approach to
remedies, and that the Charter damages remedy in fact supplements the remedial efficacy of the court in
Charter cases.

B. Charter Remedies and the Purposive Approach
In its earliest Charter jurisprudence, the Court identified the Charter as a “purposive document,” and its
overall purpose is to protect rights and freedoms by constraining government action.455 The purposive
approach to the Charter as a whole also applies to remedies specifically.
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In R v Gamble, the Court considered a habeas corpus application brought alongside a section 24(1)
Charter application for a prisoner’s relief from an unconstitutional sentence.456 The Court acknowledged
that the habeas corpus application was distinct from the section 24(1) application. In particular, it
reviewed the habeas corpus case law and found that “considerable uncertainty has clouded the scope of
review.”457 The Court then reviewed several trial court decisions using sections 7 and 24(1) of the Charter
to effect a habeas corpus remedy, affirming the general proposition that “Charter relief should not be
denied or ‘displaced by overly rigid rules.’”458 In Gamble, as in Ward, the Court provided access to a wellknown common law remedy through section 24(1), but did so in accordance with the unique purposes of
the Charter.
Roach, who has written the most comprehensive work on Charter remedies, believes that “Canada’s
constitutional remedial jurisprudence has now matured so that the principles that govern remedial
decision-making are relatively well known.”459 The landmark decision in this regard is Doucet-Boudreau,
which provides a detailed examination of the purposive approach to remedies.460
Roach defines the purposive approach as one that “seeks to integrate Charter remedies with the purposes
of the particular Charter right being remedied, the general purposes and values of the Charter and the
methodology that is applied to the interpretation of all Charter rights and the justification of limits on
rights.”461
Elsewhere, Roach has described the purposive approach to constitutional remedies as “principled remedial
discretion,” defining it in terms of establishing the house rules of litigation: “The key to principled
remedial decision-making is not that a right answer will magically appear, but that the judges and parties
can reach some tentative agreement on the relevant principles and then debate the scope and relative
weight of each principle in the particular context.” 462 A lack of clear principles creates unwieldy
discretion, and too many strict principles is a recipe for formalism.463
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1. Responsive and Effective Remedies
The Court’s elaboration of the purposive approach is summed up in Doucet-Boudreau, where it defines
the purposive approach in principled terms. It recites the maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium - “where there is a
right, there must be a remedy” - and determines that the contemporary application of the maxim to the
Charter means that remedies must be “responsive” and “effective.”464
Responsive remedies, as defined in Doucet-Boudreau, are those that promote “the purpose of the right
being protected.”465 By the time the Court penned Ward, a wealth of Charter jurisprudence that defined
the substantive content of each Charter right existed. What Doucet-Boudreau asked is for courts to
connect the substantive content of rights to their remedies. Rights can be infringed at their core, or at the
periphery. Infringements can be completed, ongoing, or prospective. Courts can expect novel
infringements arising from the evolving relationship between the state and its subjects, and should adjust
their remedial discretion accordingly. All of these factors are, in my view, critical to creating responsive
remedies.
The Ward framework addresses the need for responsive remedies. Consider, for example, the facts in
Ernst. At step 1, the claimant would establish at least the following facts: The infringed right in section
2(b), freedom of expression; the suppressed expression is political, which is arguably close to the core
purpose of the right;466 the infringement is complete, and therefore the remedy sought is for retrospective
harm. Each of these facts then relates to the justification for damages at step 2. These facts about the
nature of the breach do not make out a claim for compensation, as the infringement is unrelated to
physical, psychological, pecuniary, or intangible personal loss.467 However, at a minimum, the facts make
out an interest in vindicating the right to people to freely criticize government institutions, and deterring
government institutions from silencing political speech. At step 3, the government might point to
alternative remedies that could adequately respond to the breach and address the proven need for
vindication and deterrence. Where a declaration might be appropriate to vindicate and deter the
suppression of speech, depending on the egregiousness of the facts proven at trial, judicial review of the
Board’s decision is less responsive to the actual right. Just as an alternative remedy can negate the
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damages award, the government can raise evidence about the negative effect of liability on the tribunal,
including the policy reasons underpinning the statutory immunity and the tribunal’s quasi-judicial role.
Should the claim pass step 3, the court can determine quantum at step 4 based on what is “appropriate and
just in the circumstances,”468 including the egregiousness of the breach and fairness to this particular
defendant.469 The flexibility of the Ward framework is intended to provide a responsive remedy that serves
a functional purpose related to the Charter, whether or not that remedy is damages.
Effective remedies refers to the remedial mechanism used to vindicate the right.470 The bottom line for
effective Charter damages remedy is quantum. The only Supreme Court decision to touch on quantum is
Ward, which provides only the most basic guidance on how to determine public law damages. The
principal guide is the egregiousness of the breach, but the quantum must also be fair to the defendant, and
recovery rates will likely be modest.471 While the Court highlights the public law focus of remedying the
Charter breach “as an independent wrong, worthy of compensation in its own right”, it also permits a
court to rely on “the

private law measure of damages for similar wrongs.”472 While compensatory

damages must be proven,473 determining the quantum of vindication and deterrence damages “is an
exercise in rationality and proportionality.”474
The effectiveness of damages will be judged almost entirely on whether the quantum strikes the right
balance. The inherent flexibility of damages is, in that regard, both a blessing and a curse: while damages
avoid the all-or-nothing proposition of most 24(1) remedies, it is unlikely that courts will be able to
reliably quantify the damages amount down to the penny, dollar, or even the nearest thousandth dollar.
Consider the trial judge’s $5000 award for the unconstitutional strip search in Ward. Intuitively, $5,000
seems low, particularly compared to the cost of litigation;475 however, double the amount to $10,000 and
the award does not intuitively appear patently irrational or disproportionate. Halve the original amount– is
$2,500 unquestionably inappropriate and unjust? In Ward, had the trial judge’s $5,000 award been
appealed, the discretion for determining this number appears so broad as to defy review. Anticipating this
problem, the Ward Court entrusted the task of calculating principled quantum to trial judges, stating that
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quantum determinations “will ultimately be guided by precedent as this important chapter
of Charter jurisprudence is written by Canada’s courts.”476
As these decisions unfold, courts might consider developing a standard of reviewing damages quantums
with reference to other standards where numbers are at issue. For example, courts applying Ward could
borrow the standard from courts applying R v Nur, the case which sets the standard for determining
whether a mandatory minimum sentence is cruel and unusual punishment contrary to section 12 of the
Charter.477 Nur set out a two-step approach, requiring the sentencing judge to determine an appropriate
sentence based on the principles of sentencing (and ultimately the available sentencing precedents), then
determine whether the mandatory minimum is grossly disproportionate to the otherwise appropriate
sentence.478 This test could potentially provide a workable approach to appellate review of quantum,
where a reviewing court could determine an appropriate quantum based on the principles in Ward (and
any available precedent), then determine whether the trial judge’s award is grossly disproportionate. This
standard, or one like it, could help the Court develop effective remedies. It would also provide the parties
with a calculation method they can compute at the office before filing an appeal.
The guidelines in Ward for determining quantum, particularly in novel instances with no parallel in
private law, will certainly be controversial. As the Ward court suggests, the future of quantum
determinations will be determined as precedent begins to unfold; 479 but until then, one can expect
substantial controversy over whether dollar amounts are ‘effective’ as defined by Doucet-Boudreau.
Thus, the Ward framework is equipped to provide responsive remedies and, over time, may become better
at providing effective remedies.

2. Compensation
Just as the overall structure of Ward fits in with the purposive approach in Charter remedies, so too do the
purposes of Charter damages - compensation, vindication, and deterrence. The Court described the
interplay between these roles as follows:
Generally, compensation will be the most important object, and vindication and deterrence will
play supporting roles. This is all the more so because other Charter remedies may not provide
compensation for the claimant’s personal injury resulting from the violation of his Charter rights.
476
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However, as discussed earlier, cases may arise where vindication or deterrence play a major and
even exclusive role.480
This paragraph isolates the role of compensation from vindication and deterrence. It also distinguishes
compensation from other Charter remedies which might vindicate and deter, but not compensate. What
makes compensation different than vindication and deterrence?
Compensation is described in explicitly corrective justice terms. The Court defines it in English as “to
restore the claimant to the position she would have been in had the breach not been committed,”481 and,
for good measure, in Latin as “restitutio in integrum.”482 Roach articulates an additional goal, which is to
deprive the government of “the advantage of the violation.”483
Corrective justice is not peculiar to private law. In Kingstreet, a case about taxes collected under an ultra
vires law, Roach notes that the Court relied on the “rule of law and constitutional limits” to arrive at a
corrective justice approach to a remedy. Roach states that “This is an important reminder that private law
principles will often be inappropriate in determining constitutional remedies,”484 even where corrective
justice - an ostensibly private principle, is invoked. In other words, corrective justice serves an important
public function in the Charter irrespective of its importance in private law.
Just as corrective justice is not peculiar to private law, it is also not peculiar to monetary remedies. The
24(2) remedy for the exclusion of evidence is corrective in that the remedy places the accused in the
position he would have been in had the trial proceeded without the illegally obtained evidence.485 Even an
adjournment can be a corrective remedy, and the Court has permitted adjournments to correct Charter
infringements on the section 7 right to full answer and defence in criminal trials (even though an
adjournment does not vindicate or deter the potential underlying moral or bureaucratic failures of
government).486 In a case like Ward, where an unconstitutional strip search resulted in obtaining no
evidence, and no prosecution was ever pursued, the exclusion of evidence and adjournments cannot be
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responsive or effective remedies. However, Charter damages can correct the constitutional wrong in a
meaningful way.
The compensatory purpose of Charter damages fits within the broader corrective scheme of Charter
remedies. As such, corrective justice is not a sufficient reason to import private law tort principles into the
Ward analysis. A fault threshold, for example, is not a prerequisite for other corrective Charter remedies;
neither should it be an element in Charter damages claims. Instead, courts applying Ward can look to
other 24(1) remedies to see how corrective justice is applied in the constitutional context.

3. Vindication
Despite the legitimacy and power that corrective justice provides to judges, Roach notes that restoring the
status quo ante “both empowers and constrains the judiciary in its remedial activities.”487 It constrains the
judiciary where, for example, an obvious Charter beach produces no compensable personal loss to an
individual. Recall that this was the case in Ernst, where the Charter damages claim was advanced on
vindication and deterrence purposes only. In that case, the alleged Charter infringement was the harm in
and of itself – the unjustified restriction on free expression should be vindicated.
Vindication is a non-corrective remedy defined in Ward as “enforcing constitutional values” by focusing
“on the harm the Charter breach causes to the state and to society.”488 The Court in Ward does not refer to
any Canadian authorities in defining vindication; however, it does note that determining a quantum for
vindication should follow a similar analytical approach to that in Grant for the exclusion of evidence: “the
seriousness of the breach must be evaluated with regard to the impact of the breach on the claimant and
the seriousness of the state misconduct.”489 By contrast to compensation, the Court described vindication
with a focus on the importance of rights in and of themselves: “the function of vindication recognizes that
Charter rights must be maintained, and cannot be allowed to be whittled away by attrition.”490
Although vindication is a pliable term, it fits nicely within the Doucet-Boudreau paradigm for responsive
remedies, which demands that “the purpose of the right being protected must be promoted.”491 Like a
declaration, damages that vindicate are only nominally instrumental - although arguably an instrument to
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promote the value of the infringed right, it is also an acknowledgement that the legal wrong established by
a Charter breach in step 1 of the Ward test is worth remedying. In laymen’s terms, it seeks to remedy
situations where a person has been “done wrong” by the state, even if righting the wrong does not qualify
for corrective justice.
Although the Court references Grant in its description of vindication, there appears to be a subtle
distinction between vindication in Ward and the repute of the administration of justice in Grant.492 Writing
extrajudicially, Justice Paciocco has called the latter the “condonation theory” and has distinguished it
from vindication in Ward as protecting different interests: condonation as protecting the court’s integrity,
and vindication as focused on the victim’s right itself.493 For example, the exclusion of an involuntary
statement from an accused obtained through a section 9, 10, or 12 breach could, in the right circumstances,
prevent the administration of justice from falling into disrepute; but damages should not be awarded
against the police for that reason. Damages for vindication should be awarded to promote the purpose of
lawful arrests, detentions, rights to counsel, or the right against cruel and unusual punishment.
Paciocco has argued that the lack of definition around vindication and condonation are more harmful than
helpful, stating that “these principles, standing alone, do not guide outcomes so much as they indulge
disagreement.”494 With respect, I think vindication is best understood as remedying, in the words of Ward,
“the breach of Charter rights as an independent wrong, worthy of compensation in its own right.”495 When
a right is stepped on, a declaration may be appropriate; where a right is stomped on, a stay, mandamus, or
a constitutional exemption may be appropriate. Damages for vindication can address Charter
infringements at all levels of egregiousness, and may be superior in that a tailored dollar amount can
address the finer points of the defendant’s conduct. Indeed, in several cases where a declaration is not
enough but a stay or other coercive remedy is too much, damages may be preferable to the government.496
4. Deterrence and Future Compliance
Deterrence as a purpose for Charter damages is a sort of instrumental cousin to vindication. Through noncorrective measures, deterrence is aimed at achieving the government’s future compliance with the
Charter. The Court in Ward describes the purpose of deterrence damages to “secure state compliance” and
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to “achieve compliance” with the constitution.497 The Court also refers to deterrence as a principle
informing the definition of the “good governance” factor against awarding damages: “insofar as s. 24(1)
damages deter Charter breaches, they promote good governance. Compliance with Charter standards is a
foundational principle of good governance.”498 In other words, good governance is a reason to comply
with the Charter, not an excuse to breach it.
Roach’s review of the jurisprudence reveals that the “the court has been more forthright about the need to
deter constitutional violations with respect to Charter damages than other remedies, but it has made clear
that courts must be concerned with constitutional compliance in the future as well as the past.”499
Deterrence as a form of obtaining future compliance appears in several cases where Courts attempt to
manage particular outcomes from the executive and the legislature. Roach points to Eldridge v British
Columbia, where the Court ordered a declaration in favour of the plaintiffs but provided the government
with six months “to select the precise means to comply with the equality rights, and the need for
interpreters, in the future.”500 In Doucet-Boudreau, Roach notes that the Court went to an intrusive
extreme by ordering an injunction which would keep the court involved in ensuring government
compliance with the order to respect minority language rights.501 Roach saves the most famous case for
last - Reference re: Language Rights under the Manitoba Act, 1870 - where the Court suspended invalidity
of all of Manitoba’s unilingual statutes and maintained jurisdiction over the translation process for seven
years.502 Each of these cases illustrates a situation where a remedy was used achieve future compliance
with the constitution in that case and generally. Furthermore, as Roach notes, each of these cases involves
the enforcement of language and equality rights - an area where future compliance is central to the right
itself.503
Famously, the Canadian exclusion of evidence rule is not predicated on deterrence of individual police
officers. The Court in Grant notes that the 24(2) remedy is “not to punish the police or to deter Charter
breaches, although deterrence of Charter breaches may be a happy consequence.”504 Similarly, damages
through Ward are not a deterrent against individual police officers, but against the state directly.

497

Ward, supra note 1 at para 29. Emphasis added.
Ibid at para 38.
499
Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada, supra note 44 at para 3.1100
500
Ibid at 3.590; Eldridge, supra note 57 at 691-692.
501
Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada, supra note 44 at para 3.600; Doucet-Boudreau, supra note 8 at paras
60-86.
502
Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada, supra note 44 at para 3.610; Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1
SCR 721.
503
Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada, supra note 44 at para 3.620.
504
Grant, supra note 139 at para 73.
498

94

Unfortunately, the direct liability of the state for Charter damages is frequently minimized in discussions
on deterrence for Charter damages. In the Charter damages context, deterrence and future compliance
with the Charter should focus on the government institutions directly. In Henry, the majority of the Court
focused on the fault of individual prosecutors and how liability could potentially chill – or over-deter –
individual prosecutors.505 In future cases, the Court could instead focus on the hiring practices, training
programs, and institutional attitudes that led to the Charter breach. In Henry, that would include serious
consideration of the well-known systemic reasons for wrongful convictions. In Ernst, it means looking at
the executive responsibilities of the particular branch of the Board and asking whether imposing liability
for this particular breach would over-deter the Board or interfere with its quasi-judicial role. Charter
compliance and good governance should be focused on these systemic questions, and not narrowly on the
“rotten apples” within government.506
Direct liability of government for Charter violations can also act as a limit on the court’s remedial
discretion. The dynamic between the courts and government institutions under the Charter is quite
different than the dynamic between courts and individual government actors at common law, particularly
in the context of deterrence. While an order of damages against individual tortfeasors is uncontroversial,
courts can be limited in ordering monetary remedies against government directly.
Consider, for example, the creative approach taken in R v Rowbotham.507 In that case, the Ontario Court of
Appeal determined that denial of legal aid funds for an accused to retain a lawyer for trial may, when
certain conditions are met, be a violation of the accused’s section 7 Charter right to a fair trial.508 The
remedy in these cases, one would think, should be an order compelling the government to provide legal
aid funding to the individual; however, courts have not taken that route. Instead, on Rowbotham
applications, the remedy is a stay of proceedings conditioned upon the government providing legal aid
funding for trial.509
Roach notes that “the stay of proceedings is in effect used as an indirect means to influence governmental
behaviour in granting legal aid certificates.”510 However, the stay of proceedings, in this context, is less
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intrusive than damages, because it permits the government to choose whether to fund the litigation or live
with the termination of the prosecution.511 Roach describes the stay as a “blunt remedy” to achieve
Charter compliance,512 but the Rowbotham remedy is nonetheless a creative response to the complexities
of enforcing Charter compliance.
The Court has a history of achieving Charter compliance through creative and responsive remedies.
Charter damages fit in well beside cases like Eldridge, Doucet-Boudreau, and Reference Re Language
Rights, where creative remedies were used to achieve Charter compliance. For monetary remedies in
particular, the Ward framework is a more direct route to monetary remedies than Rowbotham applications,
which indirectly provides what Ward provides directly. Focusing the analysis of deterrence on the actual
systemic functions of government instead of its individual agents will bring the Ward remedy in line with
the Charter’s broader purpose of achieving good governance through Charter compliance.

C. Charter Limitations and Interest-Balancing
Recall that the Charter provides two methods of limiting Charter rights. The first is through section 1,
whereby government can justify its unconstitutional legislation,513 and the second is through section 33,
where the government can constitutionalize its otherwise unconstitutional laws and actions through special
legislation.514 The only other limits within the text of the Charter are in the language of 24(1). The leading
case on interpreting section 24(1) remains Doucet-Boudreau, which outlines a purposive approach to
determining whether a remedy is appropriate and just for that particular case.
The Ward framework incorporates these limitations and interest-balancing approaches in all four steps.
Roach has referred to steps 2 and 3 of the Ward test as a “mini s.1 exercise” where the claimant must
“establish the violation and functional remedial need for damages” and the government “should bear the
burden of justification especially with respect to good governance factors.”515 Furthermore, the Ward
framework is developed with reference to the Doucet-Boudreau requirements for meaningful vindication
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(step 2),516 legitimate means (step 3),517 and being fair against the party to whom the order is being made
(step 4).518 The Ward framework is in step with the Court’s broader preference for interest balancing. 519
Interest-balancing and proportionality can be controversial. In a comprehensive work on damages under
England’s quasi-constitutional Human Rights Act 1998, Varuhas rejects interest-balancing as an adequate
methodology. His primary concern with interest-balancing is its propensity for the government’s interest
to be given too much weight contrary to Dicey’s equality theory, which prefers to treat government and
private persons as equal under the law, with limited exceptions.520 Where interest-balancing is used,
Varuhas would prefer a formal structure, like the four-step Ward framework; however, he finds these
structures tend to be “collapsed into unstructured balancing.”521 He specifically refers to Henry as a
cautionary tale. While Ward set out a formal structure for interest-balancing, he criticizes the majority of
the Henry Court as a “stark illustration of the dangers” in neglecting to follow a “structured, step-by-step”
approach mandated by Ward.522 Varuhas would likely prefer, as I do, Justice McLachlin’s concurring
opinion in Henry and her dissent in Ernst, which apply the Ward framework sequentially.
However, as Chan points out, this problem is not unique to damages. There is a trend at the Supreme
Court of Canada towards “shifting of emphasis away from the efficacy of the Charter remedy toward a
minimization of the burdens imposed on government.”523 He references the Court’s decision in R v
Bjelland, which considers the exclusion of evidence under section 24(1) for late disclosure of evidence.524
The Court in that case held that evidence in late disclosure can only be excluded in two limited cases:
where the late disclosure makes the trial unfair and an adjournment or disclosure order will not remedy the
unfairness, or where exclusion is necessary to “maintain the integrity of the justice system.”525 Chan
argues that the Court’s decision “would place the burden on the accused to demonstrate that exclusion is
the least intrusive remedy. They would engage in a sort of “minimal impairment” analysis in reverse.”526
Shifting the government’s burden to the applicant was precisely the decision in Henry, where the majority
of the Court interpreted step 3 of the Ward test to impose a pleading requirement on the plaintiff to prove
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intentional, reasonable foreseeability, as well as causation and harm.527 Justice McLachlin’s concurring
opinion in Henry, in the same vein as Chan’s argument, questioned why the applicant should plead the
defendant’s case.528
Varuhas concedes, however, that if interest balancing is to be used, then “courts should consider not only
countervailing public interests but also public interests which favour awards.”529 Support for that position
can be found throughout this paper, as well as in Roach’s admonition to make case-specific decisions.530
The bottom line for Roach’s argument is that countervailing factors “should not include objectives that are
really objections to the existence of a right or remedy”:531
A complete denial of a remedy will generally not strike an overall balance between providing and
limiting a remedy even in cases where it is both rationally connected to a governmental object and
the least restrictive means of achieving that objective... Remedies are not privileges and successful
litigants have a strong presumptive right to a remedy, albeit that a remedy that can justifiably be
limited when necessary to achieve an important governmental objective.532
In other words, Roach, like Varuhas,533 would argue for a presumption of a remedy for the infringement.
Only after that basis for that presumption is established at steps 1 and 2 of the Ward framework can it be
undermined by countervailing factors at step 3. A structured application of interest-balancing in Ward,
taken by the minority opinions in Henry and Ernst, is consistent with the Charter’s approach overall and
with the best practices in interest-balancing normatively.

D. Conclusions: Damages as a Charter remedy qua Charter remedies
The Ward framework is consistent with the broader 24(1) jurisprudence. Ward can provide a responsive
and effective remedy in many circumstances, but requires a deeper exploration of the purposive approach
to calculating quantum and the significance of direct liability on vindicating and deterring rights
infringements.
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The purposes for Charter damages - compensation, vindication, and deterrence - all coincide with other
Charter remedies. Compensation as a corrective justice remedy is commonly used to deprive government
of the benefits of a Charter infringement and return the injured person to the status quo ante. Vindication
recognizes the importance of responding to infringements as a good in itself. Deterrence focuses on
government as the subject and prioritizes Charter compliance as a broader goal of the Charter.
Although the Ward Court suggests that Charter damages could benefit from analogizing to private law
damages claims, it overstates the need for reliance on private law. Charter damages claims should develop
primarily by reference to other Charter remedies.
Interest-balancing has become a hallmark of Charter litigation both for judicial review of legislation and
for individual remedies. The Ward framework is consistent with the overall approach taken in the Charter
jurisprudence and withstands Varuhas’ normative criticism – indeed, both implicate Henry directly as a
problematic outcome. Like the Henry majority, the Ernst plurality decision similarly collapses Ward’s
balancing act into “a sea of countervailing policy factors.”534
Ward is a “unique public law remedy.”535 It is not the quasi-tort described by Justice Moldaver in Henry
or the antithesis of public policy described by Justice Cromwell in Ernst. Understanding Ward as such
should assist courts in applying its four-step framework with confidence that the outcomes will be
legitimate and purposive.
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V. PRIVATE LAW IN WARD
In Ward, the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously crafted a “unique public law remedy” which
“operates concurrently with, and does not replace” private law damages claims against government.536 The
decision refers to “private law” generally and “tort law” specifically as guides in the future development
of the Ward framework.537 In this section, I discuss which aspects of private law and tort law in particular
can assist Ward’s goal to “further the general objects of the Charter.”538
Contemporary Canadian tort liability for government generally follows A.V. Dicey’s equality theory. In
short, Canada holds its government institutions and individuals to the same law as private persons, applies
the same legal standard (with limited special defences for government), and adjudicates claims in the same
court.539 In the spirit of equality under the law, government institutions and individuals are liable for the
tort of negligence, intentional torts, and specific torts developed especially for government that require
malice or knowledge, like malicious prosecutions and misfeasance of public office. These higher
thresholds and defences are exceptions to the general rule in order to account for the government’s role in
governing.540
The Ward framework, when compared to private law (and torts in particular), is an entirely different
paradigm. The Ward framework permits recovery in damages for any of the Charter’s substantive
sections, employs an interest-balancing mechanism to determine liability, and applies a purposive
approach to remedies. There are no private law causes of action that directly apply. As I have described
throughout this thesis, all three of the Court’s Charter damages decisions are guilty, to varying extents, of
relying on private law principles without much consideration for their original purpose or whether that
purpose comports with the Charter.
The purpose of this section is to assess whether Ward’s references to private law were necessary, and if
so, which particular area of private law ought to apply. I limit my analysis to the two areas of private law
most referenced by the Court’s Charter damages jurisprudence to date: the tort of negligence and the
‘malice’ torts.541 I also consider Varuhas’ compelling normative argument for using intentional torts as a
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model for human rights damages, and extend his work by focusing on how intentional torts can assist the
development of Charter damages going forward. Returning to the Ward framework, I address the specific
instances where Ward identifies potential benefits from relying on private law. I conclude that Ward may
have overstated its need for private law tort concepts.

A. Which Private Law?
Private law is not a monolith.542 Varuhas notes that while many jurisdictions agree that constitutional
damages doctrine should reflect tort doctrine, torts are “a diverse field, comprised of disparate actions
which have different functions.”543 Despite this fact, Varuhas identifies a phenomenon wherein references
to tort law are merely a reductive shorthand for “one tort, negligence - a not uncommon mistake given the
dominance of negligence.”544 Amid his review of international cases, Varuhas criticizes Ward for making
this error.545
In Canada, there are several separate tort and contract based claims that could inform Charter damages.546
In addressing the two most commonly referenced claims in the Charter damages jurisprudence – the tort
of negligence and the ‘malice’ claims – I find that neither are appropriate guides for the development of
Charter damages doctrine. Varuhas’ approach to intentional tort doctrine can be helpful to a point, but is
ultimately incongruous with the interest-balancing approach in Ward and throughout the Charter.

1. Rejecting Negligence
Peter Hogg, Patrick Monahan, and Wade Wright define negligence in the public context: “if an invalid
decision causing damage is made negligently (that is, in breach of a common law duty of care owed to the
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injured plaintiff), the decision-maker will be liable in damages for the tort of negligence.”547 The tort of
negligence generally requires proof of a duty of care, a breach of that duty, causation, and damages.548
In Canada, the government and its servants are liable for damages in the tort of negligence. The
contemporary test is derived from an English case, Anns v Merton London Borough Council, adopted by
the Supreme Court of Canada in 1984549 and refined in Cooper v Hobart in 2001.550 The test begins by
searching for a duty of care owed by government based on foreseeability and proximity, often determined
by reference to the statute under which the defendant is operating.551 The second part of the test asks
whether there are any policy reasons to not impose liability.552 The test has its critics, but has “proven
itself to be highly flexible” and retains similar characteristics to private law negligence.553
One of the great strengths of the tort of negligence is that its substance is defined by the duties government
owes to individuals. The tort is flexible enough to shift loss in a variety of situations and define how
“wrongdoers should be individually liable for the damage they cause.”554
This strength of negligence, however, is the reason why it is unfit to guide the development of Charter
damages liability. Varuhas puts it this way: “the tort’s primary function is to afford compensation for
fault-based material losses, rather than to afford strong protection to basic interests in themselves and
affirm their inherent importance.”555 Based on Varuhas’ position, the search for a duty of care to avoid
causing harm is irrelevant to protecting constitutional interests.
Varuhas contrasts the search for a duty of care with an approach grounded in the right itself, where “if the
tort were organized around protection of a defined set of basic interests or rights, those interests or rights
would delineate the tort’s scope.”556 Recall that the Charter clearly outlines rights (sections 2 to 23), those
responsible for not infringing rights (section 32), the limits on rights (sections 1 and 33), and guidelines
for remedying infringed rights with personal remedies (section 24). Where the protected interests are
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narrowly defined, there is no need to search for a duty of care. Thus, the first part of the Cooper test which
searches for a duty of care is fundamentally unsuited to developing the future of Charter damages
doctrine.
A similar criticism applies to negligence’s creation of fault-based liability to constitutional claims. Faultbased liability is not peculiar to the tort of negligence, but is a prominent feature in the standard of care.
Ordinarily, the standard of care is that of a reasonable person. The standard of care is often adjusted for
government, as in Hill, where the standard of care applied to suspects under investigation is “the
reasonable police officer in like circumstances.”557
Varuhas is critical of imposing such “defendant-oriented” analysis on constitutional damages claims. The
standard of care asks whether the defendant should be liable for the plaintiff’s losses, but says little about
the claimant’s fundamental constitutional interests.558 Recall that in both Henry and Ernst, the analysis in
the prevailing opinions focuses almost exclusively on the defendant’s conduct, whereas Ward was clear
that “the court must focus on the breach of Charter rights as an independent wrong, worthy of
compensation in its own right.”559 The tort of negligence’s focus on the conduct of the defendant may be
appropriate in the context of Hill and other cases, but is not appropriate to protecting Charter rights.
The same problem reappears with causation. Negligence claims will only provide damages with proof of
personal loss actually caused by the defendant. Varuhas contrasts the “but-for” causation pervasive in
negligence to the causation requirement for false imprisonment in English law. The difference is that a
person who causes another’s false imprisonment - an intentional tort - can be liable even if the plaintiff
“would invariably have been detained lawfully in exactly the same way and for the same period.”560
Consider how “but-for” causation would apply in Henry. The focus of the analysis would turn to whether
Henry would have been convicted regardless of the Charter breach. The very analysis of the Charter
infringement proceeds by pretending the Charter infringement did not occur. Instead, the analysis should
focus on remedying the infringement itself – the infringement of the right to fair trial in which he was not
able to make full answer and defence – and how his rights can be compensated and vindicated while the
infringement by the government is deterred.
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Furthermore, there are strong policy reasons not to adopt a negligence view. The basic tenets of
negligence are supplemented by defences like contributory negligence and illegality.561 Consider how
these defences would operate in the Charter context. Cooper-Stephenson suggests that Charter damages
awards could be reduced based on contributory negligence. He cites a scenario where an unconstitutional
search and seizure produces a damages claim for the invasion of privacy and distress, where the injured
person may have contributed to the unreasonable search through his own criminal behaviour.562
This analysis is severely problematic. First, the Charter only constrains government, and therefore
individuals cannot contravene the Charter even on a contributory basis. Since the Charter does not apply
to individuals, it follows that it is impossible for individuals to infringe their own right. Second, a similar
problematic outcome arises with the defence of illegality. The Charter protects the rights of every person
whether or not he is involved in illegality. Taking the example above, if a constitutional search of a person
produces an illegal drugs but an unconstitutional search of the same person produces a gun, the
unconstitutionality of the latter search is not negated by the illegality of the former crime. These defences
to negligence are unhelpful, even contrary, to advancing the objects of the Charter.
The reasons against using the tort of negligence to develop the future of Charter damages are primarily
based in the difference between the interests each is designed to protect. All the other inconsistencies flow
from that critical distinction. Developing Charter damages with the guidance of negligence principles will
inevitably lead to strange results.

2. Intentional Torts
Intentional torts are often overshadowed by the modern prevalence of negligence.563 Varuhas recounts the
principles from this area of tort law and argued for their application to constitutional damages doctrines.
Within Canada, intentional torts apply to government but are seldom used. Intentional torts could serve as
a model to informing the development of Ward, but, only to a point.

a. Government Liability for Intentional Torts
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Government agents are liable for the same intentional torts as private persons.564 A trite example is that of
a Canada Post mail deliverer. If this particular government actor trespasses onto private property, they can
defend themselves by stating their statutory authority to do so - but only if they are actually delivering
mail. Otherwise, the mail deliverer, the public utilities inspector, and the Prime Minister are subject to the
tort of trespass. Other intentional torts include defamation, battery, nuisance, conversion, and false
imprisonment. Though the particular elements of each tort are distinct, Varuhas argues that the overall
purpose of each is the same: protecting narrow interests and vindicating intrusions upon those interests
with damages.565
In addition, government agents can be liable for misfeasance of public office if they deliberately make
invalid decisions constituting an abuse of power.566 Hogg, Monahan, and Wright point out that although
the tort has five elements, the most important is the fault requirement. Misfeasance only attracts liability
for malice or knowledge.567 Similar to the Nelles and Miazga line of cases for malicious prosecution,
misfeasance of public office is an intentional tort that requires something more than mere intent, but an
“actual intent to inflict injury... or reckless indifference to the fact that the conduct is unlawful, and that
injury will likely result.”568 Hogg, Monahan and Wright point to Roncarelli v Duplessis as “one of the few
reported examples” of malice being found, and point to Odhavji Estate v Woodhouse as the leading case
for the slightly lower knowledge threshold.569 Misfeasance and malicious prosecution are considered
intentional torts, despite the higher malice threshold, and are unique in that they specifically apply to
government.570
Ward predicts that policy considerations justifying malice in Miazga could be relevant in a Charter
damages claim; and in Henry, the majority rejected malice but found that the policy considerations from
malicious prosecution justified a “heightened per se liability threshold.”571
Recall that Justice Moldaver distinguishes the Charter claim for disclosure defects from malicious
prosecutions and held that the malice standard was inappropriate for disclosure.572 However, Justice
Moldaver did draw on the policy considerations underlying malice in order to justify a standard of
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intentional conduct, mixing in a reasonableness requirement for good measure.573 Notably, none of the
judgments mention that the government is responsible for its ordinary intentional torts.
b. An Argument for Drawing on Intentional Torts
Varuhas provides a detailed argument in favour of using the model of intentional torts as a method
determining constitutional liability. Drawing on cases from the United Kingdom and commonwealth,
including Canada, he develops a normative argument predicated on the role of intentional torts in
vindicating narrow rights. He is critical of the Ward and Henry decisions – Ward for relying too heavily
on an interest-balancing framework, and Henry for collapsing that framework into “a sea of countervailing
policy factors.”574
Varuhas’ argument is that intentional torts, unlike negligence, have their starting point in protecting a
narrow and identifiable legal interest.575 These torts are “vindicatory” in that they are actionable absent
any harm, “including where the wrong leaves them factually no worse off.” 576 This extremely low
threshold for actionability is meant to promote “the fundamental importance of those interests as well as
their inherent value independent of any harm which may flow from the interference.”577
Likewise, Ward held that “the court must focus on the breach of Charter rights as an independent wrong,
worthy of compensation in its own right.”578 At step 1, the claimant must prove a Charter breach. In
Ward, the breach was an unreasonable search contrary to section 8, in this case a strip-search, as defined
in Golden. In Henry, the infringement was a failure to provide all relevant disclosure as described in
Stinchcombe and contrary to section 7. In Ernst, the section 2(b) claim was considered novel, but alleged a
suppression of political speech protected by the Charter and defined in law.579 Each of these interests - a
right against a strip-search, a right to a free trial, and the freedom to express political opinions - is
inherently valuable. For that reason, Ward held that an injury to those interests could, in some
circumstances, be actionable for vindication or deterrence only, absent proof of any compensatory
damages.580 The vindicatory aspect of intentional torts is in line with the Ward framework’s protection of
rights.
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Varuhas goes on to describe liability for intentional torts as strict liability, where the defendant’s
responsibility for damages is not predicated on proof of fault.581 Using trespass as an example, he writes
that the tort technically only requires that the person be on the property even if the defendant is there
“innocently” and even if the defendant does not know he is on private property.582 In Ward, the threshold
is not strict liability – after proving a Charter infringement, the damages remedy is not automatic.
Nevertheless, the Henry majority expressed concerns about “scores of marginal claims” flooding the
court.583 However, just as it is unlikely that a property owner will go through the trouble to sue an
innocent trespasser where he suffers no damages, it is unlikely that a person will initiate Charter litigation
for innocent or de minimus intrusions on his rights.
What the Henry Court did not count on is whether Ward could stop marginal claims without a fault
threshold. An important difference between intentional torts and Ward highlights the point. Whereas
intentional tort claims can be brought for minor infringements of rights, a Charter damages claim can only
be brought for infringements that, at step 2, result in the need for compensation, vindication, or deterrence.
Indeed, several measures embedded in civil litigation generally also remove marginal claims. For
example, the Rules of Civil Procedure in Ontario provide adverse cost consequences denying a favourable
settlement in advance of trial.584 If a litigant with an axe to grind brings a marginal Charter damages
claim, he may leave a trial with a declaration, his own legal fees, and the costs of the other party. Fault is
not necessary for a marginal claim, particularly where the per se protection of rights still requires
functional justification of damages as a remedy.
Varuhas writes that for intentional torts the onus is on the defendant to prove legal justification.585 In
Charter damages, it is for the government to show countervailing factors; though not for why the
substantive breach was justifiable, but why the purpose put forward for damages should be denied.586
Varuhas highlights that placing the onus on the defendant to justify its conduct reflects the importance
placed upon the impugned interest.587 The same should be true for claimant’s Charter interests, and is
reflected in step 3 of the Ward framework which places the burden on the government to show why
damages are not appropriate and just.
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On defences, Varuhas stresses that “defences are subject to careful scrutiny and narrowly constructed.”588
This characterization of defences deviates from Ward. Step 3 of Ward is open-ended by design589 and the
level of scrutiny applied to general demurs about chilling effects, floodgates, and alternative remedies in
Henry and Ernst has been minimal.590 Decisions have been made without evidence and where irrelevant to
the disposition. I am not alone in arguing that the countervailing factors ought to be more narrowly
tailored to this specific defendant and this specific context.591 It is unhelpful for every Charter damages
claimant to hear that their case is upsetting the government’s status quo operation. Charter damages
doctrine could benefit by analogy to the narrow defences to intentional torts as the Ward framework
develops.
Varuhas describes the broad range of damages available for intentional torts. Whereas negligence only
compensates for harms caused by the breach - a very narrow range - intentional torts can “redress a
damage that is ‘normative’ in nature” and claimants can be awarded damages “for the mere invasion of
their rights.”592 At one end, nominal damages are available for “fleeting and miniscule” interference; but
damages can be awarded for compensation (or not) with additional damages for the degree of the
intrusiveness on the right and to express punishment or disapproval.593 As in Ward, the bottom line is that
damages can be available for more than just compensating harm. These vindicatory torts present an
example of how to reinforce “the importance of particular interests” without limiting recovery to
compensation alone.594
Varuhas’ depiction of the normative aspects of intentional torts seems like an ideal guide for the future
development of Charter damages. Similarly, the narrowing of defences may be necessary to achieve more
contextual, principled outcomes. The best reason to apply intentional torts to Charter damages, however,
is because they are adept at protecting important personal interests. That central goal is most suited to
protecting Charter rights and freedoms.

B. Tort Theory in Ward and its Progeny
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The Ward Court noted particular aspects of the Charter damages remedy that, over time, would benefit by
reference to private law and tort claims. I highlight four points, one for each step of the Ward framework:
at step 1, private law and torts are not mentioned and therefore should be avoided; at step 2, that tort law is
more helpful for compensation than vindication and deterrence; at step 3, that private law and torts can
inform thresholds and defences to Charter damages; and, at step 4, that private law and tort quantums can
inform the quantums for comparable Charter damages claims. On each of these four points, I offer
examples of how negligence is harmful and how intentional torts offer a far more principled guideline for
the future development of Charter damages.
Ward refers to the “practical wisdom” of private law claims; but, as the analysis shows, even private law
claims do not share the same approach.

1. Step 1: Finding a Charter Breach
Ward describes step 1 in three sentences. Simply, proof of a Charter breach is required before 24(1) can
be engaged.595 Ward does not mention the need for private law principles to assist in determining a breach
of Charter rights at any point.
Henry disturbs this holding by reversing the burden of proving fault from the defendant to the claimant.
The majority crafts a test specific to the right to relevant disclosure in criminal cases, requiring three
elements in addition to a Charter breach: intention, reasonable foreseeability, as well as causation and
harm.596 Henry explicitly rejects both malice and negligence, stating of the latter that “a duty of care
paradigm risks opening up a Pandora’s box of potential liability theories.”597
The Ernst plurality disagrees with Henry and invokes a duty of care paradigm, particularly relying on
several cases like Cooper to show why an administrative agency does not owe a duty of care to the
public.598
The Court has shown no consistency on step 1. Based on the foregoing, I would agree with the Henry
majority that the negligence paradigm is inappropriate for Charter damages, but would therefore not
require any fault, reasonable foreseeability, or harm and causation at step 1. The intentional tort paradigm
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advanced by Varuhas is consistent with the Ward framework, which would make the infringement
actionable at steps 1 and 2 without proof of more than the infringement and the functional justification for
damages. This is the best way for private law to inform step 1 – by simply proving the wrong to be
remedied.
Note that taking this approach does not mean opening government to a flood of per se liability for
damages. At step 2, the claimant must prove that damages serve a function of Charter damages, and even
if successful, the government can negate damages by identifying an alternative remedy. Nothing in step 1
entitles the claimant to damages. Liability for Charter damages, in that sense, is never strict liability.
2. Step 2: Functional Justification of Damages
Ward describes the second step as the search for a functional justification for Charter damages. The
functional approach to damages is itself derived from the private law approach to personal injury
damages.599 The three functions for Charter damages are compensation, vindication, and deterrence –
three independent functions establishing a pluralist approach to remedying Charter infringements with
damages.
Ward equates compensation with tort law; but, for vindication in deterrence, “tort law is less useful.”600
Varuhas takes exception to this. He believes that this comment reflects a “a mistaken conception of tort…
as only being concerned with affording compensation for actual loss.”601 In his view, intentional torts are
primarily intended to vindicate rights.602
In this context, the majority holding in Henry is contrary to the intentional tort paradigm. The majority
required that the claimant prove causation and harm – principles which relate to compensation in
negligence, but are not necessarily relevant to intentional torts. Varuhas notes that causation and
foreseeability are not normally elements for intentional torts, though may be relevant for the scope of
recoverable damages.603 The holding in Henry essentially limits Charter damages recovery within a
negligence framework. Varuhas notes the peculiar implications of the negligence framework as applied to
constitutional rights: “It makes little sense for the law to afford compensation for consequential losses,
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which are ‘parasitic’ on the rights-violation, but not for damage to the interest that is the very object of
legal protection.”604 Henry, unfortunately, falls into that very category.
As I explain in Part IV of this paper, compensation is not necessarily unique to private law - there are
several examples of how Charter remedies perform a corrective justice function, albeit without a
monetary remedy. Placing the injured person in the position they would have been absent the breach is a
fundamental aspect of compensation.605 Requiring fault, causation, and harm are hallmarks of the tort of
negligence which need not apply to Charter remedies.
3. Step 3: Countervailing Factors
Ward identifies two countervailing factors: alternative remedies and good governance.606 Both implicate
private law considerations. Alternative remedies to Charter damages include damages in private law,
which should not be awarded “if the result would be double compensation.”607 Good governance can rely
on private law claims to create thresholds and defences for Charter damages claims where the defendant
can prove its relevance.608
For good governance in particular, an interesting paradox emerges. Several private law and tort claims
against government contain special thresholds and defences that only government may rely upon. Recall,
for example, the requirement for malice in prosecutions,609 and the special test for negligence from
Cooper requiring the plaintiff to establish proximity and foreseeability and negate any policy
considerations against awarding damages against government.610 However, these are not the norm, but an
exception to government liability. As Hogg, Monahan, and Wright point out, Dicey’s equality theory,
which is historically accepted in Canada, would hold the government to the same standard as ordinary
persons with no “special exemptions and privileges that could lead to tyranny.”611 While some special
exceptions are appropriate, these are not the norm; and in fact, the trajectory of special government
exceptions “is uniformly in the direction of subjecting the Crown of the ordinary law of the land.”612 Thus,
the private law reason for supporting an immunity is just an exception to the rule of law generally.
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Furthermore, unlike the private law, which applies to private and public persons, the Charter only applies
to government.613 For the government to require special exemptions from ordinary law is reasonable; but
why does government require special exemptions from the law that applies only to it? Rather than rely on
dubious private law principles for creating exemptions to Charter damages liability, defendants should
rely on the good governance defences that exist in the Charter – interest-balancing, justification, and other
internal limits on rights.
In this sense, Ward is potentially too open to permitting good governance defences from private law to
influence a Charter damages claim. Henry is particularly problematic in how it changes the rules of the
game – shifting the burden of fault from step 3 to step 1 and adding new elements – and Ernst is likewise
troubling in its reliance on private law principles to turn step 3 into an absolute bar on Charter damages
against tribunals. These types of holdings can be avoided if both courts and litigants are alive to the
diversity of doctrine within tort law.
4. Step 4: Quantum
In determining the quantum of damages, the Court made some room for practical aspects of private law
damages quantification to assist Charter damages. Ward holds that “private law measure of damages for
similar wrongs will often be a useful guide.”614 While the private law measure is a starting point, Charter
damages must account for “the consequent diversion of public funds.”615
When a court reviews comparable private law damages quantums, it should be sensitive to the types of
damages that were available based on the cause of action. As noted, the tort of negligence is restricted to
personal loss, and the final amount might take into consideration several cost-shifting mechanisms like
contributory negligence. Statutory damages claims may likewise be restricted, capped, or adjusted based
on the circumstances. Remaining aware of these differences is critical to landing on a comparable number
for Charter damages, which provides broader compensatory options than most private law damages
actions.
Similarly, when applying private law doctrines to Charter damages awards, courts should take care that
these awards do not frustrate the purposes of vindication and deterrence. For example, after Henry’s trial
against British Columbia, his 8-million dollar trial award was reduced by the settlement amount he
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obtained from the City of Vancouver and federal government.616 While the rule against double-recovery is
solid in principle, applying these rules can potentially frustrate the object of deterrence and vindication,
particularly since those damages are not necessarily calculated based on the deservedness of the claimant
but based on the conduct of the defendants. This is an example of an area in which the functional approach
to damages can be frustrated by application of doctrines that do not necessarily account for the purposive
approach to Charter remedies.
The purposive approach to Charter damages also raises other concerns that may not be relevant at private
law. For example, the identity of the defendant may be an important factor in determining the quantum of
deterrence damages. Consider an identical breach by a small police force like the Summerside Police
Department in Prince Edward Island – a force of 35 officers617 – compared to a large regional force like
the Ontario Provincial Police. Conventional awards also fail to address the “the unique cultural
circumstances and exceptional challenges in delivering justice” that exist in remote communities across
Canada, where judicial decision making takes on a different complexion due to cultural differences and
special institutional challenges.618 In these circumstances, conventionalising awards can run counter to
Doucet-Boudreau’s admonition to consider fairness to the defendant.619
Thus, even though the Court suggests that 24(1) damages quantums may be calculated according to
private law calculations, 620 the purposive approach to 24(1) remedies in Doucet-Boudreau and the
functional approach in Ward itself prefer an ad hoc determination of the appropriate and just remedy - and
if that remedy is damages, then the appropriate and just quantum.

C. Conclusion: The Best Role for Private Law in Ward
“For me,” wrote Linden, “after all these years still a hopeless “tortaholic”, I am intrigued by Ward, but I
hesitate to yield this new territory totally to public law.”621 Linden believes that tort law can provide
“stability and guidance to judges” on 24(1) damages cases.
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With respect to Justice Linden, the contributions of private law to Ward so far have been disastrous. The
majority decisions in Henry and Ernst apply private law in ways it was not intended to operate. There may
be a good way, as both Justice Linden and Ward suggest, to incorporate private law to Charter damages,
but the Court is still searching for it.
In the ongoing development of Charter damages claims, the tort of negligence is not the ideal source of
help. This tort focuses narrowly on harm, causation, and the search for a duty of care - all good concepts
which have nothing to do with the Charter. Intentional torts are far more helpful in that they have
experience protecting important interests, qualify for remedies without a showing of fault, and place the
burden of raising defences on the defendant - all good concepts familiar to the Charter. However,
intentional torts may not be able to cover all aspects of Charter damages, especially where the facts are
dissimilar to intentional torts.
The Ward decision sets out a framework for public law damages, but indicates its needs for reliance on
private law as this relatively new remedy grows into itself. In Ward, almost no private law principles were
leveraged to achieve the outcome of the case; however, the Court acknowledged the potential need for the
“practical wisdom” of private law to help determine future cases. The Court’s future decisions in Charter
damages cases will hopefully provide some guidance on how to distinguish between private law principles
that are wise for Charter damages, and which are folly.
I have presented Varuhas’ argument for rejecting negligence and instead relying on intentional torts as a
guide for constitutional damages. The rejection of negligence is absolutely necessary going forward. This
tort is simply incompatible with the Charter and with Ward specifically. Intentional torts are more helpful,
though they do not account for the Ward framework’s dedication to interest-balancing.
Ultimately, I have not abandoned my position in part IV - that the Charter is essentially capable of dealing
with public law damages without the assistance of private law principles. However, if any branch of tort
law is relied upon in crafting Charter damages doctrine, it is clear that intentional torts are the strongest
body of tort law to help achieve the Charter’s broader objectives of protecting rights and freedoms. In
future cases, the relevance of other private law doctrines from human rights acts, civil law delicts, and law
reformers may spark new discussions on how private law can help Ward achieve the objects of the
Charter. I welcome those discussions.
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VI. CONCLUSION
After almost three decades of uncertainty around Charter damages, the Supreme Court of Canada created
a principled test for awarding a “unique public law remedy.”622 In two subsequent cases, the Court
returned this area of law to its former state of uncertainty by denying the uniquely public aspects of
Charter damages. This thesis explains the history of these developments and suggests a return to awarding
Charter damages with an emphasis on its legitimacy as a public law remedy.
In particular, I argue for a return to a faithful application of the Ward framework. Emphasizing the
‘Charter’ in Charter damages will clarify how Ward is a legitimate method of arriving at “appropriate and
just”623 results. Charter damages through the Ward framework should compensate claimants in the same
way other 24(1) remedies compensate, should vindicate the same way 24(1) remedies vindicate, and deter
the same way 24(1) remedies deter. Compensation is a valid object of the Charter, not just of damages,
and ought to apply a corrective justice function in the same way the exclusion of evidence, for example,
places the claimant in the status quo ante. Vindication and deterrence ought to uphold Charter rights and
achieve future compliance through the same means that other 24(1) remedies have done for decades. The
Charter damages remedy is a Charter remedy, and understanding its consistency with the Charter overall
provides it with the same legitimacy as other Charter remedies.
Ward mirrors the Charter approach to remedying constitutional infringements. Ward reflects a
commitment to interest-balancing through what Roach refers to as a “mini s. 1 analysis” where courts are
instructed to balance the interest of the claimant in Charter damages against the countervailing interests of
the government.624 Consider it another way: Step 2 and step 3 could easily be renamed “appropriate” and
“just.” Step 2 asks whether damages appropriately fulfil any of the three objectives of the Charter. Step 3
asks whether damages against government are justifiable. Where a court is satisfied that the claimant can
prove the appropriateness of damages and the government cannot negate its justness, damages can be
calculated against the same standard: “appropriate and just.”625 This approach to awarding damages is
precisely what makes Ward a “unique public law remedy.”626
The Court has struggled with how to apply step 3 of the Ward framework. Based on my analysis, there are
three guidelines to highlight.
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First, limit the use of step 3 policy factors to negate the damages remedy, not to redefine the test for a
Charter infringement. Like section 1, step 3 balances interests; however, unlike section 1, step 3 balances
interests in a remedy only, not in whether a breach has occurred. Limiting its application to its intended
use will produce more principled results.
Second, specify why each policy factor negates each functional purpose of damages. Consider, for
example, the facts in a case like Schachter, where statutory benefits are denied to a class by an
underinclusive statute. The government has a good argument against providing compensation since a strict
application of corrective justice will make it impossible to determine whether the claimant’s class would
have been included absent the infringing statute; however, if the claimant can prove their class was
excluded based on prejudice or harmful stereotypes, they may be entitled to damages in vindication or
deterrence. This approach is superior to applying the “general rule” from Mackin against combining
section 52(1) and 24(1) remedies.
Third, connect good governance to a good society. Arguments about chilling effects and floodgates should
only be accepted by the court of the government can prove that those phenomena are not just bad for
government but bad for society. If the policy factor raised is simply bad for the status quo operation of
government, then it should be discarded. Good governance ought to connect to the good of the governed.
On government motions against the claimant’s pleadings, step 3 need not be applied. In particular, step 3
should not be used to change the rules of the game. Where a non-Charter policy consideration is relevant,
it should certainly not be used to mutate the Ward framework. This was the result in Henry, where the
majority relied on the chilling effect and floodgates rationales to stack pleading requirements over and
above the claimant’s proof of a Charter infringement.627 In a future case, it may be that the Court will
require a fault threshold to award Charter damages. In accordance with the Ward framework, the burden
to a) raise the relevance of that threshold and b) to prove that the plaintiff has not met that threshold
should be on the defendant at trial. This is the most rational explanation for how step 3 ought to operate.
Similarly, the rule from Mackin ought to be subjected to step 3 or be discarded entirely. The Ward
framework strikes the appropriate balance to determining whether section 52(1) remedies can be
combined with section 24(1) remedies. The government is free to argue at step 3 that the alternative
remedy through 52(1) has achieved the purposes of compensation, vindication, and deterrence, and that
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therefore no 24(1) remedy need apply. In those cases, the most likely outcome will be that the 52(1)
remedy will adequately remedy all three principles unless the government’s conduct is so egregious or the
harm so obvious as to merit an add-on remedy for compensation, vindication, or deterrence.
Consider how this conclusion might affect a future case like Guimond. Striking down an unconstitutional
sentencing statute may vindicate society’s interest in enforcing the right against cruel and unusual
punishment; however, being jailed under an unconstitutional statute (even if presumptively constitutional)
is a serious affront to a person’s liberty and dignity that ought to be compensated in and of itself.
Deterrence may be unnecessary since the government should not be deterred from enforcing
presumptively constitutional statutes; however, this type of ‘claim of right’ defence should not
automatically negate all the step 2 purposes by a general application of restricting the combination of
remedies. McAllister raised several reasons to reconsider or overrule Mackin. In the post-Ward era, there
are several more.
There is no paradigmatic Charter damages case. Those that resemble private law torts, like Ward and
Henry, only happen to resemble torts. The Court can expect to hear more cases raising issues like the
suppression of political expression in Ernst, where there is no private law analog. Cases in appellate courts
since Ward have raised Charter damages claims for minority language education rights in section 23628
and cruel and unusual punishment in section 12.629 Any section of the Charter can be remedied by
damages, so long as it raises the need for compensation, vindication, or deterrence.
For this reason, there is no private law paradigm that adequately fits as a proper guide for the future
development of the Ward framework. However, based on my analysis in this thesis, there are several
conclusions to draw on how the relationship between Ward and private law principles ought to proceed.
First, since Ward is a “unique public law remedy,” a court should only supplement Ward with private law
after it has exhausted its inquiry into analogous public law principles. For example, when compensation is
at issue, a court should first ask whether the answer lies in other compensatory 24(1) remedies before
searching for answers in any area of private law. If there is no clear answer from within the Charter
remedial jurisprudence, only then should it be necessary to venture into private law. One area where this
will be common in the early years of Charter damages is in quantum determinations, where private law
amounts will have to suffice until a substantial Charter jurisprudence builds up.
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Second, where private law principles are used in Ward, the court should be clear on why this principle was
chosen to apply to the circumstances and how it fits in with the purposive approach to Charter remedies.
Identifying the source of the principle is ideal. If a claimant or defendant raises a principle from the tort of
negligence, there will be strong reasons to argue against its use. As discussed, the core purpose of the tort
of negligence is to shift loss, not to protect important rights. Intentional torts protect important rights and
may find purposive application in future Charter damages cases, but their application should never
obstruct the interest-balancing mechanisms of Ward. Overgeneralization of tort principles will inherently
be contrary to a purposive approach. When fitting a private law principle into the Ward framework, care
should be taken to describe how this principle will further the objects of compensation, vindication, and
deterrence, or will limit them through a purposive approach to being fair to government.
Third, although the calculation of quantum at step 4 will rely on private law damages awards until a
substantial Charter damages jurisprudence builds up, courts should be cautious with respect to adopting
calculations uncritically. The calculation of private law damages amounts may reflect private law policies
that would not apply in the Charter. For example, courts should be aware that the final damages amount in
negligence cases, for example, may reflect a subtraction of damages for contributory negligence – a
doctrine that should absolutely not apply in the Charter damages context. Courts should be critical of the
final numbers and make necessary adjustments relating to the purposes of compensation, vindication, and
deterrence. Since courts lack the ability to translate Charter rights infringements into precise dollar
amounts, wide discretion should be given to trial judges. Review of that discretion on appeal should, if
possible, should follow a Charter-based approach to review of 24(1) discretion. I raised the Nur test
regarding sentencing as a potential guide to determining review since, like Ward, the Nur test is concerned
with determining appropriateness and justness of numbers. A test like the one in Nur, adapted for review
on appeal, could provide much needed legitimacy to the final dollar amounts awarded by courts against
the government.
Fourth, the Court must eventually decide whether a statutory immunity, like the one in Ernst, will apply to
limiting either 24(1) remedies broadly or Charter damages specifically. I suggest it would be bad policy to
permit a statute to immunize government from any 24(1) remedy. The drafters of the Charter specifically
rejected limiting remedies to those provided for by law.630 Similarly, the Court should be careful to
provide such a substantial limitation on enforcing Charter rights that is not circumscribed by section 33.
Given the variety of statutes in purpose and construction, I suspect finding a place to draw the line will
630

See text accompanying note 41.
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result is more split decisions like Ernst. My conclusion on this point is for courts to guide their approach
by determining which statutes of ordinary application can assist the definition of “court of competent
jurisdiction” and which statutes only immunize government or otherwise frustrate the broad discretion of
24(1).
Finally, there are several points of conclusion on how direct liability of government ought to guide the
development of the Ward framework in future cases.
First, direct liability is not a policy choice by the Court. It is the textual application of section 32.631 Thus,
Courts should keep in mind that although all Charter infringements can inevitably be traced to human
error or misconduct, the aim of the Charter is to hold government accountable. The approach to awarding
Charter damages should thus focus on the government directly.
Second, direct liability should have a more important role in guiding the analysis of good governance at
step 3. In Henry, for example, the majority’s focus on the fault of individual Crown lawyers led to the
unintentional result of leaving the reputation of those lawyers in the balance of litigation to which they are
not a party. The focus should instead be on the culture, policies, and practices of the local Crown
attorney’s office and the provincial Ministry. In Ernst, the focus of the Justice Cromwell and Abella’s
opinions were too broadly focused on the entire administrative agency. The allegations pointed to the
executive branch, not the tribunal itself; yet, both opinions refused to distinguish between the two
departments based on principles drawn from negligence cases.632 The dissenting opinion would have
focused on the branch of the agency which caused the infringement. Because Charter liability implicates
Charter compliance and good government, the target of compliance ought to be singled out specifically.
This analysis may not have changed the outcome in Ernst, but it would have been a more solid foundation
for determining whether deterrence was appropriate or whether good government concerns negate the
justifications for Charter damages.
Third, direct liability of government implies that liability should depend on the government’s
shortcomings, not those of its individual agents. Fault of the individual person will rarely account for
bureaucratic, practical, and cultural failures of government. In Henry, for example, the wealth of
information about how systemic shortcoming cause wrongful convictions should have provided context to
the development of how Ward applies to Stinchcombe issues. In future cases, particularly those involving
631
632

Ward, supra note 1 at para 22.
Henry, supra note 3 at para 80, Moldaver J; Ernst, supra note 4 at para 48, Cromwell J.
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equality rights, religion, or police brutality, the Charter infringement should be connected to the broader
well-known systemic issues about stereotyping marginalized groups. It would be a tragedy if, in those
cases, government was only liable if the claimant could prove that the officer who assaulted him was a
racist; or conversely, that the government could avoid liability by arguing that the officer’s racism should
negate Charter damages in favour of tort liability only.
After 36 years of the Charter and three Supreme Court of Canada decisions, Charter damages remain in
their infancy. As more appellate decisions define the parameters and purposes of Charter damages, it will
be interesting to see whether Ward will retain its distinctly constitutional features or devolve into a hybrid
of constitutional torts. If the minority opinions in Henry and Ernst prevail, there is some hope for the
Ward framework to grow into a “unique public law remedy.”633

633

Ward, supra note 1 at para 31.
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